| 来源类型 | Academic Papers |
| 规范类型 | 其他 |
| Property Rights, Regulatory Capture, and Exploitation of Natural Resources | |
| Christopher Costello; Corbett Grainger | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-02-14 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 概述 | How the strength of property rights to individual extractive firms affects a regulator’s choice over exploitation rates for a natural resource |
| 摘要 | Abstract We study how the strength of property rights to individual extractive firms affects a regulator’s choice over exploitation rates for a natural resource. The regulator is modeled as an intermediary between current and future resource harvesters rather than between producers and consumers, as in the traditional regulatory capture paradigm. When incumbent resource users have weak property rights, they have an incentive to pressure the regulator to allow resource extraction at an inefficiently rapid rate. The main theoretical prediction–that stronger individual property rights will lead the regulator to choose more economically efficient extraction paths–is tested empirically with novel panel data from global fisheries. Exploiting the variation in timing of Catch Share implementation, as well as employing an instrumental variables strategy, we find that regulators are significantly more conservative in managing resources for which firms have strong property rights; this is especially pronounced for resources that have been historically overexploited. |
| URL | https://www.perc.org/2018/02/14/property-rights-regulatory-capture-exploitation-natural-resources/ |
| 来源智库 | Property and Environment Research Center (United States) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/360199 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Christopher Costello,Corbett Grainger. Property Rights, Regulatory Capture, and Exploitation of Natural Resources. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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