全球智库信息集成服务系统

Even a journey of 1,000 li starts with a first step.
—Ancient Chinese Proverb

The “Great Triangle” of the Asia-Pacific region formed by the United States, Russia, and China is particularly important in both geopolitical and military-strategic terms. The strategic arsenals and military programs of the two traditional superpowers and the steady buildup of the nuclear and missile capabilities of China, the newly emergent superpower of the twenty-first century, give global significance to the Great Triangle they form.

Key Features of Great-Triangle Relations

• The United States and Russia maintain a relationship based on nuclear parity, mutual nuclear deterrence, and a forty-year experience of arms limitation and reduction agreements.
   
• Unlike the United States and Russia, China’s approach to strategic stability is not based on missile and nuclear parity and mutually assured destruction. China is the only one of the “big five” nuclear powers that does not provide information on its nuclear forces.
   
• If China’s nuclear forces are as limited as they are believed to be, they would be unable to deliver a retaliatory strike and are operationally most likely oriented toward a preemptive attack. The Chinese second-strike capability is only viable if China has hidden missile reserves.
   
• China must be taken into consideration when discussing subsequent U.S.-Russian initiatives on arms limitations and reductions.
   
• China would join the disarmament process only if its concessions regarding transparency and weapons limitations are offset by U.S. and Russian concessions.

Incentives for China to Participate in the Disarmament Process

• The United States could commit to cease its buildup of sea- and land-based ballistic missile defense (BMD) assets in the Pacific Ocean.
   
• The United States and Russia must assume an obligation that China will be able to take part, in a format acceptable to Beijing, in BMD cooperation projects that the two superpowers agree upon.
   
• One such project might be an Asia-Pacific joint center for the exchange of missile launch data. This center would be similar to the Russia-United States and Russia-NATO centers, which were initiated or discussed in relation to Europe but never became operational.
   
• The United States and Russia could proceed with negotiations on the next strategic arms reduction treaty including limitations on conventionally armed strategic weapon systems. This would fulfill the necessary precondition for China to also limit its precision-guided missiles armed with conventional warheads that are indistinguishable from nuclear warheads.
   
• Progress must be made in limiting U.S. and Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons (excluding, in spite of the NATO position, their redeployment from Europe to Asia). This would establish the necessary conditions for limiting the Chinese intermediate- and shorter-range missile systems.

Introduction

The shift of the nuclear disarmament process from bilateral (between Russia and the United States) to multilateral has increasingly drawn the attention of politicians and experts across the world. At a meeting with experts at the Sarov Federal Nuclear Center on February 24, 2012, president-to-be Vladimir Putin declared: “We will not disarm unilaterally. . . . All nuclear powers should participate in this process. We cannot disarm while other nuclear powers are building up their arms.”¹

In this context, the “Great Triangle” of the Asia-Pacific region formed by the United States, Russia, and China is of particular importance, both in geopolitical and in military-strategic terms. Although such a geostrategic construction may naturally appear to be rather arbitrary, the parameters of the nuclear arsenals and major military programs of the two traditional superpowers, combined with the steady improvement of the nuclear missile capabilities of the newly emergent superpower of the twenty-first century, attach global significance to the triangle they form.

This triangle has an important regional dimension as well, in that other nuclear states (India, North Korea, and Pakistan) adjoin it in Asia. It is directly or indirectly linked to military, political, territorial, and economic issues of both international and intranational relations in the Western Pacific and Southeast Asia.

For the foreseeable future, the Asia-Pacific region will play an increasingly important role in both the global economy and international security. Both Russia and the United States have officially announced that their national strategies are being redirected to focus on this region. The course of events in the region will greatly influence the level of conflicts across the globe, the dynamics of military competition among nations, and the prospects for arms limitation and nonproliferation. Thus, the nature of the military and political relations among China, Russia, and the United States merits closer examination, particularly with respect to strategic and other nuclear weapons, which will have a decisive impact on regional and global security.

The Peculiarities of Relations Based on Nuclear Deterrence

Military-strategic relations within the Great Triangle are intertwined into a complex knot of common interests and disagreements relating to offensive and defensive strategic (and nonstrategic) weapons.

Russia and the United States

Russia and the United States possess the largest arsenals of nuclear weapons in the world. The total number of nuclear weapons that each side possesses exceeds the combined total number belonging to the remaining seven nuclear-weapon states. At the same time, nuclear stockpiles in both Russia and the United States have consistently been reduced (and the weapons of the two countries modernized at quite a moderate pace), while the nuclear capabilities of third countries (primarily of China, India, and Pakistan) have been growing steadily both in quantity and quality.

The United States

According to data exchanged under the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), the U.S. strategic nuclear forces (SNFs) consist of 806 deployed ballistic missiles and heavy bombers armed (under the treaty’s counting rules) with 1,722 warheads.² The land-based component of the U.S. nuclear triad consists of 500 silo-based Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), some of which have single warheads while others have three multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs) for a total of about 550 warheads. Under the framework of the 2010 New START Treaty, all of these ICBMs are to be reconfigured for single warheads between 2013 and 2017.³

The sea-based component of the triad consists of fourteen Trident Ohio-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, each of which can carry 24 Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) with eight MIRVs apiece. Four other submarines of this type have been converted to carry sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) armed with conventional payloads (154 missiles aboard each submarine, 616 in total). With two submarines currently under repair, the SLBMs are not considered deployed. Finally, Trident II SLBMs are counted as carrying not eight warheads but an average of four. This amounts to twelve submarines with 288 missiles and 1,152 warheads. Of these submarines, eight are based in and patrol the Pacific Ocean and six patrol the Atlantic Ocean.

The air component consists of heavy bombers, of which 93 are B-52H Stratofortresses and 21 are B-2 Spirits. There are currently 44 B-52H and sixteen B-2 bombers in service, armed with 350 air-launched cruise missiles and 150 air bombs. In addition, 67 B-1B bombers have been converted to conventional bombers. There are currently no combat-ready heavy bombers on combat alert (in the past, a number of them have always been held ready, fueled, and armed), and their nuclear bombs and missiles have been placed into storage at Air Force bases. In consideration of this circumstance, the new treaty counts heavy bombers as having one nuclear warhead each. At a realistically probable immediate heavy bomber loading, the U.S. SNFs would actually have about 2,000 warheads, rather than 1,722.

The United States currently has about 500 nonstrategic or tactical nuclear weapons, although official information on this subject has been rather ambiguous. They consist of 100 Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles for nuclear attack submarines (according to the 2010 announcement, all of these missiles were to have been scrapped) and 400 free-fall air bombs, of which about 200 are stored at six U.S. Air Force storage facilities in five NATO countries (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey). These bombs are designed to be delivered by F-16 U.S. Air Force fighter-bombers, as well as by the analogous Belgian and British aircraft and German-Italian combat Tornado-type aircraft. About 2,800 strategic warheads are stored in reserve, while up to 3,100 await decommissioning.⁴

The U.S. nuclear forces development program does not provide for building any new ballistic missiles, bombers, or strategic submarines for the foreseeable future. The service life of the Minuteman III missile has been extended to 2030. The modified Trident II SLBMs and Ohio-class submarines must stay in service until 2030–2040. The U.S. Air Force is developing a new advanced cruise missile (Experimental Cruise Missile) and has begun the development of a next-generation bomber for the period beyond 2020.

According to the Department of Defense, once it reaches the limits stipulated under the New START Treaty, the U.S. nuclear triad will consist of 420 Minuteman III ICBMs, fourteen Ohio-class submarines with 240 Trident II SLBMs, and up to 60 nuclear-capable heavy bombers.⁵ In terms of nonstrategic nuclear arms, the decision has been made to decommission all nuclear-armed Tomahawk SLCMs but to retain and upgrade the B61 air bombs. It is possible that the F-35 fifth-generation fighter will be certified for these bombs.

In recent years, the United States has shifted its emphasis somewhat from the traditional nuclear deterrence strategy to strategic ballistic missile defense and strategic conventional precision-guided munitions.

In recent years, the United States has shifted its emphasis somewhat from the traditional nuclear deterrence strategy to strategic ballistic missile defense (BMD) and strategic conventional precision-guided munitions (cruise missiles, advanced hypersonic weapons of the Prompt Global Strike program). Although these systems are directed at third countries, they will still have an effect upon the strategic balance and negotiations between Russia and the United States.

The Russian Federation

In contrast to the United States, Russia has increased its emphasis on nuclear deterrence both at the global level and regionally (judging from some indirect indications).⁶

According to data exchanged under the New START Treaty, Russia’s strategic nuclear forces comprise 491 deployed launchers and 1,499 warheads.⁷ The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates that Russian ground missile forces as part of the strategic nuclear forces have 322 launchers and ICBMs equipped with 1,087 warheads, including 50 silo-based heavy RS-20 (SS-18 Satan) ICBMs (each with ten MIRVs), 48 RS-18 (SS-19) missiles (each with six warheads), 135 road-mobile RS-12M Topol (SS-25) single warhead missiles, 56 silo-based and eighteen road-mobile RS-12M2 Topol-M (SS-27) missiles with single warheads, and fifteen RS-24 Yars (SS-27 Mod 2) MIRVed missiles with six warheads each.⁸

The Russian sea-based strategic leg consists of twelve strategic missile submarines carrying 144 missiles and 512 warheads, including six Delta IV-class submarines (Project 667BDRM, Delfin) with 96 RSM-54 (SS-N-23 Skiff) missiles, each carrying four warheads. With one of the submarines currently being overhauled, only five submarines and 80 deployed missiles are included in the count.⁹ The Pacific Fleet has three older (Project 667BDR, Kalmar) submarines carrying R-29R (SS-N-18) missiles armed with three warheads each. In addition, one Typhoon-class submarine (Project 941 Akula) serves as a test platform for the RSM-56 Bulava (SS-NX-32). One Yuri Dolgorukiy-class submarine (Project 955 Borei) completed sea trials in 2010 and was commissioned in January 2013. It is equipped with the same Bulava missiles.¹⁰ Another submarine of this class, Alexander Nevsky, is undergoing tests.

The strategic air force component consists of 76 aircraft: 63 Tu-95MS6 and Tu-95MS16 (Bear H) and thirteen Tu-160 (Blackjack) bombers.¹¹ Under the provisions of the new treaty, they are counted as 76 launchers and 76 warheads; however, in reality they can carry a total of 820 X-55 (AS-15 Kent) air-launched cruise missiles.¹² Thus, the Russian strategic nuclear forces are actually armed not with 1,499 warheads but with more than 2,000.¹³

Information relating to Russian nonstrategic nuclear forces is even scarcer than information relating to those of the United States. According to foreign sources, Russia currently possesses about 730 tactical nuclear air-launched missiles and bombs that can be delivered by 150 medium-range Tu-22M (Backfire) bombers and Su-24 (Fencer) and Su-34 (Fullback) fighter-bombers. In addition, there are about 700 antiship, antisubmarine, and antiaircraft missiles, as well as depth charges and ship and submarine torpedoes, including long-range submarine-launched cruise missiles. About 430 nuclear warheads are attributed to the S-300 (SA-10 Grumble) and other air defense systems, and approximately 160 warheads to tactical missiles of the ground forces.¹⁴

The overall nonstrategic nuclear arsenal that could be operationally deployed is estimated to be about 2,000 warheads, with another approximately 2,000 explosive devices in storage and slated for disposal.¹⁵ According to Russian military and political leaders, all nonstrategic nuclear weapons have already been placed into storage at central storage facilities.¹⁶

Unclassified sections of the development program for the Russian strategic nuclear forces provide above all for the continued deployment of the silo-based and road-mobile MIRV-equipped RS-24 Yars ICBMs. In addition, plans have been announced to develop a liquid-fueled, silo-based heavy ICBM with multiple warheads.¹⁷

At the heart of Russia’s naval strategic program lies the new submarine design, Project 955, one of which has already entered service, with three more at various stages of construction. Plans call for building eight new ballistic missile submarines by 2020, to be equipped with the RSM-56 Bulava (SS-NX-32) SLBMs. Six submarines from the previous design, Project 667, have been equipped with the modified RSM-54 Sineva (SS-N-23 Skiff) SLBMs.¹⁸

The Tu-160 (Blackjack) strategic bomber continues to be built for the Air Force (one every couple of years). In addition, a new air-launched cruise missile system is under development in both a nuclear and conventional payload configuration (X-555 and X-101/102).¹⁹ Next-generation strategic bombers (the PAK DA) are at the early stages of development and are for the long-term future.

The future composition of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces will depend upon the rate at which outdated systems deployed in the 1980s and 1990s can be decommissioned, as well as how quickly new weapons can be deployed. Since more weapons are being withdrawn from service than are being deployed, the overall number of nuclear arms is declining. The New START Treaty therefore does not affect Russia’s nuclear capability to any great extent. By 2020, for example, Russia could have about 1,500 warheads on land- and sea-launched missiles, including about 900 on 300 ICBMs (RS-12M2 Topol-M, RS-23 Yars, new heavy ICBM) and approximately 600 on 100 RSM-54 Sineva and RSM-56 Bulava SLBMs, deployed on Project 667 and Project 955 (Yuri Dolgorukiy–class) submarines.²⁰

Thus, the Russian strategic nuclear forces comprise at most 450 launchers and 1,550 warheads overall (based on the counting rules of the new treaty). If the new heavy ICBM is deployed, it would add a certain number of carriers and warheads to the total for the year 2020 but could destabilize the strategic balance due to the greater concentration of warheads on a smaller number of relatively vulnerable launchers.

Based on the two countries’ arsenals and the decisions that underlie them, the conclusion may be made that Russia and the United States have maintained a classic relationship based on mutual nuclear deterrence (the concept of mutually assured destruction) and approximate strategic parity. For the past forty years, this has also served as the foundation for their arms control negotiations and agreements on principles of “equality and equal security” and “strategic stability.”

The New START Treaty once again codified this relationship, at reduced quantitative levels. Each side was limited to a maximum of 700 deployed missiles and bombers (800 counting non-deployed missile launchers and heavy bombers) and 1,550 nuclear warheads. These numbers were to be achieved by 2018, and the treaty itself is to expire in 2021. In comparison with START I (signed more than twenty years ago), the new treaty reduces the number of warheads nearly fourfold and the number of delivery vehicles by two and a half times. In addition, the new treaty is structured much more simply, and its verification regime is more modest.²¹

However, even in this regard asymmetry between the sides has been growing, which will create difficulties in further negotiations. Russia has linked the prospects for conducting future negotiations with its demand to resolve disagreements over missile defense and with the prohibition of space weapons, while the United States has linked them with the limitation of nonstrategic nuclear arms. Both powers have raised the question of including third states in the nuclear arms limitation process, with Russia suggesting the UK and France (since they are allied with the United States), while the United States has raised the issue of China (as an independent party in the strategic balance). Russia’s position with regard to China has been ambiguous and has not distinguished it from other nuclear states.

Nevertheless, within the framework of the new treaty (or outside of it), the strategic relationship between Russia and the United States will undergo essentially no significant change for the foreseeable future, leaving neither side with the capability to conduct a disarming first strike under any scenario of nuclear conflict. According to models advanced by independent experts, under any conditions of a counterforce attack the defending side would still have several hundred nuclear warheads with which to retaliate, which would be sufficient to inflict unacceptable levels of damage on the hypothetical aggressor. Following deployment of the U.S. ballistic missile defense and Russian Air-Space Defense systems, the retaliatory capacity of the opponent could be diminished by at most a dozen or slightly more warheads.²²

Thus, the strategic relationship between Russia and the United States will continue to be relatively stable for the foreseeable future, despite the impact of perturbing military and political factors. Moreover, discounting the influence of third-country nuclear states, strategic stability under the bilateral framework will be secured even if the two countries succeed in concluding the next arms reduction treaty by limiting the number of warheads for each country to 1,000 (provided that the high survivability of strategic forces is ensured).

The United States and China

A state of mutual nuclear deterrence exists between these two powers, although it very asymmetrically favors the United States. In recent years, the United States has been shifting the emphasis of its nuclear strategy in the direction of the Pacific Ocean, primarily with China in mind (as noted above, eight of the fourteen Trident Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines are deployed in the Pacific). In focusing on this area, Washington has made developing its missile defense a much higher priority there than in the Euro-Atlantic area (90 percent of the BMD radars and interception assets are situated in the Asia-Pacific), and it is also concentrating on the deployment and development of high-precision conventional strategic systems, including Prompt Global Strike programs.

At the same time, in contrast to its relations with Russia, the United States has never officially acknowledged a relationship with China based on mutual nuclear deterrence or accepted that China will eventually achieve parity with the United States. It would appear that Washington has no intention of offering such relations as a “gift” to China, the new superpower of the twenty-first century (similar to the way that the United States at one time had not wanted to recognize mutual deterrence with the Soviet Union, which then had to win parity for itself after first passing through three different cycles of the arms race and the very dangerous Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962).

China, for its part, insists on its right to mutual deterrence with the United States, with an emphasis on “minimum nuclear deterrence,” and thus has been gradually increasing the number of its ICBMs and SLBMs. Along the way, China has been building precision-guided conventional intermediate-range ballistic missiles that could potentially be used against Taiwan and the U.S. Navy and tactical ballistic missiles, and it is also conducting experiments with missile defense and antisatellite weapons.

According to independent experts, China’s strategic forces (based on the New START Treaty’s classification) consist of 93 land- and sea-launched ballistic missiles.²³

The land-based component of the Chinese nuclear forces consists of the Strategic Missile Force and missile systems of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) ground force. China’s Strategic Missile Force is represented by the so-called Second Artillery of the PLA and includes eighteen obsolete silo-based liquid-fueled DongFeng 5A (CSS-4) missiles as well as 30 new solid-fueled, road-mobile DongFeng 31 and DongFeng 31A (CSS-9) ICBMs.

The sea-based component includes two types of ballistic missile submarines: one Xia-class (type 092) with twelve single-warhead Julang-1 (CSS-N-3) SLBMs and two Jin-class (type 094) submarines, each carrying twelve single-warhead Julang-2 missiles. Although the construction of Xia-class submarines and Julang-1 SLBMs was discontinued in the 1990s, construction of type 094 submarines began in 2001 with at least four planned to be built (other sources say at least five). The two type 094 submarines that are already serving with the Chinese Navy patrol the waters adjacent to China. Thus, the sea-based component of China’s nuclear forces consists of 36 single-warhead Julang-1/2 SLBMs, the combat loads of which consist of 45 nuclear warheads.

China has a significant number of intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) as well as tactical ballistic missiles. The 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty eliminated all Russian (Soviet) and U.S. weapons of this class. China has eleven obsolete DongFeng-4 (CSS-3) IRBMs and 88 new road-mobile intermediate-range DongFeng-21/21A (CSS-5) missiles, as well as 60 DongFeng-15/15A/15B (CSS-6) and DongFeng-11A (CSS-7) (the latter does not match the INF classification, having a range of 300 kilometers). Overall, China has 160 intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. Some IRBMs and tactical ballistic missiles, apparently, are conventionally armed.

The air-based component of China’s nuclear forces consists of the strategic air force, which has 60 Xian H-6 medium-range bombers, and the tactical air force, represented by 300 Jian-5 fighter-bombers and fighter aircraft derived from the Russian multirole Su-30 fighter. In addition, 120 strategic nuclear B-5 bombs and 320 B-4 nuclear bombs are allocated to them, for an overall total of 440.

The PLA ground forces are armed with two types of road-mobile systems capable of launching either nuclear-armed or conventional-armed missiles. One system is based on use of the solid-fueled DongFeng-11 (CSS-7—about 100 units), the other on the DongHai-10 ground-launched cruise missiles (up to 500 units). Up to 150 nuclear warheads may be assigned to these missiles as nuclear payload.

Thus, as many as about 360 nuclear reentry vehicles could come under the land-based component of the Chinese nuclear forces. During peacetime, most of these warheads would be stockpiled separately from the missiles. However, contrary to the opinion of many experts, the Second Artillery is now adopting a continuous duty cycle for the DongFeng-31/31A (CSS-9) ICBM missile brigades, clearly readying these systems for immediate use upon the authorization of the Chinese political leadership. This means that the missiles in their launch containers will have nuclear warheads permanently mounted on them.

According to leading Russian experts, China has about 800 to 900 nuclear warheads in its current stockpile that are available for rapid deployment.²⁴ In addition, approximately the same number could be held in storage as backup weapons and for spare parts or be earmarked for disposal.

There is yet another aspect of utmost importance. Foreign news agencies and independent experts have periodically reported that the Chinese military has been building an extensive system of underground tunnels that could store large items of military hardware. These tunnels, which extend for several thousand kilometers, could be capable of accommodating significant numbers of backup launchers with ballistic and cruise missiles or of storing nuclear weapons. No other purpose has yet been identified for such extensive earthworks.

Unofficial sources report that new versions of the Xian H-6 medium-range bomber are being produced and that those already in service are undergoing modernization. They are equipped with new targeting and navigation equipment and will have an enlarged armament payload, including air-launched cruise missiles with nuclear warheads. The prototype for this missile is the DongHai ground-launched cruise missile. In an effort to modernize the land-based component of its nuclear forces, China has placed the emphasis on fitting ballistic missiles with MIRV warheads and with BMD penetration aids. In addition, two new ballistic missiles are under development: the DongFeng-25 IRBM and DongFeng-41 (CSS-10) ICBM. The DongFeng-25 is built using the first and second stages of the DongFeng-31, arming it with MIRVs (as many as three reentry vehicles). This system is intended to replace the outdated DongFeng-4 (CSS-3) IRBM. The DongFeng-41 ICBM was developed to be a versatile missile that could be deployed on road-mobile and rail-based launchers. It is believed to be equipped with six to ten MIRVs.

As far as the sea-based component is concerned, the main effort is being applied to increasing the speed and improving the quality of the type 094 class ballistic missile submarines. The JL-2 SLBM is undergoing modernization and being equipped with MIRV warheads. In addition, the necessary infrastructure for nuclear submarines is being built at a naval base on Hainan Island in the South China Sea. A new type 096 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, which is to be equipped with 24 JL-2 MIRVed SLBMs, is being planned for the longer term. It is expected that the first such submarine will be launched in 2014–2015.

Thus, the Chinese nuclear capability has clearly been underestimated by the international community. It appears in all likelihood that China, which is already the third-largest nuclear state after the United States and Russia, is in a class of its own. In terms of its nuclear force levels, China surpasses all of the other six nuclear states combined (excluding the two superpowers). In addition, China is the only state aside from Russia and the United States that has the technical and economic capability to build up its nuclear arsenal rapidly and manyfold.

However, the balance is hugely asymmetrical in favor of the United States with respect to the quantitative and qualitative parameters of the strategic nuclear forces, as well as their command, control, and information management systems. As a consequence, there is no parity in the strategic balance of the two countries and also no state of mutually assured destruction (by retaliatory attack under all conditions of conflict), which is the basis of strategic stability.

The United States has an excess of such capacity while, so far, China lacks it, based on the aforementioned description of its nuclear forces (in terms of their “operationally deployed capability”). In a hypothetical disarming (counterforce) strike against China’s identified strategic and nonstrategic nuclear forces, the United States could destroy (in all probability within a single launch) more than 90 percent of these military targets.²⁵ The missile defense system that is being deployed and enhanced in Asia and the Pacific by the United States (including the elements in Alaska and California) and its allies would be capable of intercepting the vast majority of the surviving Chinese nuclear missiles. For the foreseeable future, the strategic balance between the two powers will be defined by their strategic and theater offensive and defensive programs and by possible agreements in this area.

Within the U.S.-China strategic balance, mutual nuclear deterrence is not only highly asymmetrical but is also further “diluted” by scenarios of regional conflict and by the weapons systems deployed in support of U.S. commitments to its allies and partners.

As has been noted above, the United States has never acknowledged any degree of mutual nuclear deterrence or parity with China, nor has it ever admitted that such a situation could possibly emerge in the future. As applied t