全球智库信息集成服务系统

Summary

While the African Union (AU) is leading overarching efforts to establish continent-wide norms for acceptable political conduct, regional institutions are also contributing substantially to democratization and peacebuilding in their neighborhoods. Bodies such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have been actively managing conflicts and preventing movement toward authoritarianism. However, country-level commitment to democratic governance remains uneven and inconsistent. Addressing the region’s security and governance challenges calls for further integration and cooperation, which will require significant resources and new notions of sovereignty with responsibility.

Regional Initiatives

• The AU wields considerable normative power in advocating constitutionalism, democracy, and the rule of law. Its involvement has provided legitimacy to successful efforts to reverse unconstitutional changes in government in various states.
• Yet most interventions aimed at resolving conflicts and/or restoring democracy are led by regional economic communities (RECs), which can muster greater resources and draw upon local expertise.
• Among the RECs, ECOWAS has been the most effective, with Nigeria serving as a strong anchor and advocate for democratization and peacekeeping. ECOWAS has intervened against, sanctioned, or condemned actions taken by most of its member states over the past two decades. It has organized peaceful resolutions and restored constitutional governments in Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, and Gambia, among others.
• Although other bodies, such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the East African Community (EAC), have also organized collective stabilization efforts and sought to advance democratic governance, they have been less successful. 

Continued Obstacles

• Apart from ECOWAS, regional bodies often lack strong champions for democratic norms. Both SADC and EAC tolerate authoritarian members and have witnessed the erosion of democracy in potential anchor states like South Africa and Kenya.
• Regional institutions are unable to fulfill their core mandates largely because they are underfunded by global standards and tend to lack common identities or shared values.
• Little cooperation among the RECs occurs. Several of them, such as the Arab Maghreb Union and the Economic Community of Central African States, show minimal interest in democratization or peacebuilding.
• In most African regions where states face long-running conflicts and politicians are fearful of relinquishing sovereignty, progress toward integration and multilateralism remains limited.
• Enduring solutions to Africa’s security and political problems will require placing regional institutions at the center of stabilization efforts. But they cannot play a leading role without further buy-in from individual states and renewed international engagement.
• In addition to infrastructure development, trade facilitation, and peacekeeping, external actors need to invest in ideas, activities, and programs that foster linkages among African states. 

Introduction

African regional institutions are playing major roles in democratization and conflict management. This reflects, in part, efforts since the early 2000s to transform the African Union (AU) into a strong, collective security and norm-building mechanism. It also stems from the growing role of Africa’s regional economic communities (RECs), notably the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). They have contributed to democracy promotion and conflict management initiatives, including peacemaking and peacekeeping, in numerous countries, such as Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Gambia, Lesotho, Mali, South Sudan, and Somalia. Overall, this growing wave of regional efforts dovetails with the continent’s frequent calls to find local solutions to African problems.

Regional approaches are strongly needed in Africa to overcome economic fragmentation and political vulnerabilities.

However, although the AU and RECs have articulated norms and institutions on democratic governance and security, these norms have yet to be firmly accepted and implemented. Regional institutions are attempting to make normative and behavioral alterations in circumstances where the values of democratization remain contested and where resource constraints limit their ability to implement these norms. Paradoxically, while regional institutions are weaker in Africa than elsewhere, the continent’s states are continually resorting to them for collective problem solving. Regional approaches are strongly needed in Africa to overcome economic fragmentation and political vulnerabilities, but nationalistic tendencies hamper the capability of African institutions to become loci of meaningful integration. Resolving these weaknesses largely hinges on African initiatives to solidify the normative foundations of regional institutions and strengthen their capacities to achieve outcomes. It also hinges on forging a consensus that democratization is an essential tool for conflict management.

Before looking to the future, it is useful to examine the long-term trend in Africa toward greater regional cooperation on democratization and conflict management, the normative frameworks and instruments adopted by the AU and RECs, and the implementation efforts by the AU and RECs in specific countries. Understanding these trends offers insights into the broad evolution of African regional institutions primarily because norm building is contingent on advancing integration. These norms are also critical to establishing firm foundations for the future. In this regard, African regions that have made gains in breaking multiple barriers to integration are most likely to invest in collective endeavors to promote democratization and stabilization.

The Path Toward Greater Regionalism

With fifty-five interconnected states, diverse actors in Africa have long sought to surmount the deficiencies of weak states by building collective norms and institutions for security, prosperity, and unity. The major push for continental identity and unity began in the 1960s under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and various economic integration schemes. Over time, however, civil wars, pressures for democratization, and the relative disengagement of external actors from Africa drove actors to focus more on developing regional institutions that could prevent instability and end conflicts. In the early 1990s, continental movements called for stronger African institutions with greater resources and responsibilities, as well as popularized the significance of democratic governance, constitutionalism, and human rights as normative frameworks that underpin regional integration.¹

[Regional] mechanisms and norms are burdened by weak implementation, insufficient buy-in, and an absence of strong leadership.

In repositioning regional institutions as agents for democratization and conflict resolution, there was growing recognition among African countries that narrowly defined sovereignties that dominated the post-independence period were inhibiting cooperation and integration. Moreover, conflicts had become increasingly regionalized, requiring collective approaches and responses. Through new notions of nonindifference and sovereignty with responsibility, African states began to move toward renegotiating sovereignties in the context of regional institutions.² This trend has invariably yielded tentative steps toward regionalization, as reflected in norms and restraints that continental and regional institutions have imposed on African states. Proponents of strong regionalism also allege that with more African ownership of its governance and security problems, the continent should be able to elicit more resources and greater commitments from international partners for mutually beneficial initiatives.³

Means of Establishing Norms and Mechanisms

African regional organizations have increasingly become the arenas for resolving conflicts and forging norms on governance and democratization. Barely twenty-five years old, these roles have evolved alongside the acknowledgment of African agency in security and stabilization. Two dominant patterns have characterized these efforts. First, Africa has tried to strengthen the capacity and mandates of the AU and its affiliated institutions to lead these continental efforts. Second, there have been similar initiatives in most of Africa’s RECs that aim to craft rules and normative experiments for stabilization and democratization. At both the continental and subregional levels, these mechanisms and norms are burdened by weak implementation, insufficient buy-in, and an absence of strong leadership.

Unlike other organizations in previous decades, the AU has actively shaped the African conflict management and democratization landscapes. The AU’s continental reach and membership provide it a wide umbrella to articulate common positions, shared values, and aspirations. However, some member states still regard the AU as distant and alien, denuding it of legitimacy and hampering its effectiveness. Africa’s RECs have emerged as the most promising local institutions for conflict management and democratization because of their long-standing promotion of economic integration, but their record is lopsided. Many African subregions have organizations that exist in name only. For instance, intrastate conflicts and leadership animosities have prevented the evolution of steady regional institutions in Central and North Africa. Even regions with the most advanced institutions, such as SADC and EAC, still lack credible, strong players to lead the creation of mechanisms and norms on democracy and conflict management. Without strong continental and subregional institutions, African attempts to articulate and project shared frameworks will remain ineffective.       

African Union

Replacing the OAU with the AU in 2002 was a fundamental step toward greater regional cooperation on democracy and conflict. Article 3 of the AU’s Constitutive Act stresses the advancement of collective efforts to achieve unity, peace, security, and stability; the promotion of political and socioeconomic integration; and the strengthening of democratic principles and institutions, popular participation, and good governance.⁴ To bolster democracy and constitutionalism, the Constitutive Act adopted measures to prevent the overthrow of governments—by military actors or civilians—that were reluctant to leave power. Commonly known as the provisions for unconstitutional changes of government, these measures include the suspension of governments’ memberships that come to power by force. These normative principles marked the initial shift from the previous OAU policy of noninterference to the AU policy of nonindifference and intervention.⁵ In 2002, the AU adopted the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC), which gave the council power to institute sanctions when unconstitutional changes of government occur. The protocol identified the spate of military coups and constitutional reversals and the lack of strong democracy, rule of law, and human rights institutions as the causes of insecurity, instability, and violent conflicts in Africa.⁶

The AU’s comprehensive framework on democracy and constitutionalism—called the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance (ACDEG)—was adopted in 2007 and enacted in 2012. The ACDEG combines continental commitments to democracy and governance in a legally binding instrument. As stated in Article 2, the charter’s main objectives, among others, are to promote adherence by parties to the universal values and principles of democracy and respect for human rights; promote adherence to the rule of law premised upon the respect for, and the supremacy of, the constitutions and constitutional order in the political arrangements of parties; and encourage the effective coordination and harmonization of governance policies among parties with the aim of promoting continental and regional integration.⁷

Democracy and governance issues have also been articulated in various AU institutions and platforms, including the Pan African Parliament; the Economic, Social and Cultural Council; the New Partnership for Africa’s Development; the African Peer Review Mechanism; and the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. In 2011, to avoid duplication of these initiatives, the AU launched an agenda called Shared Values and created the African Governance Architecture (AGA).⁸ The AU has defined the Shared Values as a set of core principles for Africa to govern by: basic right to life, participation in governance, equality of persons, justice, adherence to the rule of law, sovereignty, and the interdependence of states.

The AGA, part of the AU Department of Political Affairs, seeks to foster operational linkages by coordinating and harmonizing existing governance institutions and mechanisms. The AGA is also engaged in advocacy campaigns to ensure that member states implement the normative frameworks and imbed the values of constitutionalism in national legislation and governance practices. Equally vital, the AGA works alongside the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) to deepen the nexus of democracy, security, and development. As the central institution for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts, the APSA is a core component of the PSC. Although the linkages among the AGA, APSA, and other AU institutions have yet to be clearly elaborated, the continental normative frameworks for democracy and conflict resolution are steadily gaining traction. The AU’s achievements in implementing some of these provisions has helped to incrementally popularize these norms.

Regional Economic Communities

As a complement to the AU, RECs have been established to promote the implementation of democratic norms and conflict mechanisms. But the effectiveness of these communities varies greatly according to leadership dynamics, political and cultural cleavages, and the depth of integration. ECOWAS, SADC, and EAC have made greater strides in economic integration, the institutionalization of democratic norms, and peace and security than others, such as the Economic Community of Central African States, IGAD, the Arab Maghreb Union, and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa. In addition to lacking historical ties of integration, the latter regional institutions face civil conflicts, interstate strife, and an absence of anchor nations to lead integration efforts.

In West Africa, from the early 1990s, ECOWAS (under Nigeria’s leadership) pioneered the practical implementation of normative frameworks for security and political cooperation. The 1991 ECOWAS Declaration of Political Principles envisioned a region governed by common values, including democratic accountability and respect for human rights.⁹ Spurred on by military interventions in Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, ECOWAS also adopted the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, which enabled the body to proactively intervene in the conflicts of member states.

The effectiveness of these [regional economic] communities varies greatly according to leadership dynamics, political and cultural cleavages, and the depth of integration.

To strengthen the 1991 collective security protocol, ECOWAS signed a supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance in December 2001 that elaborates a set of shared “constitutional convergence principles.” These include the separation of powers; independence of the judiciary; free, fair, and transparent elections; zero tolerance for power obtained by unconstitutional means; popular participation in decisionmaking; adherence to democratic principles and decentralization of power at all levels of governance; freedom from ethnic, religious, regional, or racial discrimination; and freedom of association and of the press.¹⁰ Should a member state be found in violation of a principle, the protocol authorizes the use of sanctions, including the state’s suspension from ECOWAS decisionmaking bodies.¹¹ As Jean Bossuyt notes, the ECOWAS protocol on security and democracy “conferred a clear (and quite unique) mandate to the regional organization to be a guarantor of peace and a guardian of the effective application of democracy and human rights norms in a region with a relatively large number of fragile states.”¹²

Meanwhile, Southern Africa has benefited from a long history of interstate collaboration and the presence of South Africa, the regional anchor state. Article 5 of the SADC Treaty mandates that member states promote “common political values, political systems, and other shared values which are transmitted through institutions, which are democratic, legitimate and effective.”¹³ In addition, the Protocol on Politics, Defense, and Security Cooperation directs member states to promote the development of democratic institutions and practices and encourage universal human rights. SADC has also established the Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections, which, along with the mandates of the SADC Electoral Advisory Council, were put in place to foster participatory and accountable elections.¹⁴

In East Africa, EAC has set up mechanisms for peace, security, and democratization. The EAC Treaty obliges member states to abide by operational principles related to democracy, the rule of law, social justice, and universally accepted standards of human rights. These principles are reiterated in the EAC’s Draft Protocol on Foreign Policy. In addition, the EAC Forum of National Electoral Commissions has established common standards and principles to determine the credibility and legitimacy of electoral processes.¹⁵ Given the prominence of regional security threats, particularly from Somalia and South Sudan, EAC is also focused on defense and security collaboration. In February 2014, Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda signed a mutual defense pact that establishes a framework for joint military exercises and intelligence sharing.¹⁶ In the Horn of Africa, IGAD has the Protocol on Democracy, Governance and Elections, but it has not gained traction because of the priority accorded to security and stabilization issues in the region.

AU-REC Coordination

The AU and RECs signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in January 2008 to ensure coordination on peace, security, and stabilization initiatives. This MOU mandates that the AU chairperson and PSC work closely with individual RECs to promote the core values and principles that member states have signed onto. In addition, it emphasizes the RECs’ valuable role in implementing the APSA. The APSA Roadmap 2016–2020 prioritizes the AU’s partnerships with the RECs. While relations between them have not always been as smooth as envisaged in the MOU, the AU has long maintained its practice of deferring major decisions to the RECs because of their grasp of cultural and political dynamics in their subregions. The APSA Roadmap recognizes the RECs’ comparative advantage in supporting peace and stabilization efforts and requires that the AU and RECs work together to identify their respective roles and responsibilities in responding to different aspects of a conflict.¹⁷

African Union Efforts on Conflict Prevention and Management

The PSC’s mandate, as Africa’s leading conflict management institution, is to pursue sustainable peace through conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and postconflict reconstruction. The PSC draws support from the Continental Early Warning System, the Panel of the Wise, and the African Standby Force (ASF), among other systems and bodies. Over the past two decades, the PSC has had a mixed record in managing conflicts because of limited organizational and financial resources and the intractable nature of some conflicts. As Paul Williams notes, “the AU’s practical capabilities in the field of conflict management suffer from a persistent capabilities-expectations gap, falling well short of the ambitious vision and rhetoric contained in its founding documents.”¹⁸ The PSC’s successes have emanated from its ability to mobilize international resources and build partnerships with the RECs to address conflicts in Burundi, the CAR, Mali, Somalia, and Sudan.

The AU has had a stronger record in preventing conflict through the popularization of normative frameworks on constitutionalism, democratic governance norms, and the rule of law and through enforcement, including condemnation and sanctioning.¹⁹ Over the past decade, the AU has been actively implementing the provisions for unconstitutional changes of government. Its successes in condemning and/or reversing unconstitutional changes in government in Burkina Faso (2015), the CAR (2003), Côte d’Ivoire (2010), Guinea (2009), Guinea-Bissau (2003, 2012), Mauritania (2005), Madagascar (2001, 2009), Niger (2010), and Togo (2005) have helped build an African norm around constitutional legality.²⁰

Even though the RECs took the lead in these efforts, the AU, in most cases, was critical in providing broad continental legitimacy to these interventions. On the eve of its formation, the AU condemned and sanctioned Madagascar because Marc Ravalomanana had declared himself president after refusing to participate in an election runoff in 2001.²¹ Ravalomanana was barred from attending the inaugural AU summit in Durban in July 2002. Together with SADC, the AU took the same position in 2009 when Ravalomanana was ousted in a military coup. The memberships of the CAR and São Tomé and Príncipe were also suspended in 2003 under the same AU provision. In the CAR, the suspension affected then president François Bozizé, who had overthrown the government of Angé-Felix Patassé; the CAR was subsequently readmitted after its elections in 2005. In São Tomé and Príncipe, there was a short-lived military seizure of power, which was reversed when the AU held talks with the military on restoring democratic rule.

The North African uprisings that toppled regimes in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia presented the AU with a dilemma: should they be recognized as popular, legitimate seizures of power or condemned as unconstitutional changes of government? In Libya, even though the AU condemned the Western intervention that ended Muammar Qaddafi’s regime, a consensus emerged among AU institutions in favor of incorporating uprisings against illegitimate governments as an acceptable mode of constitutional change. Despite this consensus, however, the AU faced a quandary following the ouster of then Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi by the military in July 2013. At first, the AU suspended Egypt’s membership, but it reversed this position a year later due to Cairo’s diplomatic offensive and Egypt’s strategic leadership role in Africa.²²

This challenge has not been isolated to North Africa. This same issue was highlighted in November 2017 when Zimbabwe’s military ousted then president Robert Mugabe and replaced him with a new leader, President Emmerson Mnangagwa. In this case, the AU first threatened to impose sanctions but retreated when Zimbabwe’s military initiated the transition to a new leader. Likewise, although the 2007 Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance prohibits “any amendment or revision of the constitution or legal instruments which is an infringement on the principle of democratic change of government,” the AU has been ineffective in censuring countries where presidents have changed constitutions to extend their tenures or delay holding elections.²³ As of 2017, Burundi, Cameroon, the DRC, Rwanda, Togo, and Uganda have amended their constitutions on the AU’s watch.

Actions by Regional Economic Communities

There is significant unevenness in Africa’s integration schemes due to the differing regional impacts of colonial legacies, the depth of socioeconomic and cultural interactions, and the role of anchor countries in boosting cooperation. Regions with relatively strong integration arrangements established during colonial days—such as East, West, and Southern Africa—have managed to build more solid ties than those without these legacies. In addition to colonial history, the EAC and SADC have benefited from cultural contiguities and a history of labor mobility that have strengthened recent initiatives to further integration. In West Africa, since the 1970s, Nigeria has played a vital role in reducing the enormous barriers among former French, British, and Portuguese colonies in a grand experiment that is reflected in ECOWAS. But Nigeria has not led on all issues; rather, it has drawn on the energies and skills of like-minded states such as Ghana and Senegal to build a consensus on regional integration. Even though West Africa’s geographical vastness has slowed the expansion of economic ties, ECOWAS has pursued dynamic policies geared toward establishing uniformity in political governance, democratization, and conflict management.

West Africa

Long before the much-heralded intervention in Gambia in January 2017, ECOWAS had established a solid reputation for developing regional mechanisms to promote peace and democratic governance. As stated above, Nigeria’s leadership efforts to stabilize the region at critical junctures since the early 1990s has formed the basis for a collective security system that has expanded into democracy promotion. In a region that has had a disproportionately large number of military coups, the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance has been vital in deterring additional ones. This protocol established what have become constitutional convergence principles that require power to be acceded or maintained through free, fair, and transparent elections and not through unconstitutional means.

There is significant unevenness in Africa’s integration schemes due to the differing regional impacts of colonial legacies, the depth of socioeconomic and cultural interactions, and the role of anchor countries in boosting cooperation.

Although controversial, ECOWAS military interventions in destabilizing civil wars in Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, and Sierra Leone resulted in the creation of crucial mechanisms for regional security. In 1990, to secure peace in Liberia, ECOWAS took the unprecedented step of creating a peacekeeping force, the Economic Community Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). With Nigeria shouldering most of the military and financial burdens, this intervention was largely a peace enforcement exercise, which ended with the election of Charles Taylor as president in 1997. In a new phase of the civil war (1998–2003), ECOWAS also played a proactive role, laying the foundation for the deployment of the United Nations Mission in Liberia, which supervised the 2005 elections that marked the war’s end.

ECOMOG played a similar role in Sierra Leone between 1997 and 1999 to prevent the rebels of the Revolutionary United Front from destabilizing the country’s legitimate government. Again, ECOMOG’s engagement laid the foundation for the United Nations (UN) to complete stabilization efforts.²⁴ Similarly, in Guinea-Bissau, ECOWAS helped two military factions struggling for power eventually agree to form a government of national unity in December 1998.²⁵

These peacekeeping and peace enforcement experiences subsequently motivated ECOWAS to broaden its obligations to defend the core values of constitutional convergence by mediating disputes and managing electoral violence and political instability in Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Mali, and, most recently, Gambia. In all these instances, ECOWAS defended the regional norms of democracy by condemning human rights violations, mediating electoral disputes, and assisting with constitutional ref