| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| On Social Sanctions and Beliefs: A Pollution Norm Example | |
| Jorge Garcia; Jiegen Wei | |
| 发表日期 | 2013-02-14 |
| 出版年 | 2013 |
| 页码 | EfD DP 13-04 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A prevailing view in the literature is that social sanctions can support, in equilibrium, high levels of obedience to a costly norm. The reason is that social disapproval and stigmatization faced by the disobedient are highest when disobedience is the exception rather than the rule in society. In contrast, the (Bayesian) model introduced here shows that imperfect information causes the expected social sanction to be lowest precisely when obedience is more common. This, amongst other findings, draws a distinct line between social and moral sanctions, both of which may depend on others' behavior but not on action observability. |
| URL | http://www.rff.org/research/publications/social-sanctions-and-beliefs-pollution-norm-example |
| 来源智库 | Resources for the Future (United States) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/41236 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jorge Garcia,Jiegen Wei. On Social Sanctions and Beliefs: A Pollution Norm Example. 2013. |
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