G2TT
来源类型Paper
规范类型工作论文
The Case for Transatlantic Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific
Erik Brattberg; Philippe Le Corre
发表日期2019-12-18
出版年2019
语种英语
概述Washington and Brussels don’t completely agree on how to respond to China’s resurgence in the Indo-Pacific, but they both want to preserve the international order, leaving some room for more cooperation
摘要

Executive Summary

The evolving strategic dynamics in the Indo-Pacific are of paramount importance for the future of the rules-based international order. While the United States is redirecting strategic focus to the region as part of its Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy, Europe is also stepping up its role—leveraging a strong economic profile, long-standing bilateral ties, and active engagement in various regional multilateral forums. The European Union (EU) and its member states can make distinct contributions to an open, transparent, inclusive, and rules-based regional order, though not necessarily always in lockstep with Washington.

Though few European countries have formally acknowledged the new U.S. strategy, the concept’s emphasis on rules-based order and multilateralism bears many similarities to the EU’s own outlook. The EU and many of its member states are becoming more ambivalent about Chinese power and are seeking to counter certain problematic Chinese economic behaviors, and the Indo-Pacific offers opportunities for transatlantic cooperation, though U.S.-EU diplomatic relations under U.S. President Donald Trump are significantly strained. However, the U.S. administration’s fixation on short-term transactional diplomacy, lack of commitment to multilateralism, and strong emphasis on Chinese containment are putting a damper on such collaboration with EU members.

Admittedly, Europe does not aspire to be a traditional hard power in Asia, lacks significant military capabilities in the region, and is reluctant to pick sides in the escalating U.S.-China competition. Only two European middle powers—France and the United Kingdom (UK)—can project serious military force in the region, as Europe has long underinvested in defense spending and needs to prioritize more immediate security threats. But Europe can amplify its political and security role in the Indo-Pacific by leveraging the growing Franco-British presence and better utilizing the EU’s collective role. Key European countries have already expanded their security footprint in the Indo-Pacific through a more regular naval presence, bilateral and multilateral joint exercises, arms sales, and various other forms of defense cooperation. Europe’s economic role is already considerable too, as the EU is a top trade and investment partner of most regional states.

Washington should welcome greater European involvement in the Indo-Pacific. A greater European presence in the region advances the U.S. objective of promoting a tighter regional security architecture with vital partners like Japan and India. Similarly, the EU’s support for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) can help foster a more multilateral, cooperative Asian security architecture. As for economic and trade policy, U.S. and EU interests in the region largely overlap but do diverge in significant ways. While both Europe and the United States are keen on increasing trade flows and addressing unfair Chinese economic practices, the EU’s emphasis on free trade has allowed it to either complete trade agreements or launch new negotiations with regional partners like Australia, Japan, and Singapore.

Despite the limitations constraining the transatlantic diplomatic agenda, meaningful joint and/or complementary European and U.S. action in the Indo-Pacific remains achievable, particularly between France, the UK, and the United States, though other European countries and the EU could get involved too. While the EU is not likely to formally endorse the U.S. slogan of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, Europeans can still meaningfully advance its objectives, which are overwhelmingly consistent with the EU’s own interests and values. Washington should encourage this trend and simultaneously seek to do more to incorporate European players as key partners on the implementation of its own Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy.

Recommendations for Europe:

  • Enhance Europe’s strategic thinking on the Indo-Pacific
  • Build a European consensus on China
  • Invest in regional multilateralism
  • Double down on nontraditional forms of security assistance
  • Identify other ways to contribute to maritime security
  • Leverage defense exports to the region
  • Invest in regional connectivity

Recommendations for Washington:

  • Enhance transatlantic strategic dialogue on the Indo-Pacific
  • Keep political messaging in sync
  • Clearly convey the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy to European partners
  • Acknowledge the EU’s unique complementary role in regional security affairs
  • Avoid taking swipes at the EU
  • Encourage greater European multilateral participation
  • Boost direct transatlantic security cooperation where possible
  • Discuss connectivity in the Indo-Pacific more
  • Enhance dialogue on export controls and FDI screening

Introduction

Home to billions of people and a sizable share of global economic output, the Indo-Pacific is of paramount importance to the future of the rules-based international order.1 While the region is a hothouse of commercial activity, it also faces profound strategic challenges, including North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and tensions across the Taiwan Strait and in the South China Sea. One of the most striking trends in the Indo-Pacific is the evolving strategic balance between China and the United States, a trend that will have far-reaching consequences for many U.S. allies and partners, including those in Europe.

While its role in Asia often has been overlooked, Europe can make distinct contributions to an open, transparent, inclusive, and rules-based regional order, though not necessarily always in lockstep with Washington. Admittedly, Europe does not aspire to be a traditional hard power in Asia, lacks significant military capabilities in the region, and is reluctant to pick sides in the escalating U.S.-China competition. Yet key European countries are expanding their security footprint in the Indo-Pacific through a more regular naval presence, bilateral and multilateral joint exercises, arms sales, and various other forms of defense cooperation. Europe’s economic role is already considerable too. For example, the European Union (EU) and China have one of the largest trading relationships in the world, and the EU is the biggest investor in many Asian countries.2 The EU also serves as a rule-setter in the region, having recently completed a massive free trade agreement with Japan.

Erik Brattberg
Erik Brattberg is director of the Europe Program and a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington. He is an expert on European politics and security and transatlantic relations.
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Europe’s growing interests in the Indo-Pacific necessitate an upgraded strategy. There is ample room for transatlantic cooperation in the areas of diplomacy, security, and economics, though coordination must improve and limitations will remain. Despite diplomatic strains on other issues, European and U.S. positions on Asia policy are partially converging, particularly on the challenges posed by China’s rise and the need to do more to defend the rules-based international order. Specifically, Brussels and member states’ capitals can cultivate a greater political and diplomatic presence in the region, help lead maritime security and freedom of navigation efforts, and expand security assistance and capacity building.

Upgrading Europe’s role in the Indo-Pacific and heightening U.S.-European cooperation there will require forethought and effort. Settling on a common transatlantic agenda for the region requires that simmering tensions among European countries on how to deal with China are addressed, as underscored, for instance, by the previous Italian government’s March 2019 decision to endorse Beijing’s push to fund overseas infrastructure through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Further, U.S. President Donald Trump and his administration must balance unilateralism with a greater measure of multilateralism, see Europe as more of a strategic partner, and refrain from protectionist tariffs and other counterproductive polices aimed at the EU.

The Limits of Trump’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy

Previous U.S. administrations sought to encourage China’s rise while hedging against its potentially destabilizing consequences. But Trump instead has treated China as an antagonistic competitor that seeks to undermine U.S. primacy, weaken U.S. ties to its regional allies, and dominate Eurasia if not more distant parts of the world.3 Both the 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy and the 2018 National Defense Strategy frame the defining, long-term strategic challenge confronting the United States as great power competition primarily with China (and to a lesser extent with other countries including Russia).4 This new U.S. approach posits that the previous policy of engagement with China has failed to encourage Beijing to act as a “responsible stakeholder.”5 Over the past few years, U.S. perceptions of Beijing’s intentions have clearly shifted, with a new bipartisan consensus in Washington on the need to do more to counterbalance the more troubling dimensions of China’s rise.6

The Trump administration’s vision of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” encapsulates this strategic focus.7 Admittedly, it remains unclear whether Washington can allocate the resources needed to accomplish its objectives and coherently wed its strategic ambitions with the interests of other regional actors. The goal is to compete more vigorously with China across several domains both in the Indo-Pacific and beyond (though the two sides could work together on specific problems like the nonproliferation challenge posed by North Korea). Fundamentally, the administration’s vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific is about safeguarding the sovereignty of other nations in the region, as reflected, for example, in Trump’s September 2019 address to the United Nations (UN) General Assembly.8

Other key principles of the U.S. regional strategy include the peaceful resolution of disputes, free and reciprocal terms of trade and investment, and adherence to international rules and norms (such as freedom of navigation and territorial integrity).9 Several regional partners have already endorsed these principles and are developing their own national strategies to help advance them, though these national strategies are not necessarily identical to the U.S. Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy.

The U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy encompasses three dimensions: economics, governance, and security. These policies aim to create a mesh of intersecting partnerships among countries affected by and wary of China’s rise, but they have been implemented unevenly so far. Ideally, this campaign would be conducted in concert with U.S. allies, but while Trump has made some cursory efforts to do so, the principal focus so far has been on unilateral actions against China on trade, technology access, and cyber theft.

In terms of execution on the messaging front, Washington has issued many erratic and contradictory statements and policies concerning the Indo-Pacific, and this is undermining U.S. credibility. Trump’s ambiguous commitment to supporting U.S. allies, his hectoring approach to burden sharing, and his reluctance to clearly affirm the importance of the liberal international order further exacerbate the key challenge facing any Indo-Pacific strategy.10 That said, in a recent speech, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs David Stilwell provided some important clarifications on the U.S. approach to China. He stressed pluralism “rooted in the sovereign rights of states” as an organizing principle in the Indo-Pacific.11

In the end, regional states want to avoid confrontation with China—the biggest trading partner for many of them—even as they seek to escape its domination by deepening ties with Washington. For example, Trump’s hostility to international trade is especially noteworthy: pulling out of what was deemed one of the most important regional trade agreements, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), undercut the United States’ regional economic leadership. For now, the administration’s mistakes are vexatious but not yet fatal because most regional actors still value the benefits of U.S. leadership despite the complications brought on by Trump. Ultimately, while the United States and Europe have ample reason to work together to protect their shared interests amid China’s economic resurgence, thorny policy differences across the Atlantic continue to constrain and sometimes even undermine such cooperation.

Europe’s Diplomatic Role

Diplomacy is central to Europe’s contributions to a transatlantic agenda for Asia, given Europeans’ track record of pragmatic engagement and commitment to multilateralism.12 The concept of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific has garnered interest in European capitals. Although the EU institutions and most member states still prefer the Asia Pacific moniker, the inclusiveness of the widened Indo-Pacific regional framework and its strong emphasis on rules-based order closely mirror the EU’s own outlook (despite the lack of consensus on its geographical boundaries). Moreover, many Europeans intuitively understand the merits of emphasizing the Indian Ocean more, given how important the Gulf of Aden is to European trade flows.

Yet many Europeans still have reservations about the concept mainly due to the Trump administration’s strong emphasis on countering China. While generally sympathetic to the concept’s underlying principles, many in Europe lack confidence in the administration’s foreign policy, misgivings rooted in several serious policy disagreements and Trump’s apparent hostility toward the EU and multilateralism.13 Most European actors are also wary of endorsing the Indo-Pacific concept outright for fear of antagonizing Beijing. For now, most of Europe prefers to wait and see how things develop. Even so, certain member states have been more forward-leaning than others. France, in particular, views the Indo-Pacific construct as central to its own view of the region and role therein (this may be, at least in part, because France maintains overseas territories in both the Indian and Pacific Oceans).14 Some other European countries and EU officials have also started to occasionally refer to the Indo-Pacific in policy statements and official documents, signaling greater awareness of and receptiveness to the new regional construct.15

In the meantime, the EU, its member states, and the post-Brexit United Kingdom (UK) all can help promote a Free and Open Indo-Pacific even without formally endorsing the concept. For starters, Europe must recognize that it will remain a relatively minor strategic actor in Asia. Only two European middle powers—France and the UK—can project serious military force in the region, as Europe has long underinvested in defense spending and needs to prioritize more immediate security threats. Notwithstanding these obvious limitations, Europe can amplify its political and security role in the Indo-Pacific by leveraging the Franco-British presence and utilizing the EU’s collective role, though the latter might be complicated by Brexit.

Taken together, the EU and its member states maintain a robust diplomatic presence throughout the Indo-Pacific, leveraging a strong economic profile, long-standing bilateral ties, and active engagement in various regional multilateral forums. Unsurprisingly, France and the UK, inter alia, maintain the most extensive network of bilateral and multilateral relationships, but other countries such as Germany are also relevant.

French Engagement in the Indo-Pacific

The Indo-Pacific is crucial for French diplomacy and the country’s vision of a stable multipolar order.16 The top French priorities in the region are protecting its overseas territories (New Caledonia and French Polynesia in the Pacific Ocean and La Réunion in the Indian Ocean), its extensive exclusive economic zone, and the over 1.6 million overseas French citizens who reside in the region.17 France is also keen on increasing defense exports, curbing nuclear proliferation and terrorism, maintaining maritime security and critical trade links, and upholding the rules-based international order.

Philippe Le Corre
Philippe Le Corre is a nonresident senior fellow in the Europe and Asia Programs at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Under former president François Hollande, France tried to upgrade its security partnerships with regional players such as Australia, India, and Japan and develop new bilateral arrangements with Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam.18 President Emmanuel Macron has intensified these efforts, focusing especially on Australia, India, and Japan, rendering France by far the most deeply connected European country in the Indo-Pacific today.19

Growing bilateral ties between France and India are especially noteworthy. The leaders of the two countries meet annually for a bilateral summit.20 At the most recent one held in Paris in August 2019, Macron invited Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to attend the G7 summit in the French city of Biarritz, where the two countries agreed on joint roadmaps on cybersecurity and digital technology.21 Their cooperative agenda spans a host of issues including civil nuclear power, energy policy and climate change, maritime security, and outer space.22 France and India also have a regular maritime security dialogue, the most recent iteration of which took place in New Delhi in November 2019.

Paris and New Delhi also boast a strong partnership in the defense sector. In March 2018, the two countries signed a joint cooperative vision for the Indian Ocean and a separate bilateral logistical cooperation agreement allowing for mutual access to military installations.23 In addition, France has expanded its defense exports to India, including a $8.8 billion deal in 2016 to supply thirty-six Rafale fighter jets, the first of which were delivered in October 2019.24 Based on an earlier $3 billion deal, six Scorpène diesel-electric attack submarines are being built in India under a technology transfer agreement. On the personnel front, France has a liaison officer assigned to the Indian Navy’s Information Fusion Center for the Indian Ocean region.25 In November 2019, the chief of staff of the French Navy, Admiral Christophe Prazuck, suggested that France and India were also discussing the possibility of conducting joint naval patrols in the Indian Ocean in 2020.26

France also cooperates significantly with Japan so as to diversify the former’s range of security partnerships. Paris and Tokyo already have a two-plus-two ministerial security dialogue involving their foreign and defense ministers, and they also recently finalized a bilateral acquisition and cross-servicing agreement. France and Japan have recently discussed conducting joint naval exercises and launching a new dialogue on maritime cooperation.27

Ties between France and Australia have grown closer in recent years, too, in part because they have similar objectives in the South Pacific. For one thing, France and Australia (along with New Zealand) share a responsibility for conducting disaster relief operations in the Pacific Ocean under the so-called FRANZ Arrangement.28 In March 2017, Paris and Canberra signed a joint statement that involves long-term strategic cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.29 During Macron’s visit to Australia in May 2018, he also touted the idea of a “Paris-Delhi-Canberra axis,” a regional security triangle designed to uphold the rules-based order and regularly convene the countries’ respective defense and foreign ministers.30 More recently, in Sydney, Prazuck said he hoped that Australian warships would escort the French aircraft carrier the Charles de Gaulle when she sails in the Indian Ocean.31 Moreover, France and Australia have enjoyed a strong industrial relationship since 2016, when the French company Naval Group (formerly called DCNS) won a $40 billion contract to supply Australia with twelve new submarines.32

In addition to cultivating bilateral ties, French ministers and senior diplomats participate in several multilateral regional forums. France is an active founding member—along with Australia, New Zealand, and the United States—of the bilingual, twenty-six-nation Pacific Community, a scientific and technical organization. Paris is also a dialogue partner, attendee, or member of a host of other organizations, including the Indian Ocean Rim Association, the South Pacific Defense Ministers Meeting, the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, and the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environmental Program.

France’s commitment to multilateralism in Asia even extends beyond these activities. The country coordinates on maritime security in the Southwest Pacific with Australia, New Zealand, and the United States as part of the Quadrilateral Defense Coordination Group. And, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a nuclear power, France shares responsibilities for managing the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula and plays an active role on sanctions policy in both the UN and the EU. Moreover, Paris has expressed interest in attending the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus.

UK Engagement in the Indo-Pacific

Similarly, as Europe’s other major military power, the UK is active in Asia to protect its national interests, promote trade and broker arms sales, project global influence and naval power, help ensure freedom of navigation, and uphold the rules-based international order.33 London has sought to increase its economic, diplomatic, and military presence in the Indo-Pacific in recent years. In part, this approach is a consequence of Brexit and the country’s need to forge new trade links in the region and elsewhere and make up for lost geopolitical relevance. Notably, the UK has emphasized expanding trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) with China, a position that could create friction with the Trump administration. For instance, in July 2019, Prime Minister Boris Johnson declared himself “enthusiastic about the Belt and Road.” 34

The UK’s regional security presence is a product of bases, partnerships, and naval deployments and joint exercises. Prominent British regional partners include Australia, India, and Japan as well as smaller Commonwealth countries such as Brunei, Malaysia, New Zealand, and Singapore.

The UK’s long-standing military and cultural ties with Australia are instructive. London and Canberra signed an updated treaty on security cooperation in 2017.35 The two countries’ foreign and defense ministers also meet for annual deliberations. Moreover, both countries participate in the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing alliance (along with Canada, New Zealand, and the United States) and in a separate nonbinding defense pact called the Five Power Defense Arrangements (with Malaysia, New Zealand, and Singapore).36 Meanwhile, a British defense firm, BAE Systems, also won a $26 billion contract in 2018 to supply the Royal Australian Navy with nine antisubmarine frigates.37

British cooperation with Japan runs especially deep as well. The 2015 Strategic Defense and Security Review refers to Japan as the UK’s “closest security partner in Asia.”38 In August 2017, former prime minister Theresa May and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe signed a five-page document outlining several concrete areas for strengthened security cooperation.39 The UK and Japan maintain a regular two-plus-two dialogue between their defense and foreign ministers, and in December 2017, they pledged to step up joint military exercises in the region.40 Royal Navy ships enforcing UN sanctions off the coast of North Korea have docking rights in Japanese harbors. The Royal Navy has also signed a trilateral defense agreement with the U.S. and Japanese navies to hold more exercises and combined patrols. Similarly, in October 2016, the UK’s Royal Air Force and the Japan Air Self-Defense Force held their first-ever joint aerial combat drill in Japan, and two years later, the British Army and the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force held a joint military exercise.41

Meanwhile, cooperation between the UK and India is growing but remains challenging. The two countries signed a strategic partnership in 2004, which led to an upgraded partnership on the security front in November 2015, and they have discussed further boosting maritime security cooperation.42 Like the French Navy, the UK Royal Navy is planning to assign an officer to the Indian Navy’s Information Fusion Center for the Indian Ocean region.43 Despite these signs of limited progress, the two countries face difficulties regarding previous colonial ties and the issue of visas for Indian workers in the UK.

In addition to bilateral relationships, the UK is also part of some of the same multilateral dialogues as France, including the Indian Ocean Rim Association, the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, and the South Pacific Defense Ministers Meeting, as well as others like the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP).

Despite the UK’s good intentions, however, Brexit has damaged the country’s credibility and hamstrung its desire to boost its presence in Asia. Although London launched a post-Brexit strategy called Global Britain to redirect military, economic, and diplomatic attention to the region, the UK’s ability to follow through while the Brexit debate rages on is debatable.44 For example, talk of establishing a reinforced British military base in the region remain speculative.45

Other European Diplomatic Relationships

Besides France and the UK, other European states naturally also maintain diplomatic relationships across the Indo-Pacific. Taken together, EU member states have fostered over forty strategic partnerships in the region and participate in over sixty bilateral dialogues.46 Many European countries engage in regular security dialogues and defense partnerships with countries like Australia, India, Indonesia, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and even China. Several are also active in some of the aforementioned regional multilateral bodies, including the ASEAN Regional Forum (which EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini attended in 2019), as well as others like the Indian Ocean Rim Association, the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, and ReCAAP. Many of them participate in other multilateral forums and gatherings, too, such as the Asia Pacific Intelligence Chiefs Conference, the Shangri-La Dialogue, the Raisina Dialogue, and the Tokyo Defense Forum. Taken together, the EU’s delegations and its member states’ many embassies—many of which host defense attachés and military advisers—give Europe an extensive diplomatic network throughout the Indo-Pacific.47

Germany, for example, wields considerable economic clout and close diplomatic ties, though little in terms of military power. In particular, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Abe have reinforced bilateral ties given their shared commitment to free trade and the rules-based international order.48 German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas has also touted an “alliance of multilateralists” with Japan and other middle powers to serve as a counterweight to growing great-power competition between China and Russia and the United States.49 This pointed implicit critique of the Trump administration prompts the question of whether U.S. and EU diplomacy may be starting to diverge not just on means but also on ends.

Germany has pursued other avenues of regional diplomacy as well, such as strengthened ties with India.50 The two countries have had a strategic partnership since 2001 and a defense cooperation agreement since 2006. During Merkel’s November 2019 visit to New Delhi, the two sides agreed to strengthen strategic cooperation on trade in agricultural goods, security, cybersecurity, and artificial intelligence.51 Given Germany’s strong dependence on trade flows with Asia, Berlin understandably prioritizes maritime security in the Indian Ocean. Though Germany lacks sizable naval capabilities like France and the UK, it regularly participates in regional maritime exercises and counterpiracy operations in the Indian Ocean; it also is part of the Indian Ocean Rim Association and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium. Beyond these diplomatic activities, German firms export arms to various Asian countries.

The European Union’s Role as a Bloc

Though most EU members prefer to cultivate bilateral ties, the union collectively also wields significant economic influence and normative power, and it remains strongly committed to multilateralism. Notably, the bloc takes common positions on a wide variety of regional foreign policy issues—be it sanctions on North Korea, the Rohingya humanitarian crisis, or the peaceful settlement of territorial disputes in the South China Sea.52 That said, common EU statements on many issues of principle such as freedom of navigation in the South China Se

主题Americas ; United States ; East Asia ; China ; Western Europe ; Foreign Policy ; Global Governance
URLhttps://carnegieendowment.org/2019/12/18/case-for-transatlantic-cooperation-in-indo-pacific-pub-80632
来源智库Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (United States)
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条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/418011
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