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Summary

Following constitutional revisions in 2011, Morocco’s Party of Justice and Development (PJD) led the government through a period of reform and greater political engagement. In doing so, the party sought to redefine the relationships among political parties, the palace, and the populace. The fact that it secured a historic second term affirmed the importance of connecting directly with the people.  

However, the palace—to protect its dominant political position—has responded by disrupting the formation of a second PJD-led government; neutralizing the party’s leader, Abdelilah Benkirane; and reasserting its role in the country’s political management. On the surface, these actions indicate an end to the post-2011 political opening, but the PJD, while weakened, maintains support at the local and regional levels and still has the chance to improve local governance.

Further, the palace’s interventions paradoxically run the risk of stripping the monarchy of the very buffer provided by elected institutions and politicians. By undermining the government, the palace leaves itself exposed to criticism, anger, and, potentially, accountability.

A Mark of Change

• The most important legacy of the PJD’s tenure from 2012 to 2016 is its effort to negotiate a greater role for the government. The PJD’s then leader and prime minister, Benkirane, was able to treat the monarchy as both an obstacle and a source of validation—thus revealing the palace’s red lines and showing his ability to play within the confines of the political system. 
• Although the PJD’s reform record has been mixed—particularly related to anticorruption, the judiciary, and the structural economy—the party has managed to convince citizens of its ability to govern, evidenced by its successes in local and regional elections and its decisive win in the 2016 national election.

An Uncertain Future

• The PJD recognizes the challenges in both appeasing the palace and governing effectively. Its efforts to date have exposed the inherent incongruities and costs of simultaneously pursuing the two tasks.
• The party’s eighth congress, in December 2017, ended its divisive debate on leadership by rejecting Benkirane’s bid for a third term as secretary-general. But the party remains the leader of a large, diluted coalition that is being undermined by the palace’s interference in public administration.
• However, if the PJD manages to effectively communicate to the public the increased limitations it faces, it could overcome the fallout from the past few months.   
• The PJD’s experience has demonstrated that an alternative, albeit risky, approach exists for Morocco’s political parties if they are willing to take it.

Introduction

King Mohammed VI’s constitutional reforms in response to the 2011 protests promised more dynamism for Morocco’s predictable politics and an opportunity for its discredited political class. However, recent events indicate that the story is taking a turn. The constitutional reforms opened up the political space and provided an opportunity for parties to play a bigger role in governing the country. This paved the way for Morocco’s Islamist Party of Justice and Development (PJD) to carve a larger role for the government between 2012 and 2016. After making some notable progress in key reform areas, the party, led by then incumbent prime minister Abdelilah Benkirane, went on to win a plurality of seats in the October 2016 parliamentary elections—largely because the populace perceived the PJD as capable of governing. But the palace soon began to view the party’s success as a threat.

After the PJD’s second historic electoral win, the palace, through political manipulations of opposition parties and former partners, maneuvered to block Benkirane from forming a second coalition—arguably to counterbalance the party’s popularity and protect its own political and economic interests.

By March 2017, the king called for Benkirane to be replaced, naming the more subdued PJD figure Saadeddine Othmani as prime minister–designate. And during its eighth congress on December 9 and 10, the PJD elected Othamni as secretary-general, putting an end to Benkirane’s leadership aspirations.

By neutralizing Benkirane and pressuring the party to be part of a large coalition, the palace created the conditions for a weaker PJD-led government, leaving the party internally divided and unable to capitalize on its electoral win and reform successes. Understanding the palace’s intervention against the PJD and the broader implications for the country moving forward requires close examination of the party’s experience in power, its testing of the palace’s red lines while remaining loyal, and its direct linkages to the Moroccan people. The palace and other political actors either underestimated or failed to foresee that any political party could take advantage of the constitutional openings and translate them into electoral success and greater outreach to the population. Only Benkirane and the PJD seemed to fully grasp the opportunities around greater citizen interest in politics and the post-2011 feeling of political agency.

The palace created the conditions for a weaker PJD-led government, leaving the party internally divided.

The PJD’s post-2011 achievements—and their implications for the broader exercise of power in Morocco—should not be diminished. The main legacy of the PJD’s experience in leading the government from 2012 to 2016 was its efforts to negotiate a greater role and independence for the government and, by extension, for the party. While this furtive progress is coming to a halt, the PJD’s experience remains an important case study for how a political actor created an alternative governing approach and attempted to redefine its relationship with the palace. For the palace, the PJD’s experience—powerful enough to cause a backlash—risked dispelling the notion that political actors are ineffectual.

The monarchy’s response to the PJD seeking a greater role for the parliament and for political parties, as mandated by Morocco’s 2011 constitution, has been to retract the brief political opening and once again heavily manipulate politics and political parties. However, the monarchy’s reassertion of control in such a heavy-handed manner has the potential to generate popular anger. One lasting legacy of the 2011 protest wave is citizens’ interest in their political fate and future. The unrest in the central northern Rif region that went on for months is one example of how Moroccans are increasingly taking an interest in and ownership of the country’s politics and development—demanding better governance, greater transparency, increased economic opportunities, and more respect for their basic rights.

For the palace, the PJD’s experience—powerful enough to cause a backlash—risked dispelling the notion that political actors are ineffectual.

Morocco provided an alternative to the post-2011 political trajectories across the region. By avoiding a revolution, the palace maintained stability and peace, and by offering some political space, it allowed its people to hope for more prosperity and a stake in the country’s politics. Yet the palace today is pushing for greater economic and security stability, even as it shuts down political engagement and independence. However, greater economic prosperity and development will depend on the strength of the country’s institutions—which are overruled, heavily controlled, and often made obsolete by the king. As long as the monarchy resists allowing these institutions to become strong and independent, the country’s long-term social and economic development will be limited and the potential for instability will be considerable.

The Palace’s Sharing of Power

In contrast to other Arab monarchies, Morocco has a history of diverse and dynamic political parties and elections. However, prior to 2011, these parties rarely exercised any genuine power separate from the palace. In fact, the monarchy promoted a multiparty system to ensure that no single party could dominate politics and weaken its authority.¹

There are currently thirty-three official political parties in Morocco, which span the spectrum of political ideologies from communist to Islamist.² They vary in size and relevance, with the most notable being the PJD; the center-right Istiqlal Party, Morocco’s oldest, with a storied history as leader of the movement for independence; and the center-left Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP), which was the torchbearer of opposition during the repressive years of King Hassan II. There is also an array of parties closely connected to the palace, including the National Rally of Independents (RNI); the Constitutional Union (UC); the Popular Movement (MP); and a relative newcomer to Moroccan politics, the Party of Authenticity and Modernity (PAM), which was founded in 2008 by Fouad Ali El Himma, a close friend and adviser to King Mohammed VI and whose dislike of the Islamists is well known.

When Mohammed VI ascended to the throne in 1999, he inherited from his father, Hassan II, a system that generates and exploits unruly party politics to fragment and discredit the political class, helping the king to cement his monopoly over power.³ Frequent infighting within Moroccan parties, as well as their disorganization, aided this strategy.⁴ King Mohammed VI went on to cement the tradition of a political party deriving its power more from its proximity to the palace than the appeal of its ideology or program. Over time, the distinction between opposition and loyalist parties became harder to discern, as all parties, by choice or necessity, inched closer to the monarchy to ensure their political survival.⁵ In that way, they increasingly lost their connection to voters, adding to Moroccans’ disillusionment with their political elite. This was reflected by citizens’ general apathy toward the political process, low voter turnout in elections, and mistrust of politicians, especially among youth.⁶

Over time, the distinction between opposition and loyalist parties became harder to discern.

The so-called Government of Change (Gouvernement d’Alternance) in the late 1990s was illustrative of the challenges faced by Moroccan political parties. After the November 1997 elections, the palace invited leftists in the opposition, including the USFP, to form a government as part of a supposed reform plan. In March 1998, the USFP formed a coalition with six other parties, and though this government was severely checked by the palace, it raised expectations for reform. Ultimately, however, reform efforts were stymied by the palace’s interventions and internal and intra-party discord, which proved insurmountable.⁷

Much like the PJD-led government, the USFP-led government in 1998 came into office following constitutional changes that granted expanded powers to the government and parliament; however, it struggled to determine a role for itself in the face of a powerful monarchy. While the USFP had an official role in government, its inability to tackle important social welfare projects discredited the party.⁸ The USFP-led government had to contend with the presence of palace-aligned ministers who arguably stymied its work—most notably, at the start, the all-powerful minister of interior and Hassan II’s right hand, Driss Basri. Once the new king came to the throne, items the government either prioritized or sought to tackle—such as human rights issues, women’s empowerment, and other social and economic initiatives—were overtaken by the king. The government appeared completely overshadowed and grew useless in the eyes of Moroccans.⁹ By appearing to give such parties a stake in the system while still tightly controlling them, the monarchy ensured that they would fail in the eyes of the public, dispelling any notion that they might become effective partners or alternatives to the monarchy.

As public perceptions of political parties sank, the palace was once again highlighted as the actor most able to address popular concerns. Especially early in his reign, King Mohammed VI fostered a reputation for being compassionate and kind, which created a sense that a new era of palace-driven openness and prosperity was coming. This further sidelined the political parties. The king acknowledged past human rights violations and sought to address the country’s dire poverty and development issues. Most significant among these efforts were the 2004 reforms of the Moudawana (family status code), which legislated significant improvements in women’s rights. Also in 2004, the king established the Equity and Reconciliation Commission to address past human rights abuses and, in 2005, launched a number of economic and social development programs, including the National Initiative for Human Development.¹⁰ This was in addition to personal charity initiatives, such as the Mohammed V Foundation for Solidarity that he established in 1999.¹¹

At home, the king’s reforms and initiatives, while welcomed by the population, also reinforced traditional political dynamics in the country.

Domestically, the king’s popularity was high. A poll conducted in 2009 found that 91 percent of Moroccans judged his ten-year reign to be positive.¹² The international community was particularly impressed by his efforts; while viewed through a comparative lens, they rightly stood out against his father’s oppressive rule.¹³ At home, the king’s reforms and initiatives, while welcomed by the population, also reinforced traditional political dynamics in the country. The king was the effective governing authority, while political parties were ineffective and even counterproductive when it came to Morocco’s progress. Though the population was comforted in the knowledge that the most repressive of Hassan II’s years were over, the enthusiasm over Mohammed IV’s reign and what it could achieve gradually subsided; it became clear that attempts at reforms were largely symbolic and fell short of providing the needed economic, political, and social change.

In this context, the popular protests of 2011 resonated in Morocco. In early 2011, King Mohammed VI sought to get ahead of the antigovernment narratives sweeping the region. By March 2011, protests had effectively brought down the entrenched regimes of president Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and president Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia and plunged Libya into civil war. Morocco’s protests, labeled the February 20 Movement, brought together Moroccans across the ideological, religious, social, and political spectrums. The protests gathered momentum across Moroccan towns, with protesters calling for solutions to the country’s urgent economic and social issues but particularly the country’s persistent political issues: lack of accountability, corruption, nepotism, and inefficiency of government institutions, among others.

In response, on March 9, 2011, only two and a half weeks into Morocco’s protest movement, the king made a televised speech promising constitutional changes.¹⁴ The February 20 Movement gradually faded, largely because the king’s response took the wind out of its sails and the population was appeased by his response and its promise. The movement also lacked a strong organizational structure that could hold it together, and, eventually, the variety of views and perspectives that gave it its initial strength contributed to its weakness. There are also allegations that it was infiltrated by government loyalists who sought to weaken it from within. But the movement’s main contribution was that it helped bring on the constitutional revision, which, in turn, provided a greater role for government institutions. The movement showed the extent to which citizens were willing to engage when they perceive change to be possible—and potentially help bring about that change.

During the referendum of July 1, 2011, the new constitution passed with a 98 percent majority. About 73 percent of registered voters participated, greatly surpassing the turnout in most previous elections and underlining the popular expectation for change.¹⁵ Although the constitutional changes fell short of what many hoped to see, they did expand mandates for the prime minister, the government, and the parliament to allow them a greater role in the legislative and governing processes while preserving the king’s role.¹⁶

In principle, the constitutional changes would have allowed parties some opportunities for greater engagement. However, all but the Islamists found themselves unable to capitalize on that potential.¹⁷ As in other Arab countries that faced uprisings in 2011, Islamists, notably the PJD, were better positioned than the traditional political forces to benefit from the new political environment. While they were understood to be a part of the same political establishment that Moroccans were unhappy with, the PJD maintained a degree of comparative credibility that translated into more votes in the polls. Although the party had distanced itself from the February 20 Movement protests, the political openings allowed it to take advantage of its reputation as a relatively less corrupt political actor. Its clear platform, more democratic internal organization, strong grassroots connections, and reputation for relative independence appealed to the populace.¹⁸ Also, its limited government experience was an advantage in this case, given the public’s skepticism about traditional political forces. The party, which has been participating in elections since 1997 when it won eight seats, has gradually increased its shares of parliamentary seats but remained in the opposition until 2011.¹⁹

Islamists, notably the PJD, were better positioned than the traditional political forces to benefit from the new political environment.

Prior to 2011, the PJD was not seen as having accomplished much as part of the political process, but the party’s parliamentarians were more competent than their peers and not entirely driven by self-interest.²⁰ At that time, the PJD was focused on enhancing its governance credentials while strengthening its local presence and grassroots outreach. It is active on campuses and schools through civil society—namely the Movement of Unity and Reform (MUR), a large charity and educational (including preaching, or da’wa) institution with a presence across the kingdom—and further supported by an external network of loosely affiliated schools, health centers, and other professional organizations. The MUR is often considered the religious arm of the PJD and an ideological influencer. The two entities’ histories are intertwined and they still draw from the same pool of talent: members of the PJD leadership. Ministers or former ministers have a role in the MUR, and they also maintain strong communication and organization channels. Although the MUR members and the PJD members deny any interference in the party’s affairs and the two entities insist on boundaries, the links between them remain strong and have been characterized as “strategic cooperation.”²¹

The PJD’s links to the MUR, with its religious proselytizing, only add to debate about the broader question of the exact nature of the religious versus political character of the party. As it evolved and its political participation increased, the PJD became increasingly less reflective of the traditional framework of Islamist parties. This has been especially true since it came to power in 2011. With respect to the role of religion and how it defined the PJD’s political engagement, a decade earlier the 2003 terrorist attacks in Casablanca and the ensuing scrutiny of political Islam drove the party to emphasize its similarities with other political parties in Morocco. And as its engagement in national politics grew, it had to temper and play down its religious character. In practice, and certainly during its time in government, the PJD has largely operated as any secular party. The socially conservative elements of its agenda had already been toned down significantly. Benkirane, previously seen as a hard-line figure, realized that pursuing a religious—meaning a socially conservative—agenda would further pigeonhole the PJD and prevent it from gaining wide support. In 2011, as prime minister–designate, Benkirane declared that once he headed a government, “I will never be interested in the private life of people. Allah created mankind free. I will never ask if a woman is wearing a short skirt or a long skirt.”²² From then on, there was little in the party’s tone and focus that distinguished it from nonreligious parties.

In practice, and certainly during its time in government, the PJD has largely operated as any secular party.

Like other Islamist movements across the region, the PJD’s connection to the population has been an important character and asset. Politically, the party’s gradual and low-profile approaches to participation, together with its clear support for the monarchy’s political and religious role, reassured the king that the party did not constitute a threat to the political order.²³ This deference to the monarchy—a requirement to remain in the political game—and gradual participation in elections amounted to a more pragmatic agenda that mostly stayed away from divisive religious or dogmatic issues, especially after 2003. The combination of the PJD’s experience and the post-2011 mood in Morocco created an ideal situation for the party. Not too close to the palace to be seen as co-opted but close enough to be able to participate in politics, the party signaled it would focus on serving the Moroccan people. This message resonated in the November 2011 parliamentary elections, when the PJD came in first with 107 seats out of 395 in the lower house, followed by the Istiqlal Party with 60 seats.²⁴ On November 29, in line with the new constitution, the king asked Abdelilah Benkirane, the PJD’s leader, to form a government. About a month later, Benkirane formed a coalition that included Istiqlal, the MP, and the Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS).²⁵

The PJD in Power Between 2011 and 2016

The PJD was in new territory. Not only was it leading a ruling coalition and working with former political opponents but, in a broader sense, it was implementing a new constitution, which involved working closely with the palace.²⁶ To what extent, then, was the PJD free to introduce constitutional reforms and thereby potentially alter the basis of Moroccan politics? Perhaps inevitably, the answer was equivocal.

The PJD’s first government evolved over three distinct phases. Between January 2012 and July 2013, the party was still learning to navigate a new political system in which it had no ruling experience. This somewhat unsuccessful phase ended when the Istiqlal Party—which had increasingly become more loyal to the palace—withdrew from the government, obliging the PJD to form a new coalition. This brought on a second phase in which the party began implementing its agenda with more ease. In the third phase, starting in the fall of 2015, the party focused on two important electoral cycles: the 2015 local and regional elections and the 2016 national election.

Once in power, the PJD had an opportunity to secure a more robust role for the parliament and the government. The party communicated a certain hope that it could navigate the palace’s red lines, despite the reported tensions between the new Islamist-led government and the palace.²⁷ Overall, the media coverage portrayed the PJD as slowly coming to grips with the intricacies and limitations of the country’s governance model.²⁸

Learning to Coexist (2012–2013)

Initially, the PJD had to focus on establishing its place within the new power structure (especially vis-à-vis the palace) and determining where the opportunities and limitations lie. So in that sense, the composition of its first government, which the king approved on January 3, 2012, was important to the PJD. The party sought to gain as much influence as it could and to set a precedent for how a leading party could balance its interests against those of the palace. Not surprisingly, in turn, the palace aimed to ensure that it did not cede any more power than it needed to under the new constitutional amendments.

During this period, the PJD was careful to demonstrate its commitment to change while it avoided alarming the monarchy.²⁹ It was also able to gain control over key ministerial posts despite pushback from the palace. These included the Ministry of Justice under Mustapha Ramid and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation under Saadeddine Othmani.^[30] The palace maintained some oversight through its advisers, who are collectively seen as a shadow government that wields significant power. They included the former foreign minister Taieb Fassi Fihri and the king’s close friend and notable adversary of the PJD, Fouad Ali El Himma.³¹

Not surprisingly, the PJD soon faced tensions with the monarchy and its advisers over the approach and scope of various reforms related to, for example, judicial independence, subsidies, and anticorruption. This showed the public that, in contrast to other party leaders, Benkirane had the ability and willingness to push back against the palace. The prime minister never overtly challenged the king, but neither did he shy away from pointing out the restrictions the palace placed on the government’s ability to act in accordance with the constitution.

The prime minister never overtly challenged the king, but neither did he shy away from pointing out the restrictions the palace placed on the government’s ability to act in accordance with the constitution.

The occasional disharmony helped Benkirane insulate himself from popular discontent should he and the PJD face criticism for particular failures.³² It also emphasized the widely known but rarely highlighted extent of the palace’s control over politics in Morocco. Altogether, this allowed Benkirane to claim that he was fighting the status quo to better serve Moroccan citizens. He managed to transform the tension between the PJD-led government and the palace into a political gain, without jeopardizing his standing or his party’s chances of staying in power. This dual use of the monarchy as both an obstacle and a source of validation was no contradiction but rather illustrated the prime minister’s ability to play within the confines of the political system.

Throughout this first year, and to a lesser extent the rest of the PJD’s mandate, tensions over the scope of the government’s and the prime minister’s mandate and power continued with the monarchy. For instance, in 2013, PJD parliamentarians fought to determine the details of the investigative committees that would serve as watchdogs over the government per the constitution; ³³ the parliament was supposed to draft the law regulating the committees’ work, but the legislature’s secretariat-general—a body that reports to the palace—ultimately took control and drafted it.³⁴ This frustrated the PJD bloc in the parliament and highlighted the palace’s effort to minimize the impact of constitutional reforms and safeguard its monopoly over power.³⁵

Earlier, in September 2012, Abdelali Hamieddine, a prominent and outspoken young member of the PJD, wrote an op-ed to emphasize the importance of the new constitution and rule of law. He criticized a royal order that had called for an investigation of and disciplinary action against customs officials accused of misconduct.³⁶ Hamieddine argued that the order was unconstitutional because it hijacked the administrative prerogatives of the government and the prime minister. This bold argument went to the heart of the debate over the palace’s political role and how it fit in within the new political system. It also dovetailed with the PJD’s emerging strategy of explaining the importance of this debate to the public. This was partly to shield the party from potential criticism—on the grounds that it was not fully accountable for any shortcomings given its limited room for action. However, it also worked to demystify the rules of political engagement in Moroccan politics and identify the red lines drawn by the palace.

In response to increased popular interest in domestic politics and in light of the new context—a new constitutional framework and, for the first time, a leading Islamist party—the media reported extensively on political developments, including the details of the government formation negotiations, and even brought a sense of what was happening behind the scenes to the public. Benkirane took advantage of the increased curiosity spurred by the media coverage to explain the tension between the palace and the party and to increasingly draw attention to the palace’s involvement. Its role, while always understood, had not been previously highlighted in such a way.

Benkirane took advantage of the increased curiosity spurred by the media coverage to explain the tension between the palace and the party and to increasingly draw attention to the palace’s involvement.

Also novel was Benkirane’s propensity to speak publicly about tensions with the palace in the early days. His approach, which might have seemed potentially dangerous, as it could draw the ire of the palace, was a point of pride for Benkirane himself. He often remarked that he would always be candid with the people, including about the challenges he faced. However, whenever he was critical of