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来源类型	Research Paper
规范类型	工作论文
	China’s pursuit of advanced dual-use technologies
	Meia Nouwens; Helena Legarda
发表日期	2018-12-18
出版年	2018
语种	英语
概述	\u003cp\u003eChina has embarked on a major process to achieve civil\u0026ndash;military integration and to develop advanced dual-use technologies. In this report, the IISS and MERICS outline the actions Europe should take to protect its own innovations.\u003c/p\u003e
摘要	\u003cp\u003eIn its quest to become a global \u0026lsquo;science and tech superpower\u0026rsquo; and to build a strong military that can fight and win wars, China has embarked on a major process to achieve civil\u0026ndash;military integration (CMI) and develop advanced dual-use technologies. Using various methods both to promote indigenous innovation and to access foreign technology and know-how, China\u0026rsquo;s goal is to leapfrog the United States and Europe and achieve dominance in these technologies, which will have major civilian and military implications in the future. The EU does not have strong, coordinated strategies to promote the development of indigenous dual-use technologies or to protect Europe\u0026rsquo;s indigenous innovation. As a result of this patchwork regime, China is either catching up to, or surpassing, European capabilities regarding most of these technologies through a \u0026lsquo;whole-of-government\u0026rsquo; regulatory framework and financial investment, as well as by accessing European innovation and technology through a variety of means. For Europe, the incentive to keep up with China\u0026rsquo;s progress in these technologies, and to protect its own innovation in this field, is one with military, but also commercial and economic, imperatives. At a time when China is increasing its commitment to this process of developing advanced, dual-use technologies, it is high time for Europe to think strategically and take action to leverage its own competitive advantages. \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003e1. Introduction\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn both the civil and military spheres, technological innovation has become a significant policy focus for the governments of the most advanced economies. The scale and scope of modern technology continues to expand. By 2020, the number of Internet of Things (IoT) devices could reach 24 billion and an estimated US$6bn \u0026lsquo;will flow into IoT solutions including application development, device hardware, system integration, data storage, security and connectivity\u0026rsquo;.\u003csup\u003e1\u003c/sup\u003e The global market for robotics and systems utilising Artificial Intelligence (AI) is expected to reach US$153bn by 2020. The amount of venture capital funding going into robotics in 2015 stood at US$587 million, double the amount invested in 2011.\u003csup\u003e2\u003c/sup\u003e \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe trend of focusing policies to take advantage of these technologies and lead in their development is evident in the European Union, as well as in China under President Xi Jinping\u0026rsquo;s leadership. In an effort to drive the country towards the 2049 centenary goal of becoming a modern and prosperous socialist state, as well as building a global top-tier military capable of fighting and winning wars, Xi has turned to a two-pronged strategy for military modernisation: making large defence state-owned enterprises (SOEs) more efficient, globally competitive and innovative, while also turning increasingly to the civil and commercial sectors for innovation potential and inspiration. In particular, China is investing heavily in its pursuit and integration of emerging dual-use technologies,\u003csup\u003e3\u003c/sup\u003e hoping they will help the People\u0026rsquo;s Liberation Army (PLA) to surpass conventional military capabilities to achieve battlefield dominance across domains. Technologies such as AI, cyber infrastructure and software, and automation are primarily civilian in their application, but their relevance to defence and to how future wars will be fought is clearly growing.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe European Union, too, has a stake in these areas, as well as economic and strategic incentives to stay ahead of the game. According to a McKinsey study, half of the activities currently carried out by workers in Europe could be automated in the near future.\u003csup\u003e4\u003c/sup\u003e For France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom, the study estimated that about US$1.9 trillion in wages and 62m workers are associated with technically automatable activities. The share of the population of working age in the EU is expected to decline until 2050, and by 2080 29.1% of the EU-28 population will be aged 65 years or over.\u003csup\u003e5\u003c/sup\u003e The total age-dependency ratio is expected to increase from nearly 53.9% to 80% of the EU-28 population between 2017 and 2080. In short, there will be greater demand for resources and services with fewer people in the workforce, creating an imperative for increased European investment in automation technology, which will be vital to the future workforce and to maintaining the EU\u0026rsquo;s industrial and innovation edge. \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThough countries like China, South Korea and the United States are particularly invested in researching the military applications of dual-use technologies, not all emerging technologies have been fully integrated into militaries yet and many are still in the development and testing phases.\u003csup\u003e6\u003c/sup\u003e This, however, does not take away from their potential future defence applications. \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eCurrent literature focuses largely on the relationship between China and the US, and the debate centres on how export controls and investment screening mechanisms might protect the United States\u0026rsquo; domestic innovation edge. Similar debates have been picked up in news coverage in Australia, New Zealand and the UK. However, a serious public discussion is yet to take shape about how China\u0026rsquo;s quest to become a leading innovator in emerging technologies could affect the interests of the European Union and its member states.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWhile the US has reinforced its policing of foreign investment by bolstering the purview of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), the European Union and its member states have been slow to come to terms with China\u0026rsquo;s R\u0026amp;D strategies and have not yet systematically tackled the question of what they mean for related industries in the EU. Examining whether China has achieved a strategic advantage in the field of dual-use technologies, this paper will develop recommendations for the European Union to boost its own innovation potential both at the supranational and member-state level.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003e2. China\u0026rsquo;s innovation toolbox: top-down goals and preferential conditions\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn recent years, the Chinese government has pushed forward industrial reforms and laid out ambitious plans to drive domestic science and technological innovation to develop and produce high-end products and emerging technologies. At the same time, the development of China\u0026rsquo;s national research and development capacities has also been utilised in civil\u0026ndash;military integration (CMI) efforts, with commercial innovation spilling over into military applications. The military aspect of Chinese innovation is important, particularly at a time when the People\u0026rsquo;s Liberation Army (PLA) is undergoing a series of major modernisation and reform efforts in its conventional military capabilities. China seeks to leverage new and innovative emerging technologies to \u0026lsquo;leapfrog\u0026rsquo; its main strategic competitor, the United States.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe Chinese government has thus laid out a \u0026lsquo;whole-of-government approach\u0026rsquo; to closing the gap with the West in areas such as robotics, artificial intelligence, unmanned and fully automated systems, quantum computing, space technology and hypersonic weapons. It continues to be a heavily organised, top-down process, with the government playing a vital and central role. Unlike in the US and UK, industrial plans in China are set by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for specific sectors at national and local government levels, with targets then set for localisation, market creation and productivity. National champions, or market leaders, are created with the help of state funding, domestic market protectionist policies, selective foreign investment, and by importing technology and talent, through mergers and acquisitions or joint ventures with Western firms. Industrial espionage also remains a tool in the Chinese innovation toolbox.\u003csup\u003e7\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ctable\u003e\n \u003ctbody\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u0026nbsp;China\u0026rsquo;s innovation toolbox\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd\u003e\u0026nbsp;Civil-military integration efforts\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd\u003e\u0026nbsp;Five-Year Plans\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd\u003e\u0026nbsp;Sector-specific industrial plans at national and local government levels\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd\u003e\u0026nbsp;Targets for localisation, market creation and productivity per sector\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd\u003e\u0026nbsp;Targets for international and national market shares for Chinese\u003cbr /\u003e\n companies\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd\u003e\u0026nbsp;R\u0026amp;D funding\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd\u003e\u0026nbsp;Creation of centres of sector-specific innovation\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd\u003e\u0026nbsp;Creation of national champions\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd\u003e\u0026nbsp;Domestic market protection policies\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd\u003e\u0026nbsp;Selective foreign investment or joint ventures with Western firms\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd\u003e\u0026nbsp;Industrial espionage\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/tbody\u003e\n\u003c/table\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eCMI policies (named \u0026lsquo;civil\u0026ndash;military fusion\u0026rsquo; in China,\u0026nbsp;军民融合) have gained particular attention under Xi Jinping\u0026rsquo;s leadership, during which barriers of entry for private sector companies into the defence technological industrial base (DTIB) in China have been reduced. China\u0026rsquo;s defence sector currently remains heavily dominated by its state-owned enterprises (SOE), and though the proliferation of private-sector companies in China\u0026rsquo;s DTIB landscape is on the upswing, bringing these two very different types of actors together remains a challenge. To this end, CCP committees have been implanted into more than 35 Chinese tech giants to make sure that the companys\u0026rsquo; objectives don\u0026rsquo;t stray from those of the party.\u003csup\u003e8\u003c/sup\u003e In 2017, the Central Commission for Integrated Military and Civilian Development was established by the party to oversee and coordinate CMI efforts.\u003csup\u003e9\u003c/sup\u003e Military branches, like the PLA\u0026rsquo;s Strategic Support Force (PLASSF), have signed agreements with universities and software-development companies to increase their integration outside of the military. In 2017, the deputy commander of the PLASSF, Li Shangfu, was moved to the Central Military Commission\u0026rsquo;s Equipment Development Department, in what some analysts regarded as further evidence of the integration of emerging technologies into the PLA\u0026rsquo;s procurement and development processes.\u003csup\u003e10\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eCMI need not be focused on just integrating emerging technologies into the military. At the 2018 China International Aviation \u0026amp; Aerospace Exhibition, a whole exhibition hall of enterprises was dedicated to CMI, with one private company \u0026ndash; Guangdong Hongda Blasting \u0026ndash; showcasing its latest product, the HD-1 supersonic cruise missile with ramjet propulsion, a significant undertaking for a private-sector company producing basic ordnance.\u003csup\u003e11\u003c/sup\u003e SOEs are also involved in this wave of cooperation \u0026ndash; in 2017, the China Electronics Technology Group Corporation \u003cspan\u003e(CETC) launched the world\u0026rsquo;s largest fixed-wing drone swarm using commercial fixed-wing drones produced by the private company Skywalker Technology.\u003csup\u003e12\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e","className":"richtext reading--content font-secondary"}), document.getElementById("react_o5xMiPPsOUKrFxd8bAaGyQ"))});

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