全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Experimental Departures from Self-Interest When Competing Partnerships Share Output

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	论文
	Experimental Departures from Self-Interest When Competing Partnerships Share Output
	Josh Cherry; Stephen W. Salant; Neslihan Uler
发表日期	2013-03-14
出版年	2013
页码	DP 13-07
语种	英语
摘要	When every individual's effort imposes negative externalities, self-interested behavior leads to socially excessive effort. To curb these excesses when effort cannot be monitored, competing output-sharing partnerships can form. With the right-sized groups, aggregate effort falls to the socially optimal level. We investigate this theory experimentally and and find it makes correct qualitative predictions but there are systematic quantitative deviations, always in the direction of the socially optimal investment. By using data on subjects' conjectures of each other's behavior we show that deviations are consistent with both altruism and conformity (but not extremeness aversion).
URL	http://www.rff.org/research/publications/experimental-departures-self-interest-when-competing-partnerships-share-output
来源智库	Resources for the Future (United States)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/41241
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Josh Cherry,Stephen W. Salant,Neslihan Uler. Experimental Departures from Self-Interest When Competing Partnerships Share Output. 2013.