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The Islamic Republic’s foreign policy is a product of its self-interest. Striving to protect Iran’s Islamic theocracy from external threats drives the country’s approach to foreign affairs. That approach can, at times, look aggressive or pragmatic. A sectarian angle also exists. Given its relative alienation from its neighbors since the 1979 revolution, Iran has relied on a strategy of forming relationships with nonstate groups to help promote its strategic interests. Although it supports Sunni groups, such as the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas, Iran’s backing of Shia organizations has most angered its neighbors. That practice, often fused with the unofficial policy of exporting the revolution, has paid dividends for Iran strategically but has also hardened perceptions of its confessional bias.

Religion and Iranian Behavior in the Middle East

• Religion has been an inseparable component of Iranian decisionmaking since the 1979 revolution.
• Since the revolution, Iran’s leaders have stressed their commitment to Islamic unity. They downplay the Shia character of the Islamic Republic when speaking on foreign policy issues and continue to express the pan-Islamic, as opposed to Shia-centric, tenets of the revolution’s founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.
• Despite its pan-Islamic aspirations, since 2003, Iran’s strategic approach in the Middle East has focused on supporting Shia armed groups. Working through those nonstate clients has helped Iran greatly expand its regional influence, particularly in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen.

Conclusions

• Religious identity and beliefs influence Iran’s approach to foreign relationships, but they do not dictate them. Religion matters little in Iran’s state-to-state relationships, but it figures more prominently in Iran’s relations with nonstate groups.
• Essentializing Iran’s foreign policy as sectarian obscures more than it reveals about its behavior. However, as the Middle East has grown more sectarian since the fall of Saddam Hussein and the Arab Spring, so too has Iran’s regional behavior.
• Iran’s operations in Syria provide the most overt examples of its sectarian behavior. Iran has facilitated the involvement of thousands of non-Syrian Shia militants to help defend the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Even though Iranian leaders stress the legitimacy of the intervention in Syria, and deny any sectarian agenda, Iran’s military and its affiliates frame their role in that war in distinctly confessional terms.
• Iran’s regional activities cannot be divorced from the explosion of Sunni sectarianism across the Middle East. Iran accuses its Sunni neighbors of supporting the rise of Sunni extremism and feels compelled to counter that behavior by doubling down on support to Shia allies of its own.

Introduction

With wars raging in the Middle East, more attention is being paid to Iran’s regional role. The Islamic Republic is actively supporting its allies in the region’s main conflicts—Iraq, Syria, and Yemen—which has put it on the opposite side of most of its neighbors. That divide is more than political or strategic: it is sectarian. Iran and its main allies are all Shia or considered as such. Together they are fighting against Sunni forces backed by Sunni-led states. This dynamic has deepened the region’s descent into sectarianism and has exacerbated political disputes between Iran and many of its Sunni neighbors.

Iran’s critics, especially Saudi Arabia, view its foreign policies as sectarian and expansionist. They argue that Iran has been exploiting political unrest across the region to champion its militant Shia clients and undermine the Sunni-dominated status quo. They see Iran’s endgame as an expansive, transnational, pro-Iranian Shia polity stretching from Iran to Lebanon and encompassing Iraq and Syria—something akin to a resurrected Persian empire, but with the Shia faith and allegiance to Iran’s supreme leader as the unifying characteristics. Such a scenario is worrisome to Iran’s neighbors and something Saudi Arabia and others appear committed to preventing.¹

The Islamic Republic’s foreign policies are aimed at advancing its strategic interests.

The Islamic Republic’s foreign policies are aimed at advancing its strategic interests. Sectarianism plays a role in those policies, but not in the single-minded, all-encompassing way that Iran’s critics suggest. Indeed, for most of its history, the Islamic Republic has followed a largely nonsectarian path. Iran’s leaders have long emphasized pan-Islamic ideals and courted Sunni allies. The majority of scholars who have studied Iranian foreign policy since 1979 do not describe that record of behavior as sectarian, meaning primarily aimed at advancing a pro-Shia agenda. Rather, they see Iran’s decisionmaking as closer to realpolitik.²

However, the sectarian element in Iranian foreign policy has increased over the last decade. The primary catalysts for the country’s shift toward a more clear-cut favoring of Shia clients and allies in the Middle East were the toppling of former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein in 2003 and the Arab Spring beginning in late 2010. Those events and the conflicts they ignited— particularly in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen—have sharply divided the interests of Iran and its neighbors. Fearful of each other’s intentions, the behavior of Iran and its Arab rivals has moved increasingly in a sectarian direction. Such sectarianism runs counter to Tehran’s official positions, but close relationships with Shia allies have become the basis of Iranian influence in the region. With its allies threatened in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, Iran has doubled down on its pro-Shia strategy as a way of protecting its regional interests and investments. This has been exemplified in the behavior and rhetoric of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)—Iran’s preeminent military organization and the leading agency in its strategic activities in the Middle East. In addition to being heavily involved in the region’s conflicts, the IRGC has begun to portray its allies and clients as a unified Shia front with regional ambitions.

Iran’s Reputation and Competing Visions of Sectarianism

In 2016, as part of their bitter feud, Iran and Saudi Arabia exchanged public accusations of sectarianism that reached as far as mainstream media outlets in the United States. In September, the New York Times published an op-ed by Iran’s foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, entitled “Let Us Rid the World of Wahhabism.”³ Zarif contends that Wahhabist Islam has become a plague, unleashing terrorism and murderous tumult across the Middle East and throughout the world. He calls Wahhabism a “theological perversion” that has “wrought havoc” and had a “devastating” impact in Islamic communities. The violence committed by jihadist groups such as al-Qaeda is a direct result of “Riyadh’s persistent sponsorship of extremism,” he argues, and this violence is at the root of the current conflicts in the Middle East. He accuses Saudi Arabia of “playing the ‘Iran card’” to induce its allies to take part in the Syrian and Yemeni wars, and he concludes that “concrete action against extremism is needed.” Even though Riyadh caused the mess, Zarif “invite[s]” Saudi Arabia to be part of the solution. That gesture rings hollow given the accusatory tone of the piece. It is clearly a polemic against Iran’s neighbor and archrival, another salvo in their ongoing cold war.

However, Zarif also speaks to Iran’s view of sectarianism and sectarian conflict in the Middle East. They are not organic, but rather the by-products of a misguided effort by Saudi Arabia and its Western allies to isolate Iran and curb its influence. Has Iran contributed, in any way, to the region’s current sectarian morass? Not according to Zarif. The blame is entirely one-sided.

The September 2016 op-ed followed another that the Iranian foreign minister wrote months earlier in January. In that piece, entitled “Saudi Arabia’s Reckless Extremism,” the veteran diplomat argues that while Iran’s president, Hassan Rouhani, has made “friendship with our neighbors, peace and stability in the region and global cooperation” priorities for Iran, as evinced by the July 2015 nuclear deal, “some countries,” particularly Saudi Arabia, have stood in the way of Iran’s efforts at “constructive engagement.”⁴

Zarif thus begins a similar broadside against the Saudi regime. He lists several reasons why Saudi Arabia is harming regional security. Riyadh is not only obstructing Iran’s efforts at compromise and friendship but also is involved in the “active sponsorship of violent extremism.” Zarif links Saudi Arabia to terrorist attacks in the West, al-Qaeda affiliates in the Middle East, and extremism around the globe. Zarif frames the Saudi war in Yemen, Saudi support for Syria’s Islamist rebels, and other acts as ways to bait Iran and “derail the nuclear agreement” by exacerbating tensions in the region.⁵

The January op-ed appeared at a flashpoint in Iranian-Saudi relations. Eight days earlier, the Saudi government had executed Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, a senior Saudi Shia cleric and political activist, along with forty-six other prisoners (mostly Sunni radicals). The incident caused ire in Iran and elsewhere, with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei warning that the Saudi monarchy would suffer “divine revenge.”⁶ Iraqi Shia militias allied with Iran also promised vengeance.⁷ Fury over the execution of al-Nimr culminated in a large protest outside of the Saudi embassy in Tehran. During the demonstration, a group of hardliners stormed the embassy and set it on fire.

The fallout for Iran was quick. Saudi Arabia and all of its Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) allies (except Oman), plus Jordan, Morocco, and Sudan severed or downgraded diplomatic ties with Iran. The incident was an embarrassment for Iran. The government scrambled to stem the blowback by claiming the attack had been the action of rogue elements and arresting some of the individuals involved. Zarif’s open letter fell into that context, but instead of an apology, it was an attempt to defend Iran by casting Saudi Arabia as the real culprit of regional unrest.

Later that month, Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir, Zarif’s counterpart, responded in kind through a New York Times op-ed of his own. The Saudi official responds to what he calls “outlandish” lies by reminding Zarif of Iran’s reputation:

We [Saudi Arabia] are not the country designated a state sponsor of terrorism; Iran is. We are not the nation under international sanctions for supporting terrorism; Iran is. We are not the nation whose officials are on terrorism [watch] lists; Iran is.⁸

Foreign Minister al-Jubeir further charges that, in condemning Saudi Arabia, Iran “opts to obscure its dangerous sectarian and expansionist policies,” rather than making the necessary effort to transform into a “respectable member of the international community.” For the Saudi foreign minister, Iran’s sectarian behavior has been “consistent since the 1979 revolution.” He points to Iran’s stated “objective of exporting the revolution” as the basis of its foreign policy ills, and he lists Iran’s support for Shia groups, “Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen and sectarian militias in Iraq” as proof of Iran’s continued sectarian agenda. This behavior runs counter to Iran’s stated desire for cooperation, al-Jubeir argues:

While Iran claims its top foreign policy priority is friendship, its behavior shows the opposite is true. Iran is the single-most-belligerent-actor in the region, and its actions display both a commitment to regional hegemony and a deeply held view that conciliatory gestures signal weakness either on Iran’s part or on the part of its adversaries.⁹

Those comments should not be seen simply through the lens of Saudi-Iranian tensions. Rather, Middle Eastern officials widely share this perspective of Iran as a sectarian and expansionist actor in the region. In March 2015, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan accused Iran of “trying to dominate the region” through supporting Shia groups in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.¹⁰ In Iraq, he highlighted the involvement of the Quds Force, a division of Iran’s IRGC, as especially sectarian. Commenting on the Quds commander, Major General Qassem Suleimani, who oversees Iranian military operations abroad, Erdoğan claimed: “This is someone I know very well. . . . So, what is [Iran’s] objective? To increase the power of Shi’ite[s] in Iraq. That’s what they want.” A number of Arab states have made similar indictments regarding Iran’s activities outside its borders. Nearly the entire Arab League, which represents twenty-two states, formally condemned Iran’s foreign “meddling” at its annual 2016 meeting.¹¹ Lebanon was the only league member not to sign the declaration.

Middle Eastern officials widely share this perspective of Iran as a sectarian and expansionist actor.

The anxiety held by many Muslim states concerning Iran’s perceived sectarian aspirations is mostly rooted in the rhetoric and behavior that Tehran’s leaders adopted after the 1979 revolution—the ethno-nationalism of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi and Iran’s history as a Shia state since the early modern Safavid dynasty are deeper sources of tension, but they are not the focus here. The revolution introduced a radical form of Shia Islamism and anti-monarchical views to Iranian politics. That ideological turn terrified the Persian Gulf’s Arab monarchies and neighboring Iraq.¹² With political activism rising in Iraq’s politically disenfranchised Shia-majority community, Saddam Hussein felt his country was especially vulnerable to Iran’s revolution. He claimed that Iraq’s invasion of Iran in 1980, which set off the nearly eight-year Iran-Iraq war, was necessary to shield Iraq and the Sunni Arab world from the spread of the radical Shiism of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini—the father of the revolution and Iran’s first supreme leader.¹³ The GCC, which was formed by the Arab sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf to create a unified front against Iran, backed Saddam Hussein in the war. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in particular bankrolled much of his war effort.¹⁴

As problematic as he was, the Iraqi leader was considered by some to be a vital bulwark against Iran’s ambitions in the Middle East. He governed the most populous Shia country in the Arab world, which houses the most important Shia centers of learning and pilgrimage. Through arrests, torture, and murder, Saddam Hussein ensured that Iran’s Shia revolutionary fervor would not take root in his country, or be embraced by Iraq’s prominent ayatollahs and potentially spread to Arab Shia communities elsewhere in the Persian Gulf. So when he was toppled in 2003, and Shia parties began to gain political power in Iraq, fears of expanding Iranian sectarian influence and regional ambitions skyrocketed in neighboring Gulf states.¹⁵

Sensing Iran’s growing influence in the newly established Iraqi democracy, Jordan’s King Abdullah II warned in 2004 that by building a support base in Iraq, Iran was actually seeking to establish a massive Shia “crescent” that would spread from Iran through Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.¹⁶ This geographic bloc of like-minded polities would challenge the status quo of pro-Western Sunni dominance in the Middle East. Abdullah’s caution was that if Iraq were to become dominated by pro-Iranian Shia parties, this could have a cascading effect in the region. Shia-Sunni tensions could reemerge, which could destabilize Persian Gulf states that have sizable Shia minority populations, such as Saudi Arabia. This would “propel the possibility of a Shiite-Sunni conflict even more” outside of Iraq, Abdullah argued.

From the perspectives of many Arab states and Turkey, if not that of the general observer, recent history has borne out the sectarian conflict that Abdullah warned would occur. They see Shia-dominated, post-Baathist Iraq as the genesis of what has become a series of sectarian-driven conflicts in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, as well as in the Arab Spring protests in Bahrain and the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. Iran is blamed for all of the turmoil. To its critics, these crises are a direct product of Iran’s unchecked ambitions to control the region through the sowing of sectarian discord and the establishment of powerful Shia armed groups across the region.¹⁷

Is Iran a Sectarian Actor?

Iran’s activities in the Middle East are well-documented and can appear sectarian in nature. There is no question that Iran is heavily involved in today’s conflicts in Iraq and Syria. The scope of Iranian activity in Yemen is murkier and more disputed,¹⁸ but Iran does little to hide its support to the Zaidi Shia Houthis and their Ansar Allah movement.¹⁹ The fact that Iran’s allies in these conflicts are non-Sunnis who either share the same brand of Shiism as Iran’s leaders (Lebanese Hezbollah and Iraqi militias) or identify with other forms of Shia Islam (Alawism in Syria and Zaidism in Yemen) is also not in question. Such connections give Iran’s foreign policy a clear sectarian angle. But is Iran’s foreign policy driven by sectarian interests, or is it more complicated than that?

Iran’s activities in the Middle East are well documented and can appear sectarian in nature.

When one analyzes Iran’s strategic behavior and decisionmaking, it is important to note that the country has two main levels of foreign policy, both of which are overseen by the supreme leader and subject to his authority, but which differ in content and form. The first level is state-to-state policy, which in most cases is managed by the elected government in Tehran. The second level is Iran’s relations with nonstate clients, which are overseen by the IRGC and mostly managed outside of the government’s purview.

Iran’s foreign policy can seem contradictory. As the country touts the supremacy of its Islamic system of government, and remains the world’s most vocal proponent of anti-Americanism and anti-Zionism, its relationships show a more diverse picture. Although Iran’s most ardent allies are nonstate actors, mostly Shia Islamist groups, Tehran maintains productive state-to-state ties with a host of countries that espouse a number of non-Islamic systems. Iran is famously closer to India than its Muslim neighbor Pakistan, and Tehran has long favored largely Christian Armenia in its ongoing disputes with largely Shia Azerbaijan.²⁰ Iran’s most ideologically committed civilian and military leaders have also had no difficulty developing important links with atheistic regimes, including those of China, North Korea, and Venezuela.

Most of Iran’s relationships are not driven by ideological or religious considerations.

Iran’s troubling and awkward relationship with al-Qaeda also indicates that there is more to Iranian foreign policy than sectarian goals. A smattering of al-Qaeda operatives and their families have lived in Iran on and off since the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. The first wave, including family members of Osama bin Laden, arrived in Iran having fled U.S. forces in Afghanistan. They were put in detention by Iranian authorities and held on ambiguous legal grounds. Internal al-Qaeda documents seized in the May 2011 Abbottabad raid that killed bin Laden speak of Iran as an enemy, not an ally, and of the group’s members in Iran as prisoners. Iran is also referred to with racial and anti-Shia sectarian epithets.²¹ After Iran’s release of some al-Qaeda members in 2009, an internal memo written to bin Laden or his lieutenants suggests that the release might have been triggered by the organization’s operations against Iran, including the kidnapping of an Iranian “trade deputy in the consulate in Peshawar [a city in Pakistan].” The author of the letter further indicates that al-Qaeda communications with Iran were virtually nil: “They [Iran] did not send any messages to us . . . this is their mentality and method. They don’t want to show that they are negotiating with us or reacting to our pressure. . . .”²²

There appears to be some form of ongoing interaction between Iran and al-Qaeda. Aside from those captives, other al-Qaeda operatives appear to have been allowed to come to Iran and live relatively freely. As recently as July 2016, the U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned several operatives believed to be living in Iran for actively supporting terrorist operations across the region, including in Syria.²³ What purpose al-Qaeda members living in Iran serve, what status they have, and how openly they are able to conduct business is unclear. Although Iran and al-Qaeda are at war in Syria and in Yemen, the two seem to have developed a mutually beneficial relationship, at least concerning the activities and presence of al-Qaeda members operating from Iran. As a 2012 West Point report on the Abbottabad documents concludes, the Iranian–al-Qaeda relationship is “fraught with difficulties.”²⁴ Iran probably values its limited al-Qaeda presence as a form of leverage that could be used, at various times, against the United States, neighbors such as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, or the states that the al-Qaeda suspects hail from.²⁵ The U.S. Department of the Treasury believes that Iran has struck a bargain with the jihadist organization, allowing it a small presence in return for no al-Qaeda–sponsored terrorism or recruitment within its borders.²⁶ Iran might also see al-Qaeda members as potential hostages of its own should it need them. Whatever the case may be, it speaks to an uncomfortable political arrangement.

Why does the Islamic Republic pursue relationships that are hard to square with its religious beliefs? Generally, it is because they correspond with the regime’s politics and antagonism toward the United States, or because they serve some other economic or strategic purpose. Most of Iran’s relationships are not driven by ideological or religious considerations. Rather, Iranian foreign policy, like that of most states, is based on a number of factors. When religion does come into play, it usually intersects with more paramount national security and strategic interests. In many ways, the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy has been fueled by its own realpolitik inclinations—inclinations that have enabled it to engage in arms deals with the United States and Israel during the Iran-Iraq war, maintain a limited relationship with al-Qaeda, and strike a strategic partnership with Russia.²⁷

The Problem With Exporting the Revolution

To understand the rationale behind Iran’s foreign policy, one should note that the 1979 revolution was above all a rejection of foreign dominion over Iran, especially the influence of the United States. Anti-Americanism and anti-imperialism were themes that unified Iran’s diverse revolutionary movement. Revolutionaries used a popular slogan—neither East nor West—to assert their desire for Iran to strike a politically and ideologically independent path. The revolution included strands of Iranian nationalism and Islamism, which, echoing philosopher Frantz Fanon, framed Shia Islam as Iran’s true native political system. Khomeinists also had a strong pan-Islamic agenda.

The 1979 revolution was above all a rejection of foreign dominion over Iran.

After the revolution, Khomeinists emerged as the dominant faction. Their commitment to anti-Americanism was as firm as their desire to establish an Islamic form of government following Khomeini’s thesis of clerical rule (velayat-e faqih). This system of theocratic government, which was adopted in the Islamic Republic’s 1979 constitution, placed near-total control in the hands of a single senior Shia cleric, the supreme leader (rahbar), who would oversee all branches of the state and have veto power over decisionmaking. Iran’s two supreme leaders to date—Khomeini, who held the post from 1979 until his death in 1989, and Ali Khamenei, who succeeded Khomeini that year and has been in power ever since—have acted more as stewards of the decisionmaking process than as micromanagers. Under Khamenei, the supreme leader’s office has become more involved in the policy process than it had been under his predecessor, but even so, as long as official bodies remain within the parameters that the supreme leader sets, they are generally afforded space to pursue their agendas.

Aside from the supreme leader, other governmental institutions were created after the revolution to take on the everyday tasks of building and enforcing policy. The democratically elected executive branch is formally responsible for Iran’s foreign policy, while the appointed Guardian Council—a board of Shia clerical and civilian jurists—vets candidates for office and ensures government policies comport with Shia law. Today, the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) is Iran’s most important body for strategic decisionmaking and is composed of top government officials, military chiefs, and representatives of the supreme leader. The SNSC is said to officially sign off on major foreign policy and strategic decisions—whether they are initially generated by the government or the IRGC—before they are put into action.

Iran’s leaders embraced a radical form of internationalism, viewing foreign policy as the management of antagonisms.

What animated Iran’s decisionmaking calculus after the revolution was an all-encompassing trepidation that the United States or its allies would attempt to overthrow the fledgling revolutionary regime. Iraq’s invasion of Iran in September 1980, and the war that followed, was a manifestation of that fear. The support that Western states and Iran’s Arab neighbors provided Saddam Hussein during the war was proof to Iran that Washington and its allies would go to great lengths to defeat the revolution.²⁸ Iran was surrounded by hostile states and alienated from much of the international community. Iran’s only friend in the region was Syria under Hafez al-Assad, who shared a mutual antagonism for Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.

Tehran’s leadership did not see their alienation as an outcome of their own hostile behavior and rhetoric; rather, it was part of an imperialistic conspiracy aimed at rooting out the nascent Islamic Republic and destroying its theocratic system. As Khomeini asserted in 1984, the war was not against Iran, but against the Islam that Iran promoted:

The superpowers are intent on opposing Islam at present. The other puppet regimes would do likewise. . . . Is it Iran that threatens them or is it Islam? If they call on the Arabs to unite, it is a call to unity against Islam. They consider Islam to be against their interests. You . . . should note that all the powers have risen against Islam and not against Iran. . . . If they find the opportunity and if you do not pay attention Islam will be uprooted.²⁹

The war confirmed for Iran’s leaders that in order to truly safeguard their revolution, its ideology and politics must be spread outside Iran’s borders. The best defense, in their estimation, was a good offense. Iran’s leaders embraced a radical form of internationalism, [that rejected] the norms of liberal internationalism.³⁰ Their approach included a policy of exporting the revolution, which meant taking the revolution’s politics and ideological values to other oppressed polities—especially in the developing world—and helping like-minded liberation and Islamic movements achieve self-determination.³¹

The IRGC was the prime mechanism for this policy. As the organization stated in 1980:

We have no recourse but to mobilize all of the faithful forces of the Islamic Revolution, and with the mobilization of forces in every region, we must strike fear into the hearts of our enemies so that the idea of invasion and the destruction of our Islamic Revolution will exit from their minds. If our revolution does not have an internationalistic and aggressive worldview the enemies of Islam will once again enslave us culturally and politically.³²

It was under the rubric of exporting the revolution that Iran pursued partnerships with a range of nonstate actors. Through the IRGC, Tehran funneled support to the mostly Sunni Palestinian movement—it also backed Christian Palestinian militants, such as George Habash and his secular Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. A similar effort led to the organization of non-Iranian Shia groups that, unlike the Palestinians, not only accepted Iranian support but also adopted Khomeinist ideology as their own. Hezbollah in Lebanon is the foremost example of the IRGC’s success in cultivating a closely knit allegiance with a foreign entity along shared political and religious lines. The other lasting successes are the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and its Badr military wing, which were established by Iraqi Shia expatriates in Iran and trained by the IRGC during the Iran-Iraq war.³³

The assertive behavior of supporting nonstate groups in the Middle East thus became a foundational element of Iran’s post-1979 foreign policy. Iran’s leaders considered this approach to be essential to the long-term success and security of the Islamic revolution. Although the scope of Iran’s foreign activities waned throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s as the country focused on healing its war-torn economy, it continued to support allied groups outside its borders and looked for opportunities to expand its client base, as it did in Bosnia during the Balkan war of the 1990s.³⁴