Gateway to Think Tanks
来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
The Impact of Team Inspections on Enforcement and Deterrence | |
Lucija Anna Muehlenbachs; Stefan Staubli; Mark A. Cohen | |
发表日期 | 2015-08-14 |
出版年 | 2015 |
页码 | DP 13-36-REV2 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | This paper provides new insights into the productivity of teams. Government enforcement agencies often send teams of inspectors instead of a sole inspector to a regulated facility. Yet, determining the impact of teams is problematic due to endogeneity as the enforcement agency might naturally send larger teams when they expect a higher likelihood of violations. Exploiting exogenous variation in the number of inspectors that are sent to o shore oil and gas platforms in the Gulf of Mexico, we find that adding an inspector to a team does not simply result in more detected violations, it also increases the severity of sanctions imposed on those violations that are detected. |
主题 | Energy and Electricity ; Risk and Uncertainty ; Water |
子主题 | Offshore Drilling ; Oil |
URL | http://www.rff.org/research/publications/impact-team-inspections-enforcement-and-deterrence |
来源智库 | Resources for the Future (United States) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/41389 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Lucija Anna Muehlenbachs,Stefan Staubli,Mark A. Cohen. The Impact of Team Inspections on Enforcement and Deterrence. 2015. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。