G2TT
来源类型Working Paper
规范类型论文
Auction Mechanisms for Allocating Subsidies for Carbon Emissions Reduction: An Experimental Investigation
Haoran He; Yefeng Chen
发表日期2014-04-18
出版年2014
页码EfD DP 14-06
语种英语
摘要

One method to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is to subsidize emissions-reducing activities. The question is how to allocate such subsidies. Allocation through auctions is an emerging mechanism. In a controlled experimental market setting, we compare the effects of a variety of auction mechanisms for allocating subsidies for carbon emissions reduction in China. Besides the conventional auction mechanisms, we place particular focus on testing the actual performance of the auction mechanism proposed by Erik Maskin (2011). We find that, while the Maskin auction mechanism spends the most from a fixed subsidy budget and leads to the largest emissions reduction, its per-unit emissions reduction cost is higher than that of discriminatory and uniform-price auction mechanisms. Both the Maskin and uniform-price auctions outperform discriminatory auctions in price discovery. Furthermore, from the government’s perspective, the Maskin auctions exhibit the strongest improvement tendency with repeated auctions.

主题Air Quality ; Climate Change ; Environmental Economics Topics ; International
子主题Cap and Trade ; China
URLhttp://www.rff.org/research/publications/auction-mechanisms-allocating-subsidies-carbon-emissions-reduction
来源智库Resources for the Future (United States)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/41295
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Haoran He,Yefeng Chen. Auction Mechanisms for Allocating Subsidies for Carbon Emissions Reduction: An Experimental Investigation. 2014.
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