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Summary

Corruption is a destabilizing force in Tunisia, infecting all levels of its economy, security, and political system. Once tightly controlled under former president Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, corruption has now become endemic, with everyday citizens engaging in and benefitting from corrupt practices. Numerous legal measures and civil society initiatives have been working to fight corruption, but it is perceived to be even more pervasive today than it was under Ben Ali. For the democratic transition to survive, Tunisia must fight a two-front war to simultaneously address the former kleptocracy and the emergence of widespread petty corruption. And to be successful, government and civil society must first agree on a framework for understanding and implementing the war. The international community should then support this framework with targeted funding and assistance.

Effective Measures

Government mechanisms to address corruption are failing for two primary reasons. First, the government is focused largely on enacting legislation to sideline the bad actors of the postrevolutionary environment and to deter individuals from engaging in corrupt practices. Meanwhile, conversely, civil society is focused on transitional justice and reconciling with the past. Second, the government’s top-down method of addressing corruption, evident by the economic reconciliation bill, has led to mistrust and a lack of public buy-in. To address the most damaging forms of corruption, the Tunisian government should:

• Implement and enforce existing laws, beginning with the enforcement of the law requiring Tunisian officials to publicly declare their assets.
• Involve civil society in the creation and implementation of anticorruption measures to ensure public buy-in of reforms.
• Prioritize the establishment of the constitutional court and ensure the independence of the Financial Judiciary Pole, charged with investigating, prosecuting, and adjudicating financial corruption cases.
• Digitize government processes by reinvigorating the Tunisia Digital 2020 initiative and using the proposed national identification system to help capture the informal sector.
• Invest heavily in the border regions to provide exit options from the informal sector, such as education and private sector jobs.

Targeted Support

If left unaddressed, corruption will remain a central roadblock to Tunisia’s democratic consolidation and increasingly add to the region’s serious economic and security challenges. To help reduce corruption, the international community should:

• Prioritize funding of Tunisia’s anticorruption bodies, including the National Anti-Corruption Authority and the Financial Judiciary Pole, as well as civil society watchdog groups, such as Al Bawsala and I Watch.
• Continue to strengthen civil society and ensure that Tunisia maintains a free media.
• Call out the government when it backtracks on anticorruption efforts.

Introduction

Over the past few years, Tunisia has made remarkable progress—from establishing democratic political institutions and processes to professionalizing the security services to revitalizing the tourism industry. Nevertheless, corruption continues to be a contagion, putting this and further progress at risk. Now decentralized, corruption plagues every aspect of Tunisia’s economic, political, and security reform process, undermining faith in institutions and promising prospective instability.

“Corruption is a contagious disease that invades the whole country.”
—Male, age 35–65, Tunis

From the start, there has been widespread recognition among the government and public that corruption must be addressed. It was one of the first issues that Tunisia took on during the postrevolutionary period. On January 15, 2011, only a day after the departure of former president Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, the provisional government established the Commission of Inquiry into Misappropriation and Corruption under the leadership of Abdelfattah Amor. And since then, numerous other legal or official mechanisms have been established. Yet, nearly seven years later, corruption is more widespread today than it was under Ben Ali. Numerous factors contributing to this problem have been documented, but two warrant further exploration and attention.¹ First, various stakeholders view corruption and how to address it differently. Tunisia is facing a two-front battle against corruption—reconciling with past corruption and eradicating ongoing corruption. The government has been primarily focused on the latter, enacting legislation to both sideline the bad actors taking advantage of the postrevolutionary environment and to deter future acts of embezzlement, fraud, and nepotism. Many civil society actors, however, are not ready to close the book on the Ben Ali regime and are still seeking justice for past crimes. Civil society has been a prime driver in pushing for a comprehensive transitional justice process that addresses both physical crimes, such as torture, and economic crimes, such as embezzlement and favoritism. Thus, when civil society and government actors speak about corruption, they often speak past each other, leading to public anger over even the most well-meaning official anticorruption measures.

Second, the government’s more recent anticorruption efforts have been developed through top-down, rather than bottom-up, processes. Tunisia’s initial major anticorruption efforts—the National Anti-Corruption Authority and the Truth and Dignity Body—grew out of an inclusive, consultative process among the government, civil society, and general public. By contrast, later efforts—the Law on Administrative Reconciliation and the “war on corruption”—have largely circumvented or marginalized the earlier consensus-based mechanisms. These initiatives are lacking public buy-in that is integral for reforms to succeed.²

“Corruption is so many things, but if we had to define it in a sentence, corruption is the experience of the Tunisian almost daily.”
—Female, age 35-65, Tunis

Bridging the gap between different viewpoints and preventing backsliding in the country’s democratic transition will require reaching a shared understanding of corruption and the related implications and priorities. This understanding should result in an effort to reinvigorate initiatives focused on justice for past corruption and to simultaneously move forward those focused on deterrence. Failing to fight this two-front battle could undermine Tunisia’s democratic transition.

What Does Corruption Look Like in Tunisia?

Academic and policy literature are generally in agreement that corruption refers to “the abuse of public office for private gain.”³ This is a broad term that encompasses many types of activities and interactions—from small bribes to grand, systemic corruption—and can occur in any government sector and at any level. Tunisian law (Article 2 of Decree Law 2011-120) takes the definition a step further to include the private sector. The law defines corruption as the “bad use of authority or power or function for personal interest.”⁴ Here, corruption encompasses all forms of bribery in the public and private sectors; embezzlement; waste, fraud, and the misappropriation of public funds; the abuse of power; and money laundering.⁵

While some degree of corruption exists in every country, under the Ben Ali regime, corruption was so centralized that it made the regime’s inner circle, particularly first lady Leila Trabelsi and her family, globally infamous.⁶ Trabelsi and her ten siblings held controlling interests in numerous Tunisian businesses, including airlines, car dealerships, internet providers, radio and television stations, and large retailers.⁷ A World Bank study on state capture in Tunisia identified 662 firms owned by the Ben Ali family that were confiscated in the first anticorruption efforts after the revolution.⁸ These firms represented only 0.2 percent of private firms but accounted for 5 percent of private sector output and 16 percent of all net private sector profits. Tunisia’s National Commission to Investigate Corruption and Embezzlement, created shortly after the revolution to investigate corruption under Ben Ali and recover stolen funds and assets, discovered billions of dollars housed in shell companies and foreign bank accounts held by Trabelsi family members and their close associates.⁹

Unsurprisingly, corruption in pre-revolutionary Tunisia was the most tangible symbol of the regime’s indifference to the interests of the people. In recognition, immediately following the revolution, the government focused on addressing past corruption through a series of transitional justice and legal mechanisms. But while the country focused on tackling grand corruption, petty corruption flourished. Thus, today, the government has shifted its attention toward (1) catching those who are benefitting most from the chaos of the postrevolutionary period and (2) addressing smuggling—one of the most dangerous yet common forms of corruption.

From Systemic to Endemic

Counterintuitively, according to external measures, the overall level of corruption in Tunisia is perceived to have risen since the revolution. In 2010, Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index ranked Tunisia 59 out of 178 countries (1 being the least corrupt), with a score of 4.3 (10 being the least corrupt). In 2016, Tunisia’s ranking dropped to 75 out of 176 countries (1 being the least corrupt), with a score of 41 (100 being the least corrupt).¹⁰ Internal measures indicate a similar trend: in the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s survey of 391 Tunisians in July and August 2017, 76 percent of respondents said there is more corruption in Tunisia today than there was under Ben Ali (see Box 1 for the key findings).

“The war on corruption is not likely to succeed because the main parties do not want it to.”
—Male, age 35–65, Sousse

These perceptions stem from several shifts in the awareness and nature of corruption. First, corruption is no longer a taboo topic. As one civil society actor explained it, people started to “wake up” in 2011 in regard to corruption. A “collective awareness [developed] of the need to deal with corruption.”¹¹ The revolution made it possible for Tunisians to talk about the Trabelsi clan as well as everyday petty corruption. This explains, in part, why the Corruption Perceptions Index numbers have gone up, not down. During the Ben Ali period, no Tunisians dared to speak about corruption, making studies on the problem challenging. Today, corruption is a regular topic of conversation, and daily accusations of corruption are lobbied at government officials, parliamentarians, business leaders, and civil society activists.

Second, since the revolution, corruption has been “democratized,” according to the head of the National Anti-Corruption Authority (INLUCC), Chawki Tabib.¹² Under Ben Ali, Tunisia had “a diabolically intrusive system of state corruption.”¹³ That is, corruption permeated every sector, and embezzlement and nepotism were the norms that guided his rule. The Trabelsi family operated a mafia of sorts, using tax audits to control people and exploiting customs agents as their personal enforcers.¹⁴ A Tunisian who worked for the Ben Ali household for nearly two decades said Ben Ali and Trabelsi saw Tunisia as “a vast personal enterprise that they could tap at any moment.”¹⁵ Thus, corruption under Ben Ali primarily benefited his small inner circle and their representatives at the local level (who were closely monitored for compliance with the boss’s orders). Today, however, the tools of corruption are available to anyone. An August 2017 survey by the International Republican Institute (IRI) found that 17 percent of Tunisians have personally experienced corruption by hospitals, 13 percent by traffic police, 8 percent by the courts, 8 percent by public schools, and 6 percent by private businesses.¹⁶ According to the same survey, more Tunisians (64 percent) believe that “being well-connected” is “very likely to lead to personal wealth” than “intelligence” (61 percent), “being born into a wealthy family” (60 percent), “hard work” (38 percent), or “a high education level” (37 percent).¹⁷ As one civil society actor said, corruption is “becoming part of the culture.”¹⁸

During a Carnegie workshop in September 2017, some civil society actors argued that Tunisia’s general public has a “tolerant attitude toward corruption.”¹⁹ This is partly due to the bloated and complicated Tunisian bureaucracy. For citizens to meet their basic needs, they must interact with an opaque and complex system where it is easier to pay a bribe than to go through official channels. As one civil society actor said, “The problem lies with the administration, not the Tunisian personality.” He explained that Tunisians have developed a forgiving attitude toward petty corruption out of necessity, noting that if a Tunisian were to live in a more developed country with a more transparent bureaucracy, “he would give up this attitude.” He also noted that foreigners, including those from countries with very low levels of corruption, end up paying bribes in Tunisia because they are necessary to efficiently carry out everyday tasks.²⁰

“Corruption is a general state of mind because no one has confidence in the application of the law.”
—Male, age 35–65, Tunis

Corruption is now particularly bad along Tunisia’s border with Libya, where smugglers have taken advantage of the removal of authoritarian control in both countries to dramatically expand their business to include arms and other illicit goods. Under Ben Ali, smuggling was rampant, but his security officials knew the smugglers by name and only allowed certain goods to cross the border. Essentially, Ben Ali’s network controlled the type and amount of corruption taking place and could therefore punish anyone, including local officials, who stepped out of line.²¹ Much like Tunisia’s neighbors across North Africa, the pre-revolutionary regime kept tight control over dangerous smuggling practices to safeguard Tunisia’s security. Today, there is no tacit agreement that prevents the smuggling of arms and drugs over the border.²²

What Are the Impacts of Corruption?

Corruption has both clear and less obvious impacts. It has a direct economic impact on citizens’ lives—by taking money away from the state coffers and putting it into the hands of corrupt individuals—and on foreign investment. It also has an impact on political systems, eroding trust between the government and the governed. Finally, it can breed instability and indirectly assist terrorist groups with achieving their goals.

Economic Implications

The economic implications of corruption are perhaps the most obvious. The World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) “regard corruption as a major obstacle to achieving sustainable economic growth and equitable development.”²³ And several academic studies have found an inverse relationship between levels of corruption and economic growth.²⁴ The cost of corruption is also very high. Some studies estimated that in the decade before the revolution, Tunisia lost, on average, an amount equivalent to about 2 percent of its gross domestic product per year.²⁵ And Tunisia’s complex bureaucracy and heavy regulation cost firms about 13 percent of revenues and incentivize corruption.²⁶

“There are politicians who themselves are corrupt . . . and who put a stick in the wheels [of anti-corruption measures].”
—Female, age 35–65, Sfax

Because transaction costs are greater than in noncorrupt markets, every economic transaction in a corrupt economy has a “corruption tax,” which harms the overall economic situation of a country or industry. Specifically, consumers pay higher prices than in a noncorrupt country. Further, “firms have no incentive to improve product quality, and the productivity gains and innovation that would come from new firms is halted. In other words, [corruption] undermines the competitiveness of the economy, hampering investment and the creation of jobs.”²⁷

Corruption also hinders socioeconomic development, particularly in the interior and south. According to some Tunisian entrepreneurs, this is due to the centrally controlled decisionmaking process.²⁸ As former Carnegie nonresident scholar Hamza Meddeb argues, “state officials, bankers, and business owners participate in networks that bind them together and facilitate corrupt practices. . . . These networks exercise control over state resources, especially bank credit and licenses, and are influential within the public administration.”²⁹ While Tunisia is preparing to embark on a decentralization process, beginning with local elections,³⁰ Meddeb argues that repeatedly postponing the local elections³¹ has created a “sense of impunity” among the local actors, “which in turn creates a sort of systemic and decentralized corruption.”³² And according to a National Democratic Institute (NDI) study, some people worry that the local elections are corrupt and the “wrong people” may be elected. A twenty-five-year-old Tunisian student put it this way, “I think corruption could be decentralized: I think it could move from corruption in one place to so many places.”³³

A high level of corruption also deters investment by undermining the trust of potential foreign and domestic investors, as well as creating unnecessary risks. Corruption regularly ranks as one of the top constraints to doing business in Tunisia.³⁴ Corruption affects both the level of foreign direct investment (FDI) and its country of origin. Countries with higher corruption generally attract lower FDI from countries that have signed anticorruption measures (globally) and higher FDI from countries with more corruption.³⁵ This reality is problematic for Tunisia, given that it seeks more investment from Europe and the United States, which are rated as less corrupt by most indices.

Additionally, corruption has second-order effects on the Tunisian economy. There is some evidence that corruption globally may impact the poor to a greater degree than the wealthy or middle class.³⁶ For example, the poor may be unable to afford bribes to receive services. And “when corruption results in shoddy public services, the poor lack the resources to pursue ‘exit’ options such as private schooling, health care, or power generation.” ³⁷

“To fight corruption, the Tunisian government must break free from lobbies and enforce the laws.”
—Male, 35–65, Sfax

According to Tabib, the parallel economy (in other words, the black market) now constitutes about half of the Tunisian economy: “While the Tunisian economy is actually doing fairly well, the state is impoverished because half of all transactions are taking place outside the official economy.”³⁸ This problem is highly complex, however. While there is consensus on the need to crack down on the smuggling of illicit goods (weapons, drugs, people), many in Tunisia’s marginalized south rely on the smuggling of legal goods (oil, foodstuffs) for their livelihood. An anticorruption policy that shuts off the smuggling pipeline without providing alternative sources of long-term, sustainable income for smugglers will lead to further poverty and mistrust, along with continued social unrest. Adequately addressing the problem will require “an economic infrastructure that creates jobs rather than asking people to create their own employment” and “an educational strategy for the high rate of young people who have quit school at an early age to join the contraband trade.”³⁹

Political Implications

Widespread corruption can have a negative impact on a country’s image on the world stage. But more directly, corruption erodes trust between citizens and their government and contributes to the decline of public services. In Tunisia, this erosion of trust is clear. While not solely due to corruption, trust in government fell in Tunisia from 62 percent in 2011 to 16 percent in 2014.⁴⁰ In IRI’s August 2017 survey, 31 percent and 41 percent of respondents gave President Beji Caid Essebsi and Prime Minister Youssef Chahed, respectively, either a “favorable” or “somewhat favorable” rating.⁴¹ That is down from 43 percent for Caid Essebsi and 44 percent for Chahed in December 2016.⁴²

Furthermore, according to an Arab Barometer survey, younger citizens (ages eighteen to twenty-nine) are more likely to say nepotism or favoritismis prevalent than those age fifty and older.⁴³ Similarly, protesters and younger Tunisians show lower levels of trust in the Tunisian government.⁴⁴ This demographic divide is important for several reasons. Young people constituted the bulk of the revolutionaries, so for them to lose faith in the institutions they fought to put in place could be potentially destabilizing for Tunisia’s democratic transition.⁴⁵ And, relatedly, extremist groups targeting the Tunisian state and its institutions could seek to recruit youths disenchanted with their political system and economic situation.

“To fight corruption the Tunisian government should sanction the corrupt publicly without complacency and without exception.”
—Male, 18–35, Tunis

Widespread corruption typically reduces the quality of government institutions, particularly the bureaucracy. When bureaucrats become accustomed to engaging in corrupt practices, it becomes harder to implement public policies that are in the best interest of the state and citizenry. The quality of administrative services also deteriorates. According to a 2015 study by the Tunisian Association of Public Auditors, 70 percent of Tunisians think that corruption is a means of facilitating daily transactions.⁴⁶ This makes it more difficult to implement anticorruption efforts at the administrative level and to recruit strong candidates for government positions.

Security Implications

Corruption directly threatens security by providing opportunities for traffickers—of weapons, drugs, and humans—to bring illicit goods into the country. Lax border controls resulting from a system of bribery can make money laundering easier and can assist in the spread of terrorism.⁴⁷ Tunisians can cross over into Libya to train with the self-proclaimed Islamic State or other terrorist groups and go on to Iraq and Syria. Tunisians can also cross into Libya to prepare for attacks on Tunisian soil. As one Tunisian security analyst said of the Tunisian-Libyan border, “as long as there are corrupt customs officials working with the smugglers, border fences are useless.”⁴⁸ Chahed has used the connection between smuggling and terrorist financing as the primary justification for his war on corruption: “We are persuaded there is a link between smuggling, terrorism financing, cross-border activities, and also capital flight.”⁴⁹

According to a 2015 Transparency International report, there is a high risk of corruption in Tunisia’s defense and security sector due to a lack of transparency and scrutiny in “procurement, budgeting, institutional oversight, and accountability.”⁵⁰ There is also little public debate regarding the defense industry, which has the potential to erode trust between the Tunisian security forces and the citizenry.⁵¹ In an April 2017 IRI survey, when asked which government institution they trust most to provide services to their family, 31 percent of Tunisians said “no one.”⁵² And while 87 percent of Tunisians said they trust the army to protect them “a great deal,” only 53 percent said the same of the national police and 61 percent of the national guard.⁵³

Ultimately, this mistrust can serve as a tool for extremist recruitment. Political scientists Jessica C. Teets and Erica Chenoweth argue that terrorists might be motivated by the presence of corruption and can recruit based on the idea that they are fighting corrupt leaders.⁵⁴ Terrorist groups “may develop within or attack corrupt states because they resent the government’s inconsistent application of the rule of law.”⁵⁵ While there is no evidence directly linking corruption and terrorism in Tunisia, groups and individuals continue to target Tunisia’s economic infrastructure and political institutions, such as the Bardo Museum and Sousse resort in March and June 2015, respectively.

“Corruption has led to unemployment and the poverty of the honest people.”
—Female, over age 65, Tunis

Many factors motivate individuals to join extremist groups, but, as noted earlier, there is a clear opportunity for terrorist recruiters to exploit the growing sense of discontentment among many Tunisian youth. And when those youth encounter corruption—whether through everyday bribery, nepotism, favoritism, or other means—they have a tangible example of the inequality that persists.

For instance, Tunisians fear that corruption is influencing hiring processes.⁵⁶ With more than half of university graduates under age thirty-five unemployed, this is troubling.⁵⁷ Some people feel that they “have invested time and money in education and training only to be overlooked for a position that they feel went to someone much less qualified.”⁵⁸ This feeling is perfect fuel for extremist recruitment. And other research has sh