G2TT
来源类型Working Paper
规范类型论文
The Impact of Team Inspections on Enforcement and Deterrence
Lucija Anna Muehlenbachs; Stefan Staubli; Mark A. Cohen
发表日期2015-08-14
出版年2015
页码DP 13-36-REV2
语种英语
摘要

This paper provides new insights into the productivity of teams. Government enforcement agencies often send teams of inspectors instead of a sole inspector to a regulated facility. Yet, determining the impact of teams is problematic due to endogeneity as the enforcement agency might naturally send larger teams when they expect a higher likelihood of violations. Exploiting exogenous variation in the number of inspectors that are sent to o shore oil and gas platforms in the Gulf of Mexico, we find that adding an inspector to a team does not simply result in more detected violations, it also increases the severity of sanctions imposed on those violations that are detected.

主题Energy and Electricity ; Risk and Uncertainty ; Water
子主题Offshore Drilling ; Oil
URLhttp://www.rff.org/research/publications/impact-team-inspections-enforcement-and-deterrence
来源智库Resources for the Future (United States)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/41389
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Lucija Anna Muehlenbachs,Stefan Staubli,Mark A. Cohen. The Impact of Team Inspections on Enforcement and Deterrence. 2015.
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