| 来源类型 | Research Reports |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| A strategy for deterring Russian de-escalation strikes | |
| Matthew Kroenig | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-04-24 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 概述 | The United States and its NATO allies have not developed a clear strategy for deterring limited Russian nuclear strikes. Specifically, in the event of a limited Russian nuclear attack, how would the United States and its NATO allies respond? |
| 摘要 | In recent years, Western analysts have become aware of the possibility that Russia may conduct limited nuclear “de-escalation” strikes in a bid to escalate its way out of failed conventional aggression. The United States and its NATO allies, however, have not developed a clear strategy for deterring limited Russian nuclear strikes. Specifically, in the event of a limited Russian nuclear attack, how would the United States and its NATO allies respond? $As part of this conversation, in his latest report Dr. Matthew Kroenig addresses the challenge of Russian nuclear de-escalatory strikes and provides recommendations for a clearer US and NATO nuclear deterrence strategy toward Russia. |
| 主题 | Defense Policy ; Europe & Eurasia ; National Security ; NATO ; Nuclear Deterrence ; Russia ; Security & Defense ; United States and Canada ; China ; Defense Policy |
| URL | https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/a-strategy-for-deterring-russian-de-escalation-strikes/ |
| 来源智库 | Atlantic Council (United States) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/345672 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Matthew Kroenig. A strategy for deterring Russian de-escalation strikes. 2018. |
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