| 来源类型 | Academic Papers |
| 规范类型 | 其他 |
| Private Eradication of Mobile Public Bads | |
| Christopher Costello | |
| 发表日期 | 2017-05-01 |
| 出版年 | 2017 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Abstract We consider analytically the non-cooperative behavior of many private property owners who each controls the stock of a public bad, which can grow and spread across spatial areas. We characterize the conditions under which private property owners will control or eradicate, and determine how this decision depends on property-specific environmental features and on the behavior of other landowners. We show that high mobility or lower control by others result in lower private control. But when the marginal dynamic cost of the bad is sufficiently large, we find that global eradication may be privately optimal – in these cases, eradication arises in the non-cooperative game and is also socially optimal so there is, in effect, no externality. |
| URL | https://www.perc.org/2017/05/01/private-eradication-mobile-public-bads/ |
| 来源智库 | Property and Environment Research Center (United States) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/360191 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Christopher Costello. Private Eradication of Mobile Public Bads. 2017. |
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