| 来源类型 | Research Reports |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| The Untapped Potential of the US-Colombia Partnership | |
| the Atlantic Council’s US-Colombia Task Force | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-09-26 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 概述 | Creating a Modernized Plan for the Bilateral Relationship |
| 摘要 | The United States and Latin America are at a historic moment. As members of the United States Senate, we believe in working closely with our partners to overcome the most difficult political and economic hurdles of our time. In Latin America, the United States has many such strong allies, with Colombia top among them. $For decades, the United States and Colombia have built a solid partnership based on mutual respect, cooperation, and common goals. This alliance has safeguarded the economic, security, and geopolitical interests of our nation, while also advancing Colombia’s path to increased stability, prosperity, and regional leadership. With Colombia’s transformations, the United States stands to reap the benefits of this vital relationship and further work with Colombia to help solve hemispheric challenges.$We must build upon our bilateral successes to ensure sustainable prosperity in the years to come. Colombia faces strong headwinds that require renewed US attention: ensuring the effective implementation of the Colombian peace accords, securing resources to continue providing assistance for Venezuelan migrants and refugees, and mitigating ongoing security threats. By further investing in the US-Colombia relationship, the United States and the US Congress can provide new momentum for the hemisphere.$This report lays out a modernized plan for the bilateral relationship. It builds on the successes of Plan Colombia and provides a roadmap for continued, strengthened, and transformative USColombia engagement. The report follows the work of the Atlantic Council’s US-Colombia Task Force, a group of current and former policymakers, including colleagues in the House of Representatives, business executives, and civil society leaders from both Colombia and the United States. As co-chairs of the Task Force, we are confident the recommendations outlined in the following pages will help advance US interests, contribute to peace and prosperity in Colombia, and promote regional stability.$This is a moment of great promise for the US-Colombia relationship. A more peaceful and prosperous Colombia not only translates to a more secure United States, but also to a more stable Western Hemisphere. We hope the work of this Task Force will help underscore the importance of a deepened and modernized US-Colombia alliance and set the stage for a new era of successful bilateral collaboration.$The multisectoral, bipartisan, bicameral, and bilateral nature of the task force allowed us to develop concrete, fresh, and actionable proposals that will help guide US and Colombian policymakers going forward. We identified three major areas of engagement: economic development and innovation; rule of law, institutional control, counternarcotics; and joint regional leadership. A strengthened US-Colombia partnership along these pillars will pay dividends on US investments far beyond our national borders.$Senator Roy Blunt (R-MO) Task Force Co-Chair$Senator Ben Cardin (D-MD) Task Force Co-Chair$Executive summary$Return to table of contents$Colombia is one of the United States’s closest allies in the Western Hemisphere. For decades, both nations consolidated a mutually beneficial partnership that successfully safeguarded US and Colombian national security interests. Today, with increased interconnectedness, both nations’ security, economic, and geopolitical interests are more intertwined than ever before.$Colombia’s transition into a more peaceful and prosperous democracy makes it imperative that the United States and Colombia seize this moment to expand and deepen the partnership. The findings presented in the following pages require urgent attention. Although Colombia is a different country than it was two decades ago, new challenges with peace accord implementation and Colombia’s role as the top receiving country of Venezuelan migrants and refugees make finding new ways to work together crucial — Colombia’s success is the United States’ success.$This report provides a blueprint for a modernized US-Colombia strategic partnership. It is the product of a nonpartisan, bicameral, multisector, and bicountry task force launched in March 2019 by the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center. Composed of high-level business executives, current and former policymakers, and civil society leaders from Colombia and the United States, the task force offers concrete, actionable, and fresh proposals on how to strengthen the bilateral relationship. The ideas are intended to provide guidance to both the Colombian and US administrations, the US Congress, and the respective business communities on opportunities to maximize the full potential of the US-Colombia relationship. Task force recommendations are divided into three categories: sustainable economic development; rule of law, rural development, and counternarcotics efforts; and joint leadership around the Venezuela regional crisis.$Tapping the full potential of the US-Colombia partnership must include the promotion of economic development. A healthy Colombian economy directly serves US national security interests as it contributes to rural development, which is critical to undermine the drug trade and other illicit economic activities as well as illegal armed actors. Fully implementing all aspects of the US-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (TPA) and endorsing the double taxation agreement will lead to deepened bilateral trade and investment.$The task force identified Colombia’s taxation system and high levels of informality as two major barriers to economic development. The partnership can include collaboration to modernize Colombia’s taxation agency and reduce informality. Further digitalizing Colombia’s economy, simplifying processes for firm creation and closure, improving access to credit and other business services, setting corporate taxes at levels similar to those of other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, and making labor regulations more flexible, will all help to incentivize the formal (or licit) economy and undermine informality. Advances in innovation, science, technology, and education are also crucial to achieve the economic development needed to combat illegal armed groups and reduce coca production and cocaine trafficking.$Advancing shared US and Colombian security interests requires the stabilization of territories where coca crops are cultivated, illicit armed actors operate, and local populations face high levels of violence and poverty. Critical to regaining control of rural areas is implementation of the Peace Agreement with the FARC. The task force recognizes the need for a long-term, adequately resourced intervention strategy that includes security, justice, formalization of land property rights, education, public goods provision, and economic opportunities in priority areas to dismantle organized armed groups, eradicate rising coca crops, and fight drug trafficking. If a successful, multidimensional intervention plan is implemented in ten municipalities, the US-Colombia partnership will disrupt the conditions that favor illegality in territories responsible for almost half the entire national coca production. Colombia and the United States should promote partnerships between both countries’ private sector and civil society to develop market-driven, large-scale and holistic rural development projects in coordination with the Colombian government.$Safeguarding US and Colombian security interests also requires enhancing rural connectivity in Colombia, addressing the world drug problem, and protecting Colombian social leaders and human rights defenders. Rural infrastructure stands as a prerequisite to rural economic growth and the success of crop substitution programs. Unless farmers can get their legal products to market, no eradication effort will prove sustainable in the long run. Colombia and the United States can work together to replicate successful projects involving local populations in the building and maintenance of secondary and tertiary roads, with the long-term goal of creating capacity for future infrastructure projects in the locality. To address the world drug problem in an integral way, the US-Colombia partnership should not only aim to reduce coca crops in the short run but also continue to target other stages of the drug market, including cocaine production, trafficking, and consumption.$The United States and Colombia share a firm commitment to human rights and should therefore continue to collaborate to end the rising levels of violence against social leaders and human rights defenders in Colombia. The United States can support Colombia’s current efforts by providing financial assistance for President Duque’s Timely Action Plan on Prevention and Protection for Human Rights Defenders, Social Leaders, and Journalists (PAO). Colombia, in turn, should develop a progress report for the PAO with clear follow-up mechanisms that involves civil society organizations in the process.$The political, economic, and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela is a threat to regional stability. Colombia has demonstrated commendable solidarity in receiving over 1.4 million Venezuelan migrants and refugees – a number that will continue to grow in the coming months and years. The United States should increase its financial, diplomatic, and technical support to Colombia as it plays a leadership role in addressing the crisis. If current international support does not increase, Colombia runs the risk of spiraling into economic stagnation, violence, criminality, illicit economies, and decayed governance. This will not only harm US national security and geopolitical interests but will lead to major economic losses to previous and current US investment in Colombia. The United States can further support its ally by enhancing the Colombian government’s capacity to gather and process data on Venezuelan migrants and refugees entering the country and by contributing to border control through monitoring technologies. The US-Colombia partnership can also create a task force to calculate the fiscal impact of the crisis to Colombia to understand the exact level of funding that will be required to absorb the growing number of Venezuelans. In addition, the partnership can support the efforts of the Venezuelan interim government by convening a group of experts on stabilization of territories and transitions to democracy that can provide it with intelligence cooperation and guidance on the promotion of rule of law and strengthening of national institutions.$The US-Colombia partnership is one of the greatest US foreign policy successes over the last two decades. Dedicated, sustained, bipartisan commitment to achieving common goals, once thought to be out of reach, was possible due to US congressional leadership and a commitment to work across US administrations. At the same time, successive Colombian governments showed themselves to be critical partners for the United States—both in-country and beyond its borders. But we cannot rest on our laurels. New domestic and regional paradigms make this moment imperative to define how our relationship can and should be taken to the next level. $Return to table of contents$Return to table of contents$Colombia is one of the United States’ strongest, most reliable allies in the Western Hemisphere. It collaborates with the United States in fighting international drug trafficking and transnational organized crime, as well as in promoting democracy, rule of law, and economic prosperity in the region. At the United Nations (UN), among other things, Colombia supports US diplomatic efforts on priorities such as North Korea, Syria, Iran, and Ukraine. It also contributes security expertise in Central America, Afghanistan, and a number of countries in Africa. Colombia is NATO’s only global partner in Latin America, one of the two Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member countries in South America, and a regional leader in facing the crisis in Venezuela. Here, its generous response to the massive influx of Venezuelan migrants and refugees should be viewed as a model for countries around the world.$With the US-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (TPA), the opportunities for mutually beneficial trade are enormous. The United States is Colombia’s largest trading partner and Colombia is the United States’ third-largest export market in Latin America behind Mexico and Brazil.1Embassy of Colombia, “Colombia and the United States: A Successful Trade Alliance,” https://www.colombiaemb.org/TradeAlliance. Today, with increasing hemispheric challenges, the US-Colombia strategic partnership is more important than ever. By continuing to invest in the already strong bilateral relationship, both countries stand to benefit in the short, medium, and long term.$Colombia is pivotal in addressing Venezuela’s unprecedented political and economic crisis, which has led to the largest mass migration in Latin American history. With 1.4 million Venezuelan migrants in its territory as of June 2019, Colombia is the primary destination for Venezuelans.2“Venezolanos en Colombia,” Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores – Gobierno de Colombia, August 1, 2019, http://migracioncolombia.gov.co/index.php/es/prensa/infografias/infografias-2019/12565-infografia-venezolanos-en-colombia. President Iván Duque has adopted a policy of complete solidarity toward Venezuelan migrants,3El Consejo Nacional de Política Económica y Social (CONPES), “Estrategia Para La Atención de la Migración desde Venezuela,” November 23, 2018, https://colaboracion.dnp.gov.co/CDT/Conpes/Económicos/3950.pdf. providing medical care, housing and public education, among other services. According to the World Bank, the estimated economic cost for Colombia in 2018, not including infrastructure and facilities, reached 0.4 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), or the equivalent of $1.5 billion.4The World Bank, “US$31.5 Million to Help Improve Services for Migrants from Venezuela and Host Communities in Colombia,” April 12, 2019, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2019/04/12/us315-million-to-help-improve-services-for-migrants-from-venezuela-and-host-communities-in-colombia.$Colombia has also sought to confront increased illegal activity in Venezuela, including illegal mining, the arms and drug trade, and human trafficking, as well as the smuggling of goods and money laundering. Here, a contradiction exists around the role of China. At the same time that China is increasing its economic ties with Latin America—and while Colombia’s exports to China increased 83 percent in 2018 compared with 2017—it continues to support the Maduro regime, helping to maintain a criminal enterprise in Venezuela that directly threatens Colombia’s interests. As the presence of guerrilla groups, drug cartels, and other transnational criminal organizations in Venezuela5“ELN in Venezuela,” InSight Crime, March 11, 2019, https://www.insightcrime.org/venezuela-organized-crime-news/eln-in-venezuela/. creates new security challenges for the region, Colombia’s role in maintaining regional stability becomes more vital than ever. Eventual reconstruction efforts in Venezuela will also require enormous Colombian support. $In addition to its partnership with the United States in the region, Colombia plays a unique role in tackling the world drug problem, as also stated in the Global Call to Action by President Donald Trump at the 2018 United Nations General Assembly. Colombia has the most to lose if the fight against drugs is unsuccessful, and it has thus advanced a full-on strategy to disrupt the cocaine trade. The United States has been a crucial ally in this quest. Since Plan Colombia was announced in 1999, the United States has provided more than $11 billion6Congressional Research Service, “Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations,” February 8, 2019, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43813.pdf. to aid the Colombian government in strengthening state capacity and institutions, decreasing coca crops, and fighting the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and other illegal groups that profited from drug trafficking. Colombia has contributed more than 95 percent of the total investment in Plan Colombia.7Dirección de Justicia, Seguridad y Gobierno (DJSG) and Dirección de Seguimiento y Evaluación de Políticas Públicas (DSEPP), “Plan Colombia: Balance de los 15 años,” Departamento Nacional de Planeación – Government of Colombia, 2016, https://sinergia.dnp.gov.co/Documentospercent20depercent20Interes/PLAN_COLOMBIA_Boletin_180216.pdf. $Between 2001 and 2016, the country destroyed 37,504 illegal laboratories, seized an average of 181,201 kilograms of cocaine each year, and reduced the area containing coca crops by half in the first six years.8United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), “Colombia – Monitoreo de territorios afectados por cultivos ilícitos 2016,” July 2017, https://www.unodc.org/documents/colombia/2017/julio/CENSO_2017_WEB_baja.pdf. Colombia has also made enormous sacrifices in terms of lives lost: between 2009 and 2018, 126 members of the state security forces as well as civilians died in eradication missions and 664 were wounded.9Juan Carlos Garzón Vergara, Juan David Gelvez F., and Ángela María Silva Aparicio, “Los costos humanos de la erradicación forzada ¿es el glifosato la solución?,” Fundación Ideas Para la Paz, March 7, 2019, http://www.ideaspaz.org/publications/posts/1734. Overall, during the first fifteen years of Plan Colombia, about six million people—including members of the state forces, combatants of illegal groups, and, mostly, civilians—were victims of a violent event such as forced displacement, homicide, or kidnapping.10Red Nacional de Información, “Inicio,” Unidad Victimas – Government of Colombia, August 1, 2019, https://cifras.unidadvictimas.gov.co/. By 2017, and after decades of enormous efforts, successive governments in Colombia had advanced in dismantling the most significant drug cartels, reached agreements to demobilize several paramilitary forces, and started the implementation of the Peace Accords with the FARC. In 2017, the country achieved the lowest homicide rate in its past forty-two years.11“Homicidios en Colombia: La tasa más baja en los últimos 42 años se dio en 2017,” El Espectador, January 21, 2018, https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/judicial/homicidios-en-colombia-la-tasa-mas-baja-en-los-ultimos-42-anos-se-dio-en-2017-articulo-734526.$In 2019, the UN Security Council, following its mission visit to Colombia in July, called Colombia’s ability to negotiate a peace agreement in 2016 “an example for others around the world.”12United Nations Security Council, “Security Council Press Statement on Colombia,” July 23, 2019, https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/sc13896.doc.htm. The Council also “welcomed Government efforts to advance the reintegration of former FARC-EP members and strengthen rural development” and stressed the importance of “implementing the peace agreement as an interlocking set of commitments.”13United Nations Security Council, “Security Council Press Statement on Colombia.”$However, several challenges to Colombia’s national security and democracy as well as the rights of its citizens still remain. These challenges are partially explained by the capacity of existing illegal armed groups and criminal organizations to adapt and take advantage of conditions that favor their growth—i.e., insufficient institutional presence, limited economic opportunities, and the availability of illegal funding sources. After the demobilization of the FARC, several armed groups competed for territorial control in areas where the guerrilla group used to operate. A vacuum had been left for them to exploit and profit from illicit economies such as drug trafficking, illegal mining, and extortion.14El Tiempo, “Estos son los grupos armados que azotan a varios departamentos,” July 23, 2019, https://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/otras-ciudades/regiones-del-pais-afectadas-por-grupos-armados-en-colombia-391642.$The rights of vulnerable populations in areas where the state is fragile therefore remain unprotected. According to Colombia’s Victims Unit, more than 360,000 people were internally displaced between January 2016 and July 2019.15Red Nacional de Información, “Desplazamiento – Personas: Registro Unico de Victimas,” Unidad Victimas – Government of Colombia, August 1, 2019, https://cifras.unidadvictimas.gov.co/Home/Desplazamiento. The situation of social leaders is particularly critical—more than 300 have been killed since 2016.16José David Rodríguez Gómez, “Más de 317 líderes sociales han sido asesinados en el último año: Medicina Legal,” RCN Radio, May 15, 2019, https://www.rcnradio.com/colombia/mas-de-317-lideres-sociales-han-sido-asesinados-en-el-ultimo-ano-medicina-legal. Corruption, which President Duque has identified as a top priority (and recently submitted legislation to counter it), has facilitated criminal activities and undermines the legitimacy of the Colombian state. At the same time, while there has been progress in the implementation of the Peace Accords, there is still a long way to go to achieve the accords’ stated goals and commitments. Additionally, instability in Venezuela and the meddling of Russia, in particular, contributes to new security challenges. $These problems do not only affect Colombia: They also directly compromise US goals. A new US-Colombia partnership can better address the structural conditions that favor illicit activities, thus reducing the flow of cocaine to the United States. The two countries can also deepen cooperation to help governments in Central America, Mexico, and South America confront transnational criminal organizations, drawing on Colombia’s experience as a leader in addressing regional security issues.$Deepening Colombia’s alliances with the United States in security and economic issues is of paramount importance for both countries to achieve their common goals. The terms of this partnership must originate with a long-term plan to effectively transform the conditions that currently favor illegality and enable the production and trafficking of cocaine but then move to a long-term vision that fully maximizes the relationship and Colombia’s regional role. This commitment to an even more robust, long-term strategic alliance will set Colombia on a path for sustainable growth and ensure that both countries’ interests are mutually reinforcing.$This report outlines the main areas for US-Colombia cooperation that the Atlantic Council’s US-Colombia Task Force identified to advance US and Colombia interests while fostering a more secure and prosperous Western Hemisphere.$Return to table of contents$Colombia is in a period of momentous transition. It is rapidly consolidating its role as a key player in Latin America and an indispensable partner for the United States on many fronts. Simultaneously, the United States has become an important source of political and economic support for Colombia, making it imperative to deepen ties between the two countries at this critical time in Colombia’s history. Colombia must not only ensure that peace is in fact achieved, but also grapple with the external and internal challenges that arise from the worsening of the crisis in Venezuela. US economic, humanitarian, and security assistance to Colombia, as well as continued bipartisan support, is thus vital for the long-term interests of Colombia and the United States.$The Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center launched its US-Colombia Task Force to create the foundation for a new plan of action vis-à-vis the US-Colombia economic and diplomatic relationship. This distinguished group built on the recommendations of the Atlantic Council’s 2017 Colombia Task Force, which provided the Trump administration with a blueprint for US engagement with Colombia. This refocused and expanded US-Colombia Task Force provides a roadmap for the Duque administration, the Trump administration, and the US Congress on how to deepen and expand the relationship along three pillars: economic development; strengthening institutions and rule of law, promoting rural development, and tackling the world drug problem; and Colombia’s leadership in the context of the Venezuela regional crisis.$The task force is co-chaired by Senator Roy Blunt (R-Missouri) and Senator Ben Cardin (D-Maryland). Senator Blunt serves on the Senate Appropriations Committee and Senator Cardin is a senior member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In addition to bipartisan leadership, members include a bipartisan grouping from the US House of Representatives: Congressman Bradley Byrne (R-Alabama); Congressman Ruben Gallego (D-Arizona); Congressman Gregory Meeks (D-New York); and Congressman Francis Rooney (R-Florida). The task force also includes former policymakers from and leaders in business and civil society in both the United States and Colombia, who provide expert insight to help guide the leaders of both countries in advancing the next chapter of the US-Colombia relationship. The task force is a truly nonpartisan, bicameral, binational working group with a wide reach and the foundation to create impact for years to come.$Return to table of contents$The United States and Colombia have consolidated a close and mutually beneficial partnership over the past decades. Plan Colombia, announced in 1999 and sustained by US leaders of both political parties, laid the foundation for a strategic alliance that has widened to include sustainable development, trade and investment, hemispheric security, human rights, and other areas of cooperation. Plan Colombia has been one of the United States’ most successful foreign policy initiatives in the past 20 years. Its success is visible today in Colombia’s positive transformations and the safeguarding of vital US interests. As former National Security Advisor Stephen J. Hadley, who served under President George W. Bush and is now executive vice chair of the Atlantic Council, said, “Plan Colombia is an example of a visionary, bipartisan strategic framework that has supported the Colombian people and government as they have transformed Colombia into a peaceful democracy.”17Atlantic Council, “A Roadmap for US Engagement with Colombia,” May 2017, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/A_Roadmap_for_US_Engagement_with_Colombia_web_0517.pdf. $Although Colombian taxpayer funds financed almost 95 percent of the total investment in Plan Colombia, US political leadership, military and police training, and technology assistance were crucial to the success of this bipartisan foreign policy initiative. US investment in Plan Colombia totals $11 billion, with $10 billion provided between 2000 and 2016—a number that represents less than 2 percent of the cost of the Iraq war over the same period.18Congressional Research Service, “The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11” (2014), https://fas.org/sgp/ crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf. A strong return on US investment is evident. In those same years, Colombia significantly strengthened its institutional capacity and made notable progress combating drug trafficking, fighting illegal armed groups, and securing government control of territories. Additionally, Colombia’s liberalized economy quadrupled in size, poverty and homicides fell by more than 50 percent, and kidnappings were reduced by 90 percent.19Miguel Silva, “Path to Peace and Prosperity: The Colombian Miracle,” Atlantic Council, 2015, http:// publications.atlanticcouncil.org/colombia-miracle/; United States Senate, “S.Res.368 – A resolution supporting efforts by the Government of Colombia to pursue peace and the end of the country’s enduring internal armed conflict and recognizing United States support for Colombia at the 15th anniversary of Plan Colombia,” 2016, https://www. congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senateresolution/368/text. With its improved security situation and strengthened democratic institutions, Colombia transitioned from being an aid recipient to a strategic ally of the United States and an exporter of security and political leadership in the region.$The successor strategy to Plan Colombia, Peace Colombia, was announced by President Barack Obama in February 2016. This multiyear initiative sought to scale up vital US support to help Colombia “win the peace,” in the event of a peace agreement with the FARC.20The White House, “Remarks by President Obama and President Santos of Colombia at Plan Colombia Reception,” February 4, 2016, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/05/remarks-president-obama-and-president-santos-colombia-plan-colombia; The White House, “Fact Sheet: Peace Colombia — A New Era of Partnership between the United States and Colombia,” February 4, 2016, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/04/fact-sheet-peace-colombia-new-era-partnership-between-united-states-and. Less than five months later, a peace agreement was signed. Peace Colombia was designed to consolidate Plan Colombia’s security gains; advance counternarcotics efforts; reintegrate former combatants into society; expand state presence and institutions, especially in territories most affec |
| 主题 | Civil Society ; Colombia ; Human Rights ; NATO Partnerships ; Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding ; Trade ; United States and Canada |
| URL | https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/untapped-potential-us-colombia-partnership/ |
| 来源智库 | Atlantic Council (United States) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/345789 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | the Atlantic Council’s US-Colombia Task Force. The Untapped Potential of the US-Colombia Partnership. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| AC_US-COLOMBIA-REPOR（14848KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
