全球智库信息集成服务系统

Summary

The global nuclear order appears increasingly tense, primarily because many states feel that the structure and distribution of benefits is unjust. Among the states that will determine how the nuclear order will adapt, Argentina, Brazil, China, India, and Pakistan are particularly important.

These states occupy an uncomfortable middle ground in the order. Each possesses advanced nuclear technology, and three of them hold nuclear weapons. Unlike other states that seek to fundamentally change the existing system, these states would like to improve their standing in the order even though they remain deeply uneasy with its perceived lack of fairness.

The Current Nuclear Order

• Criticism of the existing order tends to focus on the lack of progress toward disarmament by countries possessing nuclear weapons. Critics reject incremental arms control measures as an indicator of progress. Many states also disparage growing constraints on access to peaceful nuclear technology, which they believe will impede their economic development.
• The existing order primarily benefits states that developed nuclear technology earliest and wrote most of the rules governing international nuclear affairs. The evolution of the order will likely be driven by middle-ground states that have developed advanced nuclear technology and actively participate in nuclear governance decisionmaking, but whose interests are not completely served by the existing system.
• Thus far, middle-ground states have preferred working within the system to overturning it. Nuclear regimes provide sufficient elasticity for these states to pursue their interests within existing limitations.

Perspectives From the Middle Ground

Middle-ground states share more interests than are apparent. Despite obvious differences, including the possession of nuclear weapons by some, middle-ground states share concerns about fairness, access to peaceful nuclear technology, and the growing salience of nuclear weapons in U.S. and Russian security policies.

Regional interests trump global norms. Regional security dynamics and relationships tend to influence these states’ nuclear policies more than global norms and a desire to change the order.

Nuclear weapons have declining currency. Despite the rising salience of nuclear weapons in the United States and Russia, middle-ground states tend to consider the possession of advanced nuclear technology and membership in export control groups to be more legitimate symbols of status in the order.

Nuclear policy capacity is underdeveloped. Expert communities in middle-ground states are generally small and diffuse, which hampers their effectiveness in seeking to influence the evolution of the order. Civil society groups and governments in these states could prioritize the development of stronger technical, policy, and legal expertise on nuclear issues.

Introduction

Toby Dalton, Togzhan Kassenova, Lauryn Williams

Tensions in the global nuclear order are rising. The sources of tension are many, including profound disagreement among states about disarmament and nonproliferation priorities, regional insecurity that both contributes to proliferation concerns and enhances the salience of nuclear deterrence, disenchantment about the lack of progress toward disarmament, and questions about integrating the nuclear outlier states into the order. The 2015 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference was symptomatic of these tensions. The conference failed to reach a consensus outcome, leading one nongovernmental observer to charge that it was an “accurate reflection of the profound inadequacies and disagreements permeating the global nuclear disarmament regime” and a “necessary shock to an ailing system.”¹

Most contemporary disagreements about nuclear governance stem from the broader struggle for power in the international system as well as the extent to which states view the rules governing international nuclear affairs as just. This policy subsystem is referred to as the nuclear order—broadly defined as an arrangement of states and institutions in the international system based on beliefs about the relationship between nuclear technology and international political power. The existing order, built since the 1950s in and around the United Nations (UN), gives special preference to the early developers of nuclear technology. The dominant global powers at the time—principally the United States and the Soviet Union—succeeded both in developing nuclear weapons and in negotiating a treaty (the NPT) that legitimized, though conditionally, their possession of those weapons. Ultimately, China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States were designated nuclear-weapon states by the treaty, while all of the other countries were classified as non-nuclear-weapon states. The institutionalization of unequal access to nuclear technology, and particularly the possession of nuclear weapons to perpetuate international political power, has contributed to an order that many states consider unjust—albeit one that has remained mostly stable and free of rampant proliferation.

Argentina, Brazil, China, India, and Pakistan are five states that in different ways occupy an uncomfortable middle ground in the nuclear order.

Many actors have tried to reenvision the nuclear order. These efforts are playing out in various venues, including at the United Nations; at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); at the UN Conference on Disarmament; at Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conferences; and in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), a multilateral export control regime. Not surprisingly, the narratives that are most dominant are those put forward by the groups challenging the status quo and by the architects of the existing order and other states whose interests are served by it.

International nuclear discourse tends to pay less heed to the perspectives of states that occupy an uncomfortable middle ground. These are states who for numerous and varied reasons find the current system discriminatory and unjust and seek to reform it, while at the same time they often try to improve their position in the order in ways that perpetuate the status quo. Given this tension in views, middle-ground states provide an interesting prism through which to assess the nuclear order and the trajectory of efforts to change it.

Argentina, Brazil, China, India, and Pakistan are five states that in different ways occupy this uncomfortable middle ground. Generalizing from any group of states, including this one, is an analytical challenge, but the comparative perspectives that emerge are informative nonetheless. This introductory chapter contextualizes common themes in the nuclear discourse in each of these middle-ground states and their implications for the evolution of the nuclear order.²

As viewed from these middle-ground states, two broad evolutionary forces might produce change in the existing nuclear order. The first is the diffusion of advanced technology, both nuclear and non-nuclear. Many states today operate complex nuclear research and energy programs, including sensitive fuel-cycle facilities capable of producing enriched uranium or plutonium. Even more possess high-technology industries. Both nuclear and high-technology advancements are viewed as symbols of and contributors to economic growth and development, regardless of their actual correlation with these objectives. Increased availability and supply of these technologies creates the capability for ever more states to build nuclear weapons if they choose to do so. At the same time, states demanding these technologies confront rules for managing trade in dual-use technologies that they perceive as hindering development. The second force comes from states (or groupings of states) that are considered to be rising or emerging powers. These states had little power to shape the regimes governing the development of nuclear technology and the nuclear trade regimes as they were being constructed. Many perceive that the current order does not serve their interests. Today, these states’ rising international power permits them to seek to adapt the regimes in ways that better suit their own interests.

To date, the regimes that comprise the nuclear order have sufficiently tolerated these forces and allowed most states in the middle ground to temper their revisionism, even if they are outspoken in their criticism. For the most part, the order has remained stable because these states have preferred the current, if at times unjust, system to the potential insecurity they would confront if the rules were challenged violently or even overturned. This indicates that these states’ rhetoric in international forums and their actual behavior are diverging, with their actions tending to reinforce the status quo. Thus, these pressures in the nuclear order may be overstated to the extent that most states continue to uphold the rules even as they challenge them.

This suggests that greater attention should be given to the behavior of members rather than the rules of membership in particular institutions. Participation by non-nuclear-weapon states in groups that more actively challenge the regimes—such as the Humanitarian Initiative, which opposes the possession of nuclear weapons on the grounds that their use would have widespread and indiscriminate consequences for civilian populations—will be an important bellwether. If these countries’ involvement in such groups is accompanied by concrete actions, such as purposeful flouting of rules and standard practices, it will indicate that they no longer see the existing order as a provider of sufficiently just outcomes.

Rising Salience of Nuclear Weapons

One common theme across middle-ground states pertains to perceptions of the salience of nuclear weapons and the politics of the dominant states in the nuclear order. Recent events in Syria and Ukraine suggest that Moscow is reinvigorating its reliance on nuclear weapons and deterrence, while U.S. efforts to reverse this trend are primarily inhibited by security commitments to European allies, as well as Japan and South Korea, all of which enjoy protection under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. And though the United States and Russia have reduced their arsenals by more than 80 percent since the Cold War,³ non-nuclear states see the current focus by China, Russia, and the United States on arsenal modernization as an indication that they plan to sustain possession for decades to come.

This, in turn, reinforces perceptions among non-nuclear-weapon states that nuclear-weapon states are ultimately more interested in pursuing arms control or management measures than in eliminating their stockpiles. Indeed, the United States plans to spend nearly $1 trillion on these efforts over the next few decades, while Russia in 2015 announced the planned addition of new long-range missiles to its arsenal.⁴ Only years removed from the sweeping rhetoric of U.S. President Barack Obama’s 2009 Prague speech regarding nuclear disarmament and the negotiation of the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) between Russia and the United States, this trend constitutes a reversal of momentum, as efforts like the Global Zero movement had previously inspired belief that progress on disarmament was possible.

Non-nuclear-weapon states perceive that nuclear-weapon states are ultimately more interested in pursuing arms control or management measures than in eliminating their stockpiles.

Notably, three of these middle-ground states—China, India, and Pakistan—possess nuclear weapons. China occupies an interesting, perhaps transitional, position in the nuclear order insofar as its policies still tend to align with groups that espouse revisionist agendas; yet, it also clearly self-identifies with nuclear-weapon states, benefits from this status, and is taking steps to bolster its position in the order and its own nuclear forces. In this regard, Chinese security policy focuses more on managing rivalry and potential confrontation with the United States than on the global politics of nuclear weapons. Both India and Pakistan, too, confront a tension between the long-standing dynamics that drive their mutual security competition (nuclear weapons included) and each state’s desire to legitimize its position in the nuclear order as a responsible possessor of nuclear weapons. For these states, this tends to result in diplomacy toward the regimes that is wrapped in a veneer of global politics while mostly aimed narrowly at serving national interests.

Whether or not states with nuclear weapons take steps to decrease their salience, the global diffusion of power means that nuclear weapons in 2016 have less currency than previously assumed. Advanced nuclear energy capability and membership in multilateral export control groups and multilateral governance bodies, such as the NSG and the IAEA Board of Governors, are important symbols of status and thus extremely desirable for many middle-ground states. While certainly concerned about global nuclear trends, these states are more motivated by the potential to enhance their own position in the governance institutions that make up the nuclear order than by working toward a more just and fair nuclear order.

Demise of Arms Control

There is also growing uncertainty among middle-ground states regarding the value of arms control, both as a means to manage and mitigate potential conflict and as part of the disarmament process. Indeed, the perception that the salience of nuclear weapons has increased helps lead revisionist groups to reject the idea that arms control and transparency measures are necessary to make the nuclear order more just. Previously, including as recently as the 2010 NPT Review Conference, groups seeking to change the order exhibited a greater willingness to accept arms control as a measure of progress. But the perceived lack of concrete action by the nuclear-weapon states to fulfill commitments made in the 1995, 2000, and 2010 NPT Review Conferences, and more broadly to uphold their NPT Article VI commitment to enact “effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date,” has led more states to challenge the relationship between arms control and disarmament.⁵ States possessing nuclear weapons are unlikely to receive much credit for small transparency and confidence-building measures in the absence of more fundamental actions demonstrating a strong commitment to devaluing nuclear weapons as a step toward disarmament.

At the same time, arms control and mutual restraint mechanisms have lost currency as tools for managing the potential for conflict among both big powers and regional rivals. For example, to date, China has rejected efforts by the United States and Russia to enter into formal arms control discussions, even though China engages in several unofficial dialogues with both states on these issues. In South Asia, there is little apparent prospect of transparency or restraint as a strategy to curb the regional security competition between Pakistan and India. This is even more alarming given that both states’ possession of nuclear weapons may have heightened the risk of subconventional violence that could escalate in ways that test deterrence stability, even as relative parity in nuclear weapons appears to have lowered the risk of major war. Finally, the explosive growth of capabilities to conduct offensive cyberwarfare among state and nonstate actors raises new concerns about conflict arising from attacks on critical infrastructure, including those related to nuclear energy and nuclear weapons. Certainly, the absence of any normative or institutional framework governing the use of these capabilities poses new risks at a time when building international consensus on restraint is already increasingly difficult.

Political Economy of Nuclear Technology

Perhaps the strongest point of convergence for the middle-ground states is a shared concern about access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and the freedom to share it with others, a right guaranteed by the NPT. Indeed, for all of the diplomatic effort and rhetoric that many of these states tend to expend on nuclear weapons, disarmament, and the lack of progress by the nuclear-weapon states in implementing NPT Article VI, their priority is preserving the right to peaceful nuclear technology. Particularly for developing countries, exercising this right is seen as critical to their economic growth and advancement.

Argentina, Brazil, China, India, and Pakistan all possess advanced nuclear technology as of 2016, but to varying degrees all faced efforts by other states or regimes to deny or withhold such technology in the past. Thus, voicing concerns about technology denial and discrimination may be a remnant of their own experiences, or it may stem from a sense of responsibility for conveying the views of developing nations in general. In this, perceptions about the discriminatory nature of the nuclear order may in fact be secondary to fears that states in possession of coveted nuclear technology are using nonproliferation policies as a means to deny access to developing countries—despite the lack of available, systematic evidence that the NSG or similar regimes are actively doing so.

Such criticism and concerns notwithstanding, states in the middle ground also desire a seat at the table in the regimes governing nuclear technology trade, namely the NSG. For them, and for regime outliers, membership in these institutions would give them a voice in future rulemaking.

Perhaps the strongest point of convergence for the middle-ground states is a shared concern about access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

Concerns about nuclear rulemaking processes help explain the mixed reactions to the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. While states in the middle ground generally celebrate the deal as a victory for nonproliferation diplomacy, many (China as one of the negotiators of the Iran deal being an exception) also worry that provisions in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) may be used in a new effort to restrict peaceful nuclear rights. From this perspective, whether Iran developed nuclear weapons or not was critical insofar as it demonstrated that the regime could prevent proliferation, but more worrisome was the narrative that Iran did not have the right to pursue uranium enrichment. Thus, prior to the negotiations, Brazil and others considered the U.S.-led UN Security Council resolutions that imposed sanctions on Iran because of its nuclear program to be an abuse of multilateral institutions. Even so, only UN Security Council Resolution 1929 of 2010 was ever opposed by Brazil and Turkey, and this came shortly after the major powers did not support the two states’ joint attempt to negotiate an alternative solution with Iran. After the JCPOA, this concern manifests as a fear that technology holders and rulemakerswill seek to further constrain the freedom provided by NPT Article IV to pursue peaceful nuclear technology with autonomy. Thus, for middle-ground states, discussions of strengthening the regime by building on precedents from the