G2TT
来源类型Paper
规范类型工作论文
Sustaining Strong Partnerships: The First Trilateral Dialogue Initiative (TDI) Workshop
James L. Schoff; Paul K. Lee
发表日期2019-04-25
出版年2019
语种英语
概述Trilateral defense coordination offers Japan, South Korea, and the United States an important avenue to advance their mutual interests and support peace and security in the Asia Pacific.
摘要

Disclaimer

This publication is not a consensus document. It represents the authors’ summary of major themes and quotes drawn from a two-day discussion among specialists and government officials, which was conducted on a not-for-attribution basis.

Introduction

The dangers posed by North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs remain significant even as countries explore opportunities to improve bilateral relations with Pyongyang in exchange for verifiable denuclearization and resolution of other outstanding issues. This present threat raises the stakes for effective diplomatic policy coordination and security cooperation among Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea), and the United States. Trilateral efforts are necessary to help protect all three countries’ strategic and security interests, as well as to have any chance at rolling back the North’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. Moreover, the pursuit of multiple bilateral dialogues with Pyongyang places a premium on effective diplomatic coordination. Trilateral dialogue can also be an important catalyst to address broader regional foreign policy and regional commons issues with a coordinated effort.

To support trilateral cooperation and regional peace and security, four policy research and education institutions in the three countries formed the Japan-ROK-U.S. Trilateral Dialogue Initiative (TDI) and held its inaugural workshop in January 2019 in Tokyo. The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), the Korea National Diplomatic Academy (KNDA), and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace organized this workshop in collaboration with the Daniel Morgan Graduate School of National Security in Washington, DC. This working paper summarizes the key takeaways and priorities for further study from the two-day workshop, which involved scholars as well as former officials, and current government officials from the four partners.

This workshop was the first in a three-year project consisting of regular track 1.5 discussions in each country, accompanied by policy research, publication of findings and recommendations, and outreach to the public. This track 1.5 dialogue combines financial support from all three countries to support information exchange, collective discussion and analysis, and policy proposals focused on diplomatic coordination vis-à-vis North Korea to promote verifiable denuclearization and peace building that protects shared security interests. Trilateral foreign policy coordination on other pressing regional and global issues is another opportunity to advance mutual interests as a valuable core group within multilateral frameworks in Asia. (More information about the Japan-ROK-U.S. TDI can be found in Appendix A.)

James L. Schoff
Schoff is a senior fellow in the Carnegie Asia Program. His research focuses on U.S.-Japan relations and regional engagement, Japanese technology innovation, and regional trade and security dynamics.
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Priority areas for trilateral discussion at the workshop included diplomatic engagement with North Korea (options for coordination and the potential impact of different scenarios, including some related to arms control), the role of trilateralism amid an intensifying U.S.-China strategic rivalry, and ways to strengthen trilateral cooperation and apply it to a broader Indo-Asia-Pacific context. Overall, the workshop clarified minor points of disagreement regarding diplomatic strategy for North Korea while confirming solidarity on the general direction and key parameters. The dialogue also highlighted certain political and diplomatic challenges for trilateralism in the future, which the Japan-ROK-U.S. TDI will address as the project moves forward.

Setting the Scene

The first TDI workshop gathered in January 2019, amid expectation for a soon-to-be-announced second summit meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. Although North Korea and South Korea had discussed the possibility of Kim visiting Seoul at the very end of 2018 (or beginning of 2019), hopes were fading that the historic trip would take place before Trump and Kim met again. Presumably, Kim wanted some tangible economic benefit from a Seoul visit, and ROK President Moon Jae-in could only offer these incentives if Trump and others agreed to certain exemptions in the strict international sanctions regime established to pressure North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons.

A related development in this multifaceted diplomatic drama was an early January 2019 meeting in Beijing between Kim and Chinese President Xi Jinping—their fourth in a year—featuring continued dialogue on economic development issues and a pharmaceutical factory tour. The Kim-Xi meeting raised hopes among allied optimists that North Korea might be looking to prioritize economic cooperation and that encouraging words from Xi could give Kim sufficient confidence to make some kind of compromise with Trump at their next summit. Skeptics, however, worried that solidarity with China’s Xi might embolden Kim to demand more from the Americans.

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has been on the outside of diplomatic engagement with North Korea (stymied largely by Pyongyang’s reluctance to address its past abduction of Japanese nationals), but Abe has led a proactive foreign policy that preserves Japan’s status as an important player regardless of how North Korean denuclearization and inter-Korean relations progress. Abe’s efforts have helped improve Japan’s relations with China and Russia, and he has maintained the U.S.-Japan alliance by keeping close personal ties to Trump.

The darkest cloud hanging over the TDI workshop was the dramatic decline in Japan-ROK relations over the past year, which has clearly had a negative impact on trilateral communication and potential cooperation at the official level. Tensions between Japan and Korea have simmered for decades, fueled by South Korean demands for greater contrition over Japan’s 1910–1945 colonization of Korea and Japanese frustration that past apologies have not been deemed sufficient. After some promising efforts by both sides early in Moon’s tenure to build more “future-oriented relations,” past agreements that tried to settle colonial and wartime grievances began to unravel in new ways. A military incident at sea, only weeks before this trilateral workshop, just added more fuel to the fire.

Key Takeaways and Next Steps

Diplomatic Engagement With North Korea

Regarding the prospects of peace and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, the TDI workshop revealed perception gaps among the three partners based on different assessments of North Korean intentions and what tactics might be most successful. A U.S. participant observed that, even as recently as 2017, “security cooperation was the number one priority [for trilateral dialogue], but now has taken a back seat to diplomacy coordination.” One Japanese participant pointed out that while the United States seems “cautiously optimistic” and South Korea “positively optimistic” about North Korean intentions, Japan is the most cautious and skeptical among the three countries. A South Korean participant noted that the three sides have different strategies, rather than a perception gap, for how to achieve peace and denuclearization.

Paul K. Lee
Paul K. Lee was a James C. Gaither junior fellow in Carnegie’s Asia Program.

Most, if not all, of the South Korean participants argued that, although North Korea still poses a direct security threat to South Korea, Kim has fundamentally shifted North Korea’s grand strategy from nuclear proliferation to economic development. This change, they noted, provides an unprecedented opportunity for the United States, South Korea, and Japan to reduce the North Korean nuclear threat through negotiations. Some Japanese and U.S. participants pushed back on this idea, saying that although there has been some progress on confidence-building measures, there is no significant evidence that Pyongyang’s fundamental position has changed.

In particular, one U.S. participant observed that more high-level summits without substance or preconditions will signal U.S. acquiescence of North Korea as a de facto nuclear power. He noted that many previous U.S. presidents could have met with the North Korean leader but worried a meeting would essentially recognize and legitimize its status as a nuclear state. Despite some concerns raised by South Korean and Japanese participants, American officials reassured the group that U.S. policy remains staunchly opposed to recognition of North Korea as a nuclear state.

There was a divergence in opinions regarding Kim’s 2019 New Year’s address, where he verbally committed to four “no’s”: no testing, no use, no production, and no proliferation of nuclear weapons. While some interpreted the speech as an unprecedented positive statement, others argued that the exclusion of “no possession” was a thinly veiled expression of Kim’s intention to maintain his nuclear arsenal. One U.S. participant acknowledged that, while the speech was “tempered and different in tone,” there are still fundamental problems regarding North Korea’s demands and sequencing of concessions. A South Korean scholar, however, interpreted these signals as part of North Korean preparation to survive the sanctions regime with the help of China, Russia, and South Korea, even if the United States does not ease sanctions.

Another delegate from South Korea noted that Kim has not clarified what he means by the possibility of taking a “new path,” which has been interpreted by some to mean using China as leverage against the United States. He urged caution regarding a second U.S.–North Korean summit, which ultimately took place in Hanoi, Vietnam, at the end of February. Furthermore, he questioned whether an unverified closing of North Korea’s Yongbyon nuclear facility would be worth reopening the jointly operated Kaesong industrial complex (in North Korea), which Seoul withdrew from in 2016 amid North Korea’s escalating nuclear and missile tests. Instead, he argued that obtaining even a partial declaration from North Korea about its nuclear efforts—clarifying the history and inventory of Pyongyang’s program—would be a better way to build trust and work toward the program’s dismantlement. Reopening the Kaesong complex was one of many goals highlighted by Moon and Kim in their joint Pyongyang Declaration when they met in Pyongyang in 2018.

The trilateral discussion also provided an opportunity for the three sides to address some qualms over their perceived intentions and priorities. For example, South Korean participants reassured the group that a long-term suspension of joint military exercises with the United States would be unacceptable, and they underscored Moon’s firm intent to achieve denuclearization before any major “carrots” are given. At the same time, U.S. and Japanese participants affirmed their support for the peace process, albeit with some reservations over its fast pace. When a South Korean participant clarified that “most South Koreans don’t trust Kim Jong Un, but believe that they still have to work with him somehow,” a U.S. participant echoed the sentiment, saying “you don’t have to like Kim, but we still have to work with him.”

While Tokyo will continue to coordinate with Washington and Seoul, especially on sanctions implementation, there was a sense of pessimism from Japan. The aforementioned abductions issue is a major obstacle to Japan–North Korea negotiations, and most participants doubted that it would be resolved in time for Japan to become a more active player in the current diplomatic dynamic. When asked what it would take to change Japanese pessimism on North Korea into optimism, a Japanese participant stated that simply closing the Yongbyon facilities is not enough. Rather, he said, Japan is more concerned about North Korea’s existing nuclear weapons. North Korea should accept international observers at the Tongchang-ri missile engine test site—which was mentioned in the Pyongyang Declaration but not implemented—the Japanese participant argued.

A Second Kim-Trump Summit

Although the Trump-Kim summit in Vietnam ended early without any notable gains in their bilateral dialogue, reflecting on the pre-summit workshop dialogue is a useful way to highlight trilateral policy coordination challenges, because it reveals starkly the hopes and fears of the three countries’ specialists. Workshop participants generally expected more progress from the summit meeting, even as they raised concerns from their varied perspectives that Trump might be either too generous or too inflexible with Kim.

Responding to a question at the workshop about the potential consequences of a failed second Trump-Kim summit, a former U.S. diplomat said that “all summit meetings are by nature considered successful” by the organizers. The number one priority for Trump, the participant noted, is boosting his prospects for reelection in 2020. Regardless of how the second summit might play out, he presumed that a return to maximum pressure would be unlikely and unfeasible. Another U.S. participant, however, predicted that Trump would probably attempt to return to the strategy of maximum pressure if North Korea resumed long-range missile testing. Some participants also noted that even relatively superficial summitry would be preferable to more risky alternatives of escalating tensions and a return to “fire and fury” military pressure. 

One South Korean participant raised the idea of having a package deal at the next Trump-Kim summit consisting of a declaration of nuclear weapons and freezing of tests from Pyongyang, while Washington would provide humanitarian assistance and agreement to open liaison offices in return. A U.S. participant with track 1 negotiating experience with North Korea rebutted that a liaison office would not be a great negotiating card because the North already has a line of communication with the United States at its Permanent Mission to the United Nations (UN). At the same time, South Korean participants remained skeptical of Pyongyang’s willingness to eliminate its nuclear arsenal completely because of its asymmetric disadvantage in conventional forces.

One U.S. participant proposed what he called a “reasonable deal” for the next summit: a start to verified dismantling of nuclear facilities in Yongbyon and a freeze on fissile material production elsewhere in exchange for reopening the Kaesong industrial complex and Mount Kumgang Tourism Region (and/or some types of infrastructure investment). Other TDI members generally supported this kind of quid-pro-quo deal.

A close adviser to South Korea’s Blue House sympathized with others who were pessimistic about Kim’s intentions in the current negotiations. He noted that North Korea is “addicted” to high-level summitry because it knows Trump is the only one in the United States who is seemingly wedded to a positive outcome regardless of the details. However, he criticized the United States’ sequencing demands, arguing that “as long as Washington holds on to the idea of ‘denuclearization first, security assurances second,’ that is not going to work.” He described Kim’s offer of closing Yongbyon in exchange for “corresponding measures” as a prime opportunity, calling on Washington “to be ready to give something in exchange” simultaneously, such as various forms of sanctions relief or substantive exemptions.

Knowing how events transpired in Hanoi on February 27–28, it is apparent that the TDI workshop participants generally underestimated how much Kim would demand and overestimated what he might be willing to offer in terms of denuclearization. The United States also took a more maximalist position at the talks than some Trump administration officials had signaled beforehand.

Pertinent to future TDI activities is what the Hanoi summit revealed about U.S.–North Korea talks and their impact on South Korea and Japan. It seems clear that, eight months after the first Trump-Kim summit, the two sides have no common definition of denuclearization—if anything, their positions have widened to some degree. This does not mean that continued negotiations are futile, but the prospects for better political relations and sanctions relief seem dim without some compromise by one or both sides. Moreover, the summit seemed to diminish the option of using political gestures—such as an end-of-war declaration or liaison offices—to make incremental diplomatic gains.

As a consequence, Moon’s passionate pursuit of closer inter-Korean relations and a “new Korean Peninsula regime” has been stymied, because Seoul cannot launch the kinds of joint projects it envisions without running afoul of U.S. policy or unanimously agreed upon UN sanctions. Meanwhile, China and Russia are likely to intensify calls for sanctions relief and further undermine economic and diplomatic pressure on North Korea, while Japan continues trying to shore up U.S. and global resolve to sustain pressure.

The Hanoi summit, therefore, has sharpened the differences between North Korea skeptics and optimists among the allies: the former are more convinced that compromise cannot be offered early, while the latter are motivated to accelerate reconciliation efforts so as not to lose momentum. Beijing and Moscow might exploit this divide between allies to serve their own interests. There is still a chance that some workable solution can be created, but the brokering of a cooperative approach among the allies has become both more difficult and more important, lest this diplomatic window of opportunity with North Korea close for good.

U.S. Forces in Korea

Several U.S. and South Korean participants agreed that an indefinite quasi-moratorium on joint military exercises between ROK and U.S. forces is unsustainable and should not be viewed as a blanket freeze-for-freeze status quo. One U.S. participant asked, “Will we continue to suspend exercises indefinitely for the sake of summitry?” Another worried about the long-term negative impact that an indefinite freeze could have on force readiness and alliance cohesion more broadly. Another participant called the suspension of exercises a mistake, since it was a unilateral concession at the 2018 Singapore summit with no concessions from Pyongyang. There was strong agreement that Pyongyang needs to understand that some resumption of allied exercises, which is inevitable, is not fully linked to the freeze on North Korean missile testing. More than one South Korean participant tried to reassure others that the Moon administration understands this (despite a strong desire to avoid upsetting Pyongyang), especially because training with U.S. forces would be necessary to ensure the smooth transition of wartime operational control of ROK forces.

In general, Japanese participants welcomed the current process of inter-Korean reconciliation and even the possibility of a peace declaration, but they were concerned about Pyongyang’s intentions and the potential impact on future U.S. force posture in the region. Despite U.S. and ROK assurances, many believed that some sort of end-of-war declaration will likely lead to a reduction of U.S. forces in Korea that would put Japan more squarely on the front lines should conflict return to the peninsula. Furthermore, they expressed concern that Moon’s eagerness to expedite the peace process may end up detracting from the maximum pressure campaign on Pyongyang, which is already fraying due to the current “freeze-for-freeze” dynamic.

Most participants, including the ROK delegation, were steadfast in their support for keeping U.S. troops in South Korea and did not think that the peace process with North Korea will have an impact on U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) in the near term. An official based on the peninsula added that, in his opinion, any worries about the future of the U.S.-ROK alliance and U.S. forces in Korea were unfounded. Rather, he noted that U.S.-ROK cooperation has not only continued but actually deepened throughout the peace negotiations and enjoys a high level of governmental and public support in both countries.

The future of the UN Command (UNC) was also discussed, with most participants highlighting the value and versatility of this multilateral institution. One Japanese participant argued that because Japan is now “on the front lines” of any conflict with North Korea, it should have greater access to related military information and decision making, suggesting that a closer link to the Combined Forces Command (CFC) in South Korea might be warranted. An American participant agreed that there is room for more Japanese Self-Defense Forces involvement in Korean Peninsula security issues, but he thought that the UNC is probably a better vehicle than CFC because there is already a UNC presence in Japan (in the form of UN-flagged rear area bases). When a South Korean participant raised the possibility that China might demand an end to the UNC if a peace treaty were signed to end the Korean War, an American pushed back, saying that Seoul might prefer having “eighteen countries support its defense” rather than one, at least in the early stages of peace building.

Separately, a U.S. participant suggested that some kind of U.S. regional command-and-control arrangement might be a useful way to take into account Japan’s expanded defense capabilities and greater operational flexibility with regard to North Korean contingencies. In addition, cooperation on defense in new domains such as cyberspace, outer space, and the electromagnetic spectrum could become more important in the future. Because physical proximity matters so little in these emerging domains, they offer multiple new avenues for collaboration and information sharing in a trilateral context.

A Japanese participant agreed with this suggestion, arguing that the current regional command and control arrangement “is just a legacy of the Korean War. Japan should have access to U.S.-ROK defense planning at CFC because Japan is vulnerable to North Korean nuclear strikes in the case of a war on the Korean Peninsula. The current Japanese position is like taxation without representation, except involving human lives.” He added that “it is impossible for Japan to keep a neutral position on the Korean Peninsula if it continues to permit U.S. use of its bases without any Japanese say in the matter.”

South Korean participants clarified that inter-Korean developments are not linked to any withdrawal in U.S. forces, which Moon has confirmed multiple times. Both American and ROK members of the workshop asserted that the Moon administration’s track record—including his responses to North Korean missile launches and consent to U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense deployment—shows that there is strong support for the U.S.-ROK alliance.

Looking back at the Hanoi summit, it seems that concerns over U.S. troop withdrawals from Korea were premature. U.S. officials have been unequivocal that USFK has not been a part of negotiations. The shaky conclusion to the summit, however, means that the unofficial “freeze-for-freeze” truce is practically the only thing keeping the process afloat. North Korea’s move to reassemble its rocket launch facility at Tongchang-ri raises the possibility that Kim is willing to risk this truce to demonstrate self-confidence in pursuit of new negotiating options.

This puts a spotlight on the U.S.-ROK decision to cancel their high-profile spring military exercises and replace them with smaller scale activities. For the allies, it will become increasingly important to find a mutually acceptable balance between maintaining readiness—and risking North Korean ire—versus providing some incentive for Kim to keep refraining from nuclear and missile testing. Japanese delegates in the TDI workshop made it clear that they believe Tokyo also has an important stake in those decisions.

Reversible vs Irreversible Measures

One important takeaway from the discussions was the importance of discerning between reversible and irreversible measures in negotiations with North Korea. For example, both South Korean and Japanese participants noted the ambiguity of the Trump administration’s primary objective with regard to North Korean denuclearization. “Is it CVID [complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization], FVID [final fully verifiable denuclearization], or simply an elimination of ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] capabilities?” one ROK participant asked, warning that North Korea can easily replicate ICBMs with its existing knowledge and infrastructure.

A U.S. participant questioned whether Trump’s thinking on North Korea had evolved from satisfaction with a short-term freeze to a more complex understanding of the long-term road map required to achieve full denuclearization. Most participants, however, expressed serious concerns that, contrary to the exhortations of his advisers, Trump is ready to accept the status quo with North Korea as a political trophy and a better alternative to war.

A South Korean scholar identified the divergent views on a road map for denuclearization. Instead of the so-called Libya model for denuclearization, he argued that North Korea seeks a “voluntary” or “active” denuclearization based on their own pace and agenda. He used the analogy of an onion to symbolize North Korea’s nuclear program: while the United States wants North Korea to cut to the core of the onion (i.e. surrender a full declaration and destroy all its facilities), North Korea prefers to yield just one slice at a time. Thus, the United States and its allies should not force North Korea to surrender its entire program in one blow, but rather focus on accelerating and continuing the process of piecemeal denuclearization.

One Japanese participant stated that “we shouldn’t be in a hurry to get to a detailed agreement [with North Korea], though it is frustrating,” reminding the group that it took almost two years following the start of the Six-Party Talks in 2003 for a deal to be reached. A South Korean participant noted that normalization of relations can be a “useful card” that could be leveraged in case Pyongyang suddenly returns to hostile behavior, citing the way former president Barack Obama normalized relations with Cuba while partially maintaining the sanctions regime.

Both Japanese and South Korean participants conveyed worry about Trump’s volatility and potential unreliable commitment to denuclearization—and even alliances. One discussant raised the possibility of Trump’s eagerness to strike a “grand deal” with Kim leading to major concessions, such as U.S. troop withdrawal or lifting of the nuclear umbrella. A U.S. participant expressed long-term confidence in the U.S. political system’s ability to repair itself in the long term, advising that the priority now should be to “minimize any damage to alliances” and focusing on “maintenance.” Others, however, argued that the Trump phenomenon is symptomatic of a more deeply rooted problem in the United States that will linger long after this administration.

Ensuring a High Standard of Multilateral Verification

All three sides affirmed the importance of having a multilateral negotiation formula that sets a high standard for verification of North Korean denuclearization, and participants lamented the lack of prog

主题Americas ; United States ; East Asia ; South Korea ; Japan ; North Korea ; Defense and Security ; Foreign Policy ; Political Reform ; The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past Is Prologue
URLhttps://carnegieendowment.org/2019/04/25/sustaining-strong-partnerships-first-trilateral-dialogue-initiative-tdi-workshop-pub-78971
来源智库Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (United States)
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条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/417994
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