| 来源类型 | Research Paper |
| 规范类型 | 工作论文 |
| Are Iran’s ballistic missiles designed to be nuclear capable? | |
| Michael Elleman; Mark Fitzpatrick | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-02-28 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 概述 | Iran has the largest and most diverse ballistic-missile arsenal in the Middle East – could these systems one day be used to launch nuclear weapons? In a new report, IISS analysts Michael Elleman and Mark Fitzpatrick offer a detailed assessment of the design intentions behind each missile within Iran’s inventory. The result is a clear picture as to which platforms the United States and its allies should seek to remove, and which ones can be discounted. |
| 摘要 | \u003cp style=\u0022margin-bottom: 12pt;\u0022\u003eThe common claim that Iran\u0026rsquo;s missile development must be stopped altogether because these systems could deliver nuclear weapons in the future rests on broad generalisations. While there is reason for concern, priority attention should be given to those missiles that might realistically be used for such a purpose, if Iran were to go down a perilous nuclear path.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022margin-bottom: 12pt;\u0022\u003eThe international standard \u0026ndash; but not treaty \u0026ndash; for determining the inherent nuclear capability of missiles is the threshold developed in 1987 by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which seeks to forestall exports of missile systems able to deliver a 500kg payload a distance of 300km or more. Eight of Iran\u0026rsquo;s 13 current ballistic missile systems \u0026ndash; the largest and most diverse arsenal in the Middle East \u0026ndash; exceed this threshold and are thus deemed to be nuclear capable. The other five, all within the \u003cem\u003eFateh\u003c/em\u003e-110 family of missiles, are certainly lethal, especially when shipped to Hizbullah for use against Israel, but they are clearly not intended for nuclear use. \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022margin-bottom: 12pt;\u0022\u003eBecause capability does not equal intent, the MTCR guidelines should be just the first step in an assessment of Iran\u0026rsquo;s intentions for its missiles. When the United Nations Security Council drafted a new resolution in July 2015 to accompany the Iran nuclear agreement finalised that month, an element of intent was added to previous sanctions resolution language that prohibited launches of Iranian missiles that were \u0026lsquo;capable of delivering nuclear weapons\u0026rsquo;. The 2015 resolution calls upon Iran not to engage in activity concerning missiles \u0026lsquo;designed to be\u0026rsquo; capable of delivering nuclear weapons. \u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022margin-bottom: 12pt;\u0022\u003eWhat it means \u0026lsquo;to be designed\u0026rsquo; is undefined. Judging intent is partly subjective, but technical clues and intelligence information can guide analysis. The soundest approach is to disaggregate Iran\u0026rsquo;s various missile systems, and to assess design intentions on the basis of the technical capabilities and lineage of the different missiles. \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eAssessing design intentions\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022margin-bottom: 12pt;\u0022\u003eWe note that two of Iran\u0026rsquo;s short-range missiles \u0026ndash; the \u003cem\u003eShahab\u003c/em\u003e-1 and \u003cem\u003eShahab\u003c/em\u003e-2 \u0026ndash; are based on Soviet export-model \u003cem\u003eScud\u003c/em\u003e-Bs and -Cs that were designed to carry conventional weapons. These systems exceed the MTCR threshold and are thus inherently capable of carrying nuclear weapons. It would be incorrect to claim, however, that they were designed for this role. Iran\u0026rsquo;s reason for first acquiring these systems in the mid-1980s \u0026ndash; to retaliate against Iraq\u0026rsquo;s missile attacks against Iranian cities \u0026ndash; underscores their purpose in delivering conventional warheads.\u0026nbsp; \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022margin-bottom: 12pt;\u0022\u003eAt the other end of the scale in terms of intent, there is strong evidence that Iran\u0026rsquo;s \u003cem\u003eGhadr \u003c/em\u003esystem was indeed designed with a nuclear payload in mind. As has been well reported, the schematics on a computer hard drive turned over by a defector in 2004 demonstrate efforts to redesign the re-entry vehicle of the \u003cem\u003eShahab\u003c/em\u003e-3 to accommodate what appears to be a nuclear implosion weapon. The solid-fuelled \u003cem\u003eSajjil\u003c/em\u003e-2 and the liquid-fuelled \u003cem\u003eQiam\u003c/em\u003e have the same baby-bottle shaped nosecone and can thus were also presumptively designed for nuclear-weapons delivery. The case for the \u003cem\u003eQiam\u003c/em\u003e, however, is less clear, because it appeared several years after the tell-tale intelligence surfaced. \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022margin-bottom: 12pt;\u0022\u003eA conclusion that the \u003cem\u003eGhadr \u003c/em\u003ewas designed for nuclear-weapons delivery\u003cem\u003e \u003c/em\u003eis also supported by its North Korean \u003cem\u003eNodong\u003c/em\u003e origin. The \u003cem\u003eShahab\u003c/em\u003e-3, which is the name that Iran gave to the \u003cem\u003eNodong\u003c/em\u003es it imported, also appears to have been designed for nuclear weapons. It is not entirely clear whether \u003cem\u003eNodong\u003c/em\u003es originated in North Korea or the Soviet Union, but in either case they were developed to deliver nuclear weapons. Iran\u0026rsquo;s \u003cem\u003eEmad\u003c/em\u003e missile is a 2015 variant of the \u003cem\u003eGhadr, \u003c/em\u003eand thus by its lineage was arguably designed for nuclear weapons. It has a different nosecone, however.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022margin-bottom: 12pt;\u0022\u003eIran\u0026rsquo;s medium-range \u003cem\u003eKhorramshahr\u003c/em\u003e missile is harder to judge, because of the dearth of good information and successful test launches. It appears to be derived from North Korea\u0026rsquo;s \u003cem\u003eMusudan\u003c/em\u003e, which employs technology and hardware originally designed for the Soviet Union\u0026rsquo;s R-27 submarine-launched ballistic missile. Both the Soviets and North Korea designed the R-27 and \u003cem\u003eMusudan\u003c/em\u003e, respectively, to carry a nuclear weapon. We, therefore, tentatively judge the Iranian versions of this missile to be designed for nuclear-weapons delivery.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022margin-bottom: 12pt;\u0022\u003eIn addition to its ballistic missiles, Iran has developed two space-launch vehicles, the \u003cem\u003eSafir\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003eSimorgh\u003c/em\u003e. Both carrier rockets are optimised for launching satellites, and are not well suited to perform as a ballistic missile. Neither rocket has been tested as a ballistic missile and would require modifications for such a use. It is, therefore, hard to make the case that the \u003cem\u003eSafir\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003eSimorgh\u003c/em\u003e are designed to be capable of nuclear-weapons delivery. To the contrary, they were designed and configured to be satellite launch vehicles. It should be noted that no country has converted a satellite-launch vehicle into a long-range ballistic missile. \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eFocus on medium-range systems\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp style=\u0022margin-bottom: 12pt;\u0022\u003eIn light of the central role that ballistic missiles play in Iran\u0026rsquo;s defence and deterrence posture, especially given its antiquated and inferior air force, it is inconceivable that Tehran would voluntarily agree to surrender them entirely. The United States and its allies should give greatest priority to curtailing Iran\u0026rsquo;s medium-range systems that most clearly were designed to deliver nuclear weapons, and be prepared to accept missiles that clearly were not, including both the short-range system and space-launch vehicles.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eDesigned to be nuclear capable \u0026ndash; 23/08/18 update\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eDrawings and descriptions of a nuclear-implosion device mounted inside a \u003cem\u003eShahab\u003c/em\u003e-3 nosecone that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu unveiled on 30 April 2018 prompted an update to the assessment. The nuclear bomb, as depicted in the captured Iranian files that he displayed, has an estimated diameter of 585 mm. The diameter of the depicted \u003cem\u003eShahab\u003c/em\u003e-3 nosecone that corresponds to the maximum width of the nuclear bomb is about 720 mm. The gap between the nuclear device\u0026rsquo;s outer surface and the nosecone\u0026rsquo;s inner surface is needed for fixtures that secure the bomb within the warhead and material designed to insulate it from the thermal and vibrational loads experienced during flight, including atmospheric re-entry. This information, along with the documentation contained on a laptop smuggled out of Iran in 2004, \u003cspan\u003esuggests that Iran\u0026rsquo;s presumptive nuclear-bomb design was intended for use on a \u003cem\u003eShahab\u003c/em\u003e-3 missile.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eHowever, the 585-mm bomb design cannot be fitted into the narrower nose cone of the \u003cem\u003eGhadr\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003eSajjil\u003c/em\u003e, and by extension, the \u003cem\u003eQiam\u003c/em\u003e missiles. The modified, triconic nosecone of this system was initially revealed during a flight test in 2004, after revelation of the laptop documents. We therefore now judge that the \u003cem\u003eGhadr\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003eSajjil\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003eQiam\u003c/em\u003e missiles were not specifically designed to carry nuclear warheads, but rather, conventional weapons.\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan\u003eThis conclusion would need to be adjusted if Iran were able to develop or acquire designs for a smaller nuclear warhead.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAll other findings in our article remain unchanged. \u003c/p\u003e","className":"richtext reading--content font-secondary"}), document.getElementById("react_ZAlVzt9fuEWUyxTbOYBi6Q"))}); |
| URL | https://www.iiss.org/blogs/research-paper/2018/02/iran-missiles-nuclear-capable |
| 来源智库 | International Institute for Strategic Studies (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/433092 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michael Elleman,Mark Fitzpatrick. Are Iran’s ballistic missiles designed to be nuclear capable?. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
