| 摘要 | The Issue
Iran is engaged in a soft war, or jang-e narm, with the United States. Iran uses formal and informal means to influence populations across the globe and has expanded its information campaign utilizing the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, cultural centers, universities, and charitable foundations. But Iran’s authoritarian political system and attempts to control access to information make it vulnerable to a U.S. and Western information campaign. Iran’s weaknesses suggest that a major component of U.S. competition with Tehran should be ideological.
jang-e narm,
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The United States’ greatest strengths— its support of democratic principles, open markets, and free press—are Iran’s most significant weaknesses.
jang-enarm
bonyads
Soft Power and Soft War
attraction
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sangarha-ye farhangi
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Iranian leaders have regularly remarked that they are engaged in soft war, or jang-e narm, with the West—especially the United States.
The Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting
Seda va Sima-ye Jomhuri-ye Eslami-e Iran
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Figure 1: Logo of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting
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Figure 2: External Branches of the IRIB
Source: CSIS Transnational Threat Project
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Al-Alam, or “The World,” was Iran’s first 24-hour foreign language news channel, which launched in March 2003 to coincide with the U.S. invasion of Iraq.20 Al-Alam views itself as a competitor to the Qatari-funded Al Jazeera and Saudi-backed Al Arabiya, and broadcasts terrestrially and by satellite across the Arab world.21
Sahar TV is a religious channel for non-Persian speakers, which began broadcasting in 1997 and aims to both export the Iranian revolution abroad and support Islamic education.22 In 2010, Sahar TV split into two separate satellite channels: Sahar 1, which broadcasts 20 hours per day in Azeri, French, and Bosnian; and Sahar 2, which broadcasts 24 hours per day in Kurdish, English, and Urdu.23
Al-Kawthar, or “Fount of Abundance,” is a 24-hour religious channel which split off from Sahar TV in 2006.24 It broadcasts in Arabic with the aim of raising “human values in harmony with the Holy Quran and Sunnah” and supporting the “resistance” against “global arrogance.”25 In recent years, Al-Kawthar has expanded beyond religious and cultural programming and now includes four news bulletins per day.27
Press TV is IRIB’s 24-hour English-language news channel, launched in July 2007, which aims to offer a different perspective to mainstream Western news outlets like CNN and the BBC.28 Press TV is frequently critical of the United States and other Western countries.28 Press TV has international studios in Beirut, Damascus, Washington, and London, and it transmits across the world through satellites and live-streaming from its website.29
HispanTV, IRIB’s Spanish-language news channel, launched in December 2011.30
iFilm TV, IRIB’s Arabic-language entertainment channel, was introduced in September 2010. It broadcasts Iranian films and television shows dubbed into both Arabic and English.31
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Figure 3: External Channels for Iranians Living Abroad
Source: CSIS Transnational Threat Project
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Figure 4: IRIB Social Media Reach
Data compiled by the CSIS Transnational Threats Project. Current as of April 16, 2019.
Figure 5: Social Media Reach: IRIB vs. Competitors
Data compiled by the CSIS Transnational Threats Project. Current as of April 16, 2019.
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The Islamic Culture and Relations Organization
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Figure 6: Map of Official ICRO Offices Overseas
Source: Data compiled by the Transnational Threats Project.
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The Ahl al-Bait World Assembly, which oversees relations with global Shia populations;
The World Forum for Proximity of Islamic Schools of Thought, which oversees relations with non-Shia Muslims;
The Islamic Development Organization (IDO), which publishes religious and other material and sends missionaries abroad;
The Qom Seminary Office of Islamic Propaganda, which also sends missionaries and clerics abroad; and
The Center for Interreligious Dialogue and Civilization (CID), which engages in dialogue with religious figures and institutions inside and outside Iran.48
Figure 7: ICRO Organization Chart
Source: “Meet the Organization,” Islamic Culture and Relations Organization, http://www.icro.ir/index.aspx?fkeyid=&siteid=261&pageid=32272. Translation by CSIS.
Iranian International Universities
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Figure 8: Map of Al-Mustafa International University Locations
Source: Data compiled by the Transnational Threats Project.
Charitable Foundations
Islamic charitable foundations, or bonyads, have also been an important instrument of Iranian soft power. Some foundations existed prior to the 1979 revolution, including in the form of waqfs (or religious endowments). They provided humanitarian aid to the poor and other populations in need, though they also served as slush funds for some elites.54 After the 1979 revolution, there was a major increase in the scale and scope of bonyads. The supreme leader appoints the directors of the bonyads.
They are ostensibly non-profit organizations that provide social and public services, and they are legally exempt from taxation and some government regulations. Yet many also engage in commercial and financial activities like banking, trade, and manufacturing.55 Overall, the bonyads remain a cornerstone of clerical power, accounting for an estimated 10 to 20 percent of Iran’s gross domestic product.56
Among the first bonyads established after the revolution was the Bonyad-e Shahid (or Martyrs’ Foundation), which provides aid to the surviving relatives of dead or wounded soldiers. Now known as the Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans, it gives specialized services such as in-kind transfers, educational support, and housing services to widows, orphans, and victims of Iranian wars.57 The Bonyad-e Mostazafan va Janbazan (or Oppressed and Disabled Foundation) provides assistance to disabled individuals but also owns hotels, a shipping line, petrochemical companies, and a substantial amount of real estate.58 In addition, the Komiteh-ye Emdad-e Imam (or Imam Khomeini Relief Committee) collects donations and distributes funding for welfare, cultural, and educational purposes in countries like Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Tajikistan.59 In culture and the arts, the Farabi Cinema Foundation promotes cinema and is a powerful vehicle for disseminating Islamic ideology. Similarly, the Astan-e Quds-e Razavi bonyad in Mashhad, Iran oversees the Imam Reza shrine and other institutions that belong to the organization. Astan-e Quds-e Razavi includes several libraries and museums, and it publishes Islamic materials in English, Arabic, Persian, Urdu, and Turkish.60
Weaknesses and Opportunities
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Limited Credibility: Iran’s top-down approach and authoritarian system undermine the credibility and attractiveness of its message and have fueled corruption.61 Iranian programming is dominated by official statements, weakening its objectivity.62 In addition, the bonyads have been accused of substantial waste, inefficiency, mismanagement, and corruption. Bonyad companies compete with Iran’s private sector, though they have a significant advantage over private businesses because of their better political connections and favorable access to capital and tax exemptions.63 All of these weaknesses make Iran vulnerable to a U.S. and Western information campaign that highlights problems to populations in Iran and abroad.
Countering Iranian Information Operations: Iran’s overcentralization has also made targeting and removing its internet-based content possible for social media companies. Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and other companies and platforms have removed hundreds of fake accounts and pages linked to IRIB that used anti-Saudi, anti-Israeli, and anti-U.S. narratives as part of a global influence campaign64 In May 2019, for example, FireEye released a report exposing an Iranian information campaign that involved social media accounts posing as Americans even going so far as publishing opinion letters in American news outlets under the same fake personas.65 Meanwhile, in 2018, Google took down IRIBlinked channels on YouTube and accounts on Google Plus and Blogger that engaged in phishing and hacking attempts, conducted influence operations, and engaged in digital attacks against political campaigns. Google analysts identified technical data linked to the official IRIB IP address space, domain ownership linked to IRIB account information, and account metadata and subscriber information associated with the IRIB.66
Iran’s top-down approach and authoritarian system undermine the credibility and attractiveness of its message and have fueled corruption.
Negative Views in Much of the Muslim World: Negative views of Iran have increased or remained low in much of the Middle East and North Africa, according to polling data.67 For example, one poll concluded that Iran (along with the United States) is the most unpopular government in the Middle East, among a list that also included Russia, China, the European Union, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia.68 Outside of the Middle East and North Africa, some polling indicates that views of Iran have declined or remained low in North America, Europe, Asia, and Latin America—including Muslim-majority countries like Malaysia and Indonesia.69
One notable exception is Lebanon, where a sizable chunk of the population remains sympathetic to Iran and where Lebanese Hezbollah remains part of the government. Another is Iraq, where there is a majority Shia population and substantial Iranian influence. Still, between 2015 and 2018, Iraqi Shia with favorable opinions towards Iran dropped by over 30 percentage points. Meanwhile, Iraqi Shia who believe that Iran is a threat to Iraqi sovereignty jumped from 25 percent to 58 percent.70
This decline in Iraqi public opinion may be partially attributable to Najaf's Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, whose "quietist" school of Iraqi Shiism shuns direct clerical participation in politics. Sistani’s stance is an implicit rebuke of Islamic Republic founder Ayatollah Khomeini’s doctrine of velayat-e faqih (the Islamic system of clerical rule).71 Increasing popular disillusionment may also be due to Iran's relationship with the controversial Popular Mobilization Forces, its negative influence on the Iraqi economy, and its role in water shortages in Basra and southern Iraq. These fissures create opportunities for the United States and its partners—including Gulf countries—to continue to engage with Iraq’s Shia communities. Riyadh, for example, has established a political and economic relationship with Muqtada al-Sadr, an Iraqi politician and Shia militia leader. There may be opportunities for Iraq to work with Gulf countries like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to further develop economic ties—including rail, road, and electricity links—with southern Iraqi cities like Basra72
Successes of U.S. and Western Soft Power:
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Iran’s vulnerabilities suggest that a major component of U.S. competition with Iran should be ideological.
The United States and other government partners, news outlets, and even the private sector should increase their coverage of the Iranian regime’s political and economic challenges, augment their coverage of protests (including the causes), and even aid protesters. The U.S. State Department's Internet freedom program—which seeks to counter the efforts of authoritarian regimes like Iran to censor, monitor, and control the Internet—has had some successes in helping individuals bypass firewalls by using tools and software like Tor. 79 The U.S. government also needs to increase its funding to public diplomacy and other information efforts, just as it did during the Cold War. In the 1980s, the United States drastically increased its resources for information campaigns. The budget for Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty more than doubled from $82 million in 1981 to $170 million in 1988. The U.S. Information Agency’s budget nearly doubled from $458 million 1981 to $820 million in 1988. And the U.S. government’s entire public diplomacy budget nearly doubled from 1981 to 1988.80 The best offense against Iran and its authoritarian regime may not be just using military, financial, or diplomatic instruments—but soft power.
Seth G. Jones is the Harold Brown Chair and director of the Transnational Threats Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He is the author, most recently, of “A Covert Action: Reagan, the CIA, and the Cold War Struggle in Poland” (W.W. Norton). Danika Newlee is the program manager and research associate for the Transnational Threats Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
The authors give special thanks to Ali Nader, Brian Katz, and Jon Alterman for their review of the document and constructive comments, as well as Jacob Ware and Nicholas Harrington for their assistance in collecting and analyzing data.
CSIS Briefs are produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). © 2019 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
1See, for example, Ayatollah Khamenei, “The U.S. Opposes Anything that Will Make Iran Powerful,” October 4, 2018, http://english.khamenei.ir/ news/5991/The-U-S-opposes-anything-that-will-make-Iran-powerful. 2“Iran Adopts Aggressive Approach Toward Enemies,” Tehran Times, July 18, 2011, https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/244231/Iran-adopts-aggres- sive-approach-toward-enemies. 3On “soft power” see Joseph S. Nye Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1991); Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2005); Nye, The Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2011). 4Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616 (March 2008): 94-109. 5Amin Saikal, Iran Rising: The Survival and Future of the Islamic Republic (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019), 3. 6Saikal, Iran Rising, 156. 7Monroe Price, “Iran and the Soft War,” International Journal of Communi- cations 6 (2012): 2397-2415; Saikal, Iran Rising, 157-158. 8Edward Wastnidge, “The Modalities of Iranian Soft Power: From Cultural Diplomacy to Soft War,” Politics 35, nos. 3-4 (2015): 364-377. 9See, for example, Ayatollah Khamenei, “The U.S. Opposes Anything that Will Make Iran Powerful,” October 4, 2018, http://english.khamenei.ir/ news/5991/The-U-S-opposes-anything-that-will-make-Iran-powerful. 10Babak Rahimi, “Censorship and the Islamic Republic: Two Modes of Regulatory Measures for Media in Iran,” The Middle East Journal 69, no. 3 (Summer 2015): 375. 11“About Us,” Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, en.iribnews.ir/en/ebout. 12“Structure of Iran's State-Run TV IRIB,” Open Source Center, December 16, 2009, https://fas.org/irp/dni/osc/iran-tv.pdf. 13“About Us,” Islamic Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting. 14Alberto Zanconato and Farian Sabahi, “Iran-Media Landscape,” European Journalism Centre, 2019, https://medialandscapes.org/country/iran. 15“Structure of Iran's State-Run TV IRIB,” Open Source Center. 16BBC Monitoring, Media Environment Guide: Iran 2012 (Caversham: BBC, 2012). 17Wastnidge, “The Modalities of Iranian Soft Power.” 18Zanconato and Sabahi, “Iran-Media Landscape.” 19U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Targets Human Rights Abuses, Censorship, and Enhanced Monitoring by the Iranian Government,” Press Release, May 30, 2018, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releas- es/sm0397. 20 “About Us,” Al-Alam News Network, Al-Alam News Network, https:// en.alalam.ir/aboutus. 21Sarah Alaoui, Tired Narratives, Weary Publics: Public Diplomacy’s Role in the Struggle for Influence in the Middle East (Washington, DC: Center for Ameri- can Progress, October 2018). 22BBC Monitoring, Media Environment Guide: Iran 2012. 23“About Us,” Al Kawthar, Al Kawthar, www.alkawthartv.com/aboutus. 24“About Us,” Al Kawthar. 25“About Us,” Sahar TV, Sahar TV, http://urdu.sahartv.ir/about_us. 26BBC Monitoring, Media Environment Guide: Iran 2012. 27Wastnidge, “The Modalities of Iranian Soft Power.” 28Press TV, “About PressTV,” www.presstv.com/Detail/2014/12/31/390988/About-PressTV. 29BBC Monitoring, Media Environment Guide: Iran 2012. 30BBC Monitoring, Media Environment Guide: Iran 2012. 31See iFilm TV, www.ifilmtv.com. 32BBC Monitoring, Media Environment Guide: Iran 2012. 33“About Us,” Jam-E Jam TV Network, www.jjtvn.ir/fa/about. 34“Supreme Leader Unveils Enemy’s Conspiracy to Topple Governing System,” Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), October 12, 2015. 35See, for example, BBC Monitoring, Media Environment Guide: Iran 2012; and “Structure of Iran's State-Run TV IRIB,” Open Source Center, December 16, 2009. 36Islamic Republic of Iran Plan and Budget Organization, Budget Bill 1396: Single Article and Macroeconomic Tables of the Budget Resources and Outlays (Tehran: State Plan and Budget Organization, 2016). 37Data from CSIS Transnational Threats Project, April 2019. 38“Suspected Iranian Influence Operation Leverages Network of Inau- thentic News Sites & Social Media Targeting Audiences in U.S., UK, Latin America, Middle East,” FireEye, August 21, 2018, https://www.fireeye.com/ blog/threat-research/2018/08/suspected-iranian-influence-operation.html 39Alic Revelli and Lee Foster, “Network of Social Media Accounts Imper- sonates U.S. Political Candidates, Leverages U.S. and Israeli Media in Sup- port of Iranian Interests,” FireEye, May 28, 2019, https://www.fireeye.com/ blog/threat-research/2019/05/social-media-network-impersonates-us-po- litical-candidates-supports-iranian-interests.html. 40Nadia van Maltzahn, “Iran’s Cultural Diplomacy,” in H. E. Chehabi, Farhad Khosrokhavar, and Clement Therme, eds., Iran and the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century: Essays in Honour of Mohammad-Reza Djalili (Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 2013), 205–221. 41Saikal, Iran Rising, 161. 42Alaoui, Tired Narratives, Weary Publics; Wastnidge, “The Modalities of Iranian Soft Power,” 364-377. 43Wastnidge, “The Modalities of Iranian Soft Power,” 371; Von Maltzahn, “Iran’s Cultural Diplomacy,” 221. 44Wastnidge, “The Modalities of Iranian Soft Power,” 371. 45Data from CSIS Transnational Threats Project. 46Judith Bergman, “Iran in the US Backyard,” Gatestone Institute, May 8, 2018, https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/12268/iran-latin-america 47See Department of Justice comments on Mohsen Rabbani in “Kareem Ibrahim Sentenced to Life in Prison for Conspiring to Commit Terrorist Attack at JFK Airport,” United States Attorneys Office, Eastern District of New York, January 13, 2012, https://www.justice.gov/archive/usao/nye/ pr/2012/2012jan13.html. 48Hassan Dai, “Middle Eastern Interventions in Africa: Tehran's Extensive Soft Power,” Middle East Forum, Fall 2018, https://www.meforum.org/7254/ middle-eastern-interventions-in-africa-tehran. 49Abdolmoghset Banikamal and Wahabuddin Ra’ees, “Iran’s Educational Diplomacy in the Muslim World: Activities of Al-Mustafa International University in Malaysia and Afghanistan,” Insight Turkey 20, no. 1 (2018). 50Banikamal and Ra’ees, “Iran’s Educational Diplomacy in the Muslim World.” 51Banikamal and Ra’ees, “Iran’s Educational Diplomacy in the Muslim World.” 52“About Us,” Al-Mustafa International University, 2017, en.miu. ac.ir/#aboutus. 53“Al-Mustafa Opens 360 Qur’anic Centers Abroad,” Financial Tribune, November 21, 2014, https://financialtribune.com/articles/art-and-cul- ture/5121/al-mustafa-opens-360-qur-anic-centers-abroad#. 54Ali A. Saeidi, “The Accountability of Para-Governmental Organizations (Bonyads): The Case of Iranian Foundations,” Iranian Studies 37, no. 3 (Sep- tember 2004): 479-498; Abbas William Samii, “The Iranian Nuclear Issue and Informal Networks,” Naval War College Review 59, no. 1 (Winter 2006): 1-27; David E. Thaler et al., Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads: An Exploration of Iranian Leadership Dynamics (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010), 57. 55Saikal, Iran Rising, 72-73. 56Thomas Erdbrink, David D. Kirkpatrick, and Nilo Tabrizy, “How Cor- ruption and Cronyism in Banking Fueled Iran’s Protests,” New York Times, January 20, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/20/world/middleeast/ iran-protests-corruption-banks.html; Thaler, Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads, 158; Samii, “The Iranian Nuclear Issue and Informal Networks,” 5. 57Saeidi, “The Accountability of Para-Governmental Organizations (Bon- yads),” 479-498. 58Samii, “The Iranian Nuclear Issue and Informal Networks,” 5. 59Saikal, Iran Rising, 160. 60Saikal, Iran Rising, 161. 61Saikal, Iran Rising, 165. 62Mahmoud Reza Golshan-Pezhou, “Lozoom beh Rokh Keshi-ye Gho- drat-e Narm-e Iran [Need for Boosting Iran’s Soft Power],” IR Diplomacy, March 30, 2012, http://www.irdiplomacy.ir/fa/page/1899414. 63See, for example, Erdbrink, “How Corruption and Cronyism in Banking Fueled Iran’s Protests.” 64Alaoui, Tired Narratives, Weary Publics. 65Revelli and Foster, “Network of Social Media Accounts Impersonates U.S. Political Candidates, Leverages U.S. and Israeli Media in Support of Iranian Interests.” 66Kent Walker, “An Update on State-Sponsored Activity,” Google, August 23, 2018, https://blog.google/technology/safety-security/update-state-spon- sored-activity/; Suspected Iranian Influence Operation: Leveraging Inauthentic News Sites and Social Media Aimed at U.S., U.K., Other Audiences (Milpitas, CA: FireEye, 2018), https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/cur- rent-threats/pdfs/rpt-FireEye-Iranian-IO.pdf. 67Janell Getterolf and Jacob Poushter, Key Middle East Publics See Russia, Turkey and U.S. All Playing Larger Roles in Region (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, December 11, 2017); Hani Zainulbhai and Richard Wike, Iran’s Global Image Mostly Negative (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, June 18, 2015); James Zogby, “The Arab and Iranian Disconnect,” Huffington Post, January 29, 2015, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/the-arab-and-ira- nian-disconnect_b_6240264; James Zogby et al., Middle East Public Opinion (Washington, DC: Zogby Research Services, 2018). 68Zogby, Middle East Public Opinion. 69Hani Zainulbhai and Richard Wike, Iran’s Global Image Mostly Negative (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, June 18, 2015). 70Munqith al-Dagher, “Iran’s Influence in Iraq Is declining,” IIACSS, November 16, 2018, https://iiacss.org/irans-influence-in-iraq-is-declining- heres-why/. 71Linda Robinson, et. al., Modern Political Warfare: Current Practices and Possible Responses (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2018), 125-170. 72For media reports on possible commercial links between southern Iraq and Gulf States, see Evan Langenhahn, “For Saudi Arabia, an Electric Oppor- tunity in Iraq,” War on the Rocks, August 30, 2018, https://warontherocks. com/2018/08/for-saudi-arabia-an-electric-opportunity-in-iraq/; “Saudi Arabia’s Use of Soft Power in Iraq Is Making Iran Nervous,” Economist, March 8, 2018, https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2018/03/08/ saudi-arabias-use-of-soft-power-in-iraq-is-making-iran-nervous; Erika Solomon, “Sunni Saudi Arabia Courts an Ally in Iraq’s Shia,” Financial Times, April 1, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/b4cb47b4-2d1c-11e8-9b4b- bc4b9f08f381. 73Ayatollah Khamenei, “Speech on 27th Demise Anniversary of Imam Khomeini,” June 3, 2016, http://english.khamenei.ir/news/3891/Ayatollah- Khamenei-s-Speech-on-27th-Demise-Anniversary-of-Imam. 74Ayatollah Khamenei, “The Enemy Uses the Media to Wage Econom- ic War against Iran,” September 6, 2018, http://english.khamenei.ir/ news/5932/The-enemy-uses-the-media-to-wage-economic-war-against- Iran. 75Suddaf Chaudry, “Are Iranian Satellite Channels Aiding Regime Change?” The Arab Weekly, February 18, 2018, https://thearabweekly.com/ are-iranian-satellite-channels-aiding-regime-change. 76BBC Monitoring, Media Environment Guide: Iran 2012. 77Chaudry, “Are Iranian Satellite Channels Aiding Regime Change?” 78See, for example, Mike Saidi, More Protests, No Progress: The 2018 Iran Pro- tests (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, December 2018). 79Ryan Henry, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, and Erin York, Portfolio Assessment of the Department of State Internet Freedom Program (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2014). 80United States General Accounting Office, U.S. Information Agency: Op- tions for Addressing Possible Budget Reductions (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1996), 18-19. |
