Gateway to Think Tanks
来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
A Dynamic Enforcement Strategy to Improve Compliance with Environmental Regulations | |
Xiao-Bing Zhang; Jing Xu | |
发表日期 | 2016-05-27 |
出版年 | 2016 |
页码 | EfD DP 16-17 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | This paper develops a stochastic dynamic programming model to investigate a type of dynamic enforcement strategy where the penalties for violations of environmental regulations are based on not only the current level of violations but also the firms’ past noncompliance records. The results show that firms’ optimal level of noncompliance would be a decreasing function of their accumulated noncompliance record and that a more stringent enforcement strategy can reduce the expected fines due to the reduced violations. Comparisons with the repeated static enforcement strategy indicate that the dynamic enforcement strategy can be superior in terms of reducing both violations and enforcement efforts. |
主题 | Environmental Economics Topics |
URL | http://www.rff.org/research/publications/dynamic-enforcement-strategy-improve-compliance-environmental-regulations |
来源智库 | Resources for the Future (United States) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/41446 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Xiao-Bing Zhang,Jing Xu. A Dynamic Enforcement Strategy to Improve Compliance with Environmental Regulations. 2016. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
个性服务 |
推荐该条目 |
保存到收藏夹 |
导出为Endnote文件 |
谷歌学术 |
谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
[Xiao-Bing Zhang]的文章 |
[Jing Xu]的文章 |
百度学术 |
百度学术中相似的文章 |
[Xiao-Bing Zhang]的文章 |
[Jing Xu]的文章 |
必应学术 |
必应学术中相似的文章 |
[Xiao-Bing Zhang]的文章 |
[Jing Xu]的文章 |
相关权益政策 |
暂无数据 |
收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。