全球智库信息集成服务系统

The Center for American Progress and the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, or CICIR, have partnered often over the years, working regularly on areas of cooperation between China and the United States and on options for managing areas of competition and tension. Together, CAP and CICIR have held or participated in many conferences, workshops, and symposiums that bring together Chinese and U.S. officials and scholars; we have worked on joint publications; and we believe that we have helped enable substantial cooperation between the United States and China. Mistrust complicates U.S.-China relations and can obscure areas where cooperation might be possible and beneficial. Negative dynamics also obscure from others the depth of U.S.-China cooperation in a wide range of areas. In this report, we try to cut through these dynamics and offer new options.

In 2014, CAP and CICIR began to discuss how U.S.-China tensions might be obscuring areas of mutual interest in Southeast Asia, a region of tremendous importance strategically and economically to the entire region and the world. Prior to this project, in our respective organizations, the people who work on Southeast Asia did not work closely with colleagues working on U.S.-China bilateral relations. In most cases, our bilateral experts had spent little or no time in Southeast Asia, yet the tensions at play in the region featured prominently in their day-to-day work. Both the United States and China, meanwhile, were making investments and building new partnerships with Southeast Asian countries. Was Southeast Asia to be an arena of competition for China and the United States, or could there be areas of cooperation with members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, that brought benefit to all?

The potential for research by our teams with Southeast Asian counterparts was clear. It was our friend and colleague Nina Hachigian who proposed the concept that would make this a groundbreaking project. Now the U.S. ambassador to ASEAN, Hachigian is a diplomat and scholar of rare skill and creativity. She noted that CAP and CICIR could only do productive work in this area by doing two things: First, the organizations needed to join their stovepiped research teams into a single group with expertise on both Southeast Asia and U.S.-China relations. Second, CAP and CICIR had to partner with scholars in the region who study the United States, China, and ASEAN. And rather than holding a conference, why not travel through the region with local hosts?

Traveling together and having our research teams hosted by talented and dedicated partners in six Southeast Asian nations was a revelation. In each country, we not only identified possible areas of cooperation and discussed in-depth persistent tensions and concerns, but our teams also deepened their understanding of one another and of this region. We also discovered that we each had our own deep but parallel networks in Southeast Asia, and we established professional and personal connections across these networks. We were not limited to conference rooms, as we also visited markets and great historic sites. We enjoyed the food and culture of the nations that we visited, and we met with the people making Southeast Asia one of the most dynamic regions on earth. From a policy standpoint, this project was able to surface several areas of potential cooperation and confidence building that would be welcomed by nations in the region and make sense for the United States and China. It also built relationships among people who will be working on these issues for many years to come.

We cannot give enough thanks to our partners in Southeast Asia. The Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Indonesia; the Institute of Strategic and International Studies in Malaysia; the Strategic Studies Center in Thailand; the Institute of Strategic and International Studies and Myanmar Development Resource Institute in Myanmar; the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam; and the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore all brought a stunning array of scholars and officials to the workshops they hosted for us. We are grateful for the hospitality, the professional insights, and the challenging discussions and brainstorming sessions these organizations made possible. We are also thankful to each of our ambassadors in every country we visited and to the many officials and members of civil society who took the time to meet with us.

Finally, Helena Kolenda and Li Ling at The Henry Luce Foundation made this work possible. From the beginning, they recognized the value of taking this new approach, helped us shape the program, and gave us ideas along the way. They encouraged us to focus not only on the substance but also on the relationships among our team members and our partners in the region, as well as to value the intellectual, cultural, and personal exchange and policy innovation. We believe we were successful in these aims, and we found this collaborative research process among the most gratifying of our professional experiences.

From January 2015 to October 2016, CAP and the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations joined forces to conduct field research across six nations in Southeast Asia: Indonesia; Malaysia; Thailand; Myanmar; Vietnam; and Singapore. The thought going into this first-of-its-kind joint effort was that there were many underexplored opportunities for U.S.-China collaboration in the region. The aim was to test that assumption and find out what types of new initiatives the region would welcome. CAP and CICIR also wanted to learn more about how regional experts viewed the U.S.-China relationship. Toward that end, three questions were posed in each nation visited: (1) What do Southeast Asian nations want from a U.S.-China relationship in their region? (2) What are the opportunities for U.S.-China cooperation in the region that the two nations are not currently pursuing? and (3) How do the United States and China need to adjust strategy to make pursuing those opportunities possible?

Conversations varied across the six countries, reflecting diverse national perspectives and priorities. However, nine themes, or key findings, emerged from the sum of the research, which the CAP-CICIR team revalidated with key interlocutors prior to the publication of this report:

1. Southeast Asian countries welcome U.S.-China cooperation on challenges facing Southeast Asia and seek stable U.S.-China relations. The experts with whom the research team met highly value their relationships with both the United States and China and worry about what they view as an escalating U.S.-China rivalry in the region.
2. Southeast Asian countries expect the United States and China to respect the centrality of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations if the United States and China cooperate in Southeast Asia. Opinions varied by country regarding whether U.S.-China cooperation would be desirable with a particular third country or whether such cooperation should be done with ASEAN as a whole.
3. ASEAN countries seek reassurance that China will not become a hegemon. Most experts reported that ASEAN nations view China as a power with which they need to and can live, but they also stated that China’s policies in the region remain “unclear and unpredictable,” and that breeds unease among many ASEAN countries.¹
4. ASEAN countries generally welcome the U.S. rebalance to Asia. They take this as a sign of commitment from the United States to remain engaged with the region over the long term. At the same time, many did express concerns over the rebalance, which, in the view of many scholars, has created “big misunderstandings” and exasperated U.S.-China rivalry.²
5. Most ASEAN countries see China’s Belt and Road initiative as a big opportunity and expect to benefit from it. The CAP-CICIR field research team often heard that although researchers were not clear on the details of the Belt and Road, they welcomed the investment.³
6. China’s Southeast Asia policy is not as troubled as some observers imagine. While China’s approach to the South China Sea has caused challenges for Chinese diplomacy in the region, most experts with whom the research team met described China’s overall Southeast Asia policy as positive, with the region as hungry as ever to benefit from economic relations with China.⁴
7. ASEAN countries have clarity on what China is bringing to the table but less clarity on the future U.S. role. Many Southeast Asian leaders view economic development as their top priority and view the United States as being more engaged on security issues than economic issues; for that reason, the research team heard many questions about whether the United States was truly focused on the region’s needs.
8. ASEAN countries would like the United States and China to resuscitate moribund ASEAN initiatives and expand existing areas of positive U.S.-China cooperation into multilateral initiatives in which Southeast Asia can also engage. Southeast Asian experts interviewed were particularly interested in learning about how the United States and China are working bilaterally on global climate change, ocean issues, and people-to-people exchanges. Interlocutors also often expressed interest in the United States and China cooperating in regional multilateral forums, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum; the East Asia Summit; and the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus, among others.
9. Outside powers other than the United States and China—Japan in particular—are also critical partners for ASEAN countries. While the concept of U.S.-China collaboration in Southeast Asia was warmly welcomed throughout the region, the research team was also often reminded that “you are not the only major powers” and “you should remember that there are other interested players.” Japan was most often mentioned, as were India, Russia, South Korea, Australia, and Europe.⁵

Additionally, in each of the six Southeast Asian countries visited, the research team solicited ideas for U.S.-China cooperation in the region that would benefit all parties. While it was assumed at the beginning of the research effort that avenues for cooperation would be limited, the team found them to be abundant. Many of the recommendations shared by Southeast Asian experts were also quite practical. After filtering the many ideas for practicality both in U.S. and Chinese policy settings and capabilities, CAP and CICIR propose that the two countries’ governments consider exploring the following areas for cooperation, which will be outlined in greater detail later in this report:

• Expand U.S.-China ocean cooperation to include coastal nations and coastal cities in Southeast Asia.
• Expand U.S.-China energy and climate cooperation to include Southeast Asian nations.
• Support sustainable infrastructure development in Southeast Asian nations.
• Expand bilateral people-to-people cooperation to be trilateral.
• Deepen U.S.-China cooperation on Southeast Asia connectivity and consider embarking on a landmark infrastructure project.
• Develop a trilateral Track 2, or unofficial track, process, and leverage trilateral cooperation within existing official ASEAN institutions at the Track 1 level, or official track.
• The United States and China should find specific initiatives to cooperate on within the ASEAN institutions.

Background

The U.S.-China relationship is a lynchpin for global economic prosperity and global security. On problems ranging from global financial stability to cybersecurity to climate change, when the United States and China cooperate, they become the poles around which the rest of the global community can rally. At the bilateral level, U.S.-China cooperation is even more important for the nations’ respective domestic interests. Our economies have become so intertwined that small actions on one side of the Pacific can have big impacts on the other. Leaders in both nations recognize that on many policy issues, bilateral collaboration is the best way forward, and when it works, the benefits can be astronomical.

Yet despite the many reasons to cooperate, in recent years, disagreements, suspicions, and strategic rivalry have dominated the agenda. Our interdependence is a double-edged sword. Because our political and economic systems are so different, diverging interests are inevitable on at least some issues, and because we are so important to one another, both sides tend to view differences in approach or opinion as strategic threats. Although the U.S.-China relationship has grown steadily closer over the past three decades, we still have not managed to overcome a troubling and persistent dynamic: When tensions flare, conflicts quickly begin to dominate the overall bilateral relationship, and that makes it difficult to focus attention on areas of common interest. Furthermore, there are substantial numbers of influential U.S. opinion-makers who view China’s rise with suspicion and think a powerful China is likely to flex its muscles and seek to create a regional order that adversely affects U.S. interests. Likewise, a great many influential Chinese scholars and policymakers believe that the United States is intent on undermining China’s development and seeks to encircle a rising China with alliances and military bases.

Nowhere is this competitive dynamic more prevalent—and more damaging—today than in Southeast Asia. This is unfortunate because Southeast Asia is one of the world’s most critical regions for trade, economic growth, and global connectivity, where the United States and China share a wealth of interests. Collectively, the countries that comprise ASEAN have a $2.5 trillion economy and are the United States’ fourth largest trading partner and China’s third largest.⁶ The United States and China also both depend on the free passage of vessels through the region’s major arteries, including the Malacca Strait and the South China Sea, where half the world’s merchant tonnage passes every day.⁷

Southeast Asia’s economic importance to both Washington and Beijing should create great opportunities for cooperative U.S.-China engagement in the region. At present, however, when U.S. and Chinese leaders discuss Southeast Asia, those discussions are more likely to focus on concerns about each other’s actions in the region’s maritime territorial disputes rather than areas of common interest. To be sure, regarding the South China Sea and other security issues, there are serious disagreements between Washington and Beijing. That fact cannot be disputed, and the South China Sea problem is one that both nations—and the region as a whole—must work to address. The broader problem, however, is that when officials in Washington and Beijing view U.S.-China interactions in the region through a competitive lens, that obscures opportunities for collaboration that could benefit the two countries and the entire region. Recognizing this point, CAP and CICIR engaged in a joint research project to unearth areas where cooperation could be possible. This report outlines the scope of that project, findings based on field research, and recommendations for U.S. and Chinese policymakers.

U.S.-China cooperation in Southeast Asia has been a blind spot in U.S.-China relations. In both Washington and Beijing, U.S.-China policy is generally formulated by one group of experts, and Southeast Asia policy is formulated by another. These divides inside the expert communities make it difficult to formulate ideas for a Southeast Asia policy agenda that is integrated with U.S.-China policy. Policy discussions that bring together all relevant parties from the U.S. side, the Chinese side, and third-party Southeast Asian nations do not exist. Unfortunately, this means that all parties are often surprised to find that their policy approaches are not well-received by counterparts around or across the Pacific. Tensions begin to escalate, and cooperation appears increasingly elusive.

In an effort to break down those walls, CAP and the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations joined forces to jointly explore—bilaterally and with Southeast Asian nations—how the United States and China can better work together in this important region. CAP and CICIR conducted joint field research in Southeast Asia to hear directly from Southeast Asian nations what they want from U.S.-China cooperation in the region. The bilateral U.S.-China research team then worked collaboratively to reflect on what it heard in the region, to determine what new opportunities may exist for cooperation, and to identify a set of policy tools that leaders in both nations can use to take advantage of those opportunities.

This type of joint effort is something that has never been done before. Normally, at best, American scholars visit China and Southeast Asia separately and, once safely ensconced back in the United States, decide themselves how U.S. policymakers should approach broad regional issues. The same dynamic applies in China, and it is not productive. CAP and CICIR believe that a more collaborative research model is necessary.

In August 2015 and May 2016, the CAP-CICIR research team engaged in extensive joint field research, visiting Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Myanmar, Vietnam, and Singapore. In each country, the joint research team was co-led by CICIR Vice President Yuan Peng and CAP Vice President for National Security and International Policy Vikram Singh. CICIR Deputy Director of the Institute for South Asian, Southeast Asian and Oceania Studies Zhang Xuegang; CICIR Deputy Director of the Institute of American Studies Chen Wenxin; CAP Director for East and Southeast Asia Brian Harding; and CAP Senior Fellow and Director of China Policy Melanie Hart also participated in all stops. CICIR researchers Zhang Fan, Luo Yongkun, and Yang Wenjing; CAP researchers Blaine Johnson and Shiva Polefka; and former CAP researcher Aarthi Gunasekaran joined for portions. The research team selected these six countries to visit—three of which are located in Mainland Southeast Asia and three of which are located in Maritime Southeast Asia—due to their strategic importance and their likely interest in facilitating U.S.-China cooperation in the region.

In each country, CAP and CICIR partnered with leading think tanks to convene trilateral workshops. Those local partners included: the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Indonesia; the Institute of Strategic and International Studies in Malaysia; the Strategic Studies Center in Thailand; the Institute of Strategic and International Studies in Myanmar; the Myanmar Development Resource Institute; the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam; and the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. Government and nongovernment experts participated in each of these workshops. Each workshop began with the three sides sharing their respective perspectives on U.S.-China relations, China-Southeast Asia relations, and U.S.-Southeast Asia relations. The workshops continued with discussion of possible options for U.S.-China collaboration in Southeast Asia.

The CAP-CICIR team jointly identified three key research questions to guide this project:

• What do Southeast Asian nations want from a U.S.-China relationship in their region?
• What are the opportunities for U.S.-China cooperation in the region that the two nations are not currently pursuing?
• How do the United States and China need to adjust strategy on both sides to make pursuing those options possible?

CAP and CICIR designed the workshops in each nation to gain regional input on those questions and compare views across nations. Following these workshops, the research team also convened an additional meeting in Singapore in May 2016 with representatives from all six countries that it visited to discuss the recommendations outlined in this report.

What the research team heard in these joint meetings was unique, given the trilateral settings and the presence of both Chinese and U.S. participants. While there was concern that interlocutors might hold back criticism of either the United States or China in a meeting where scholars from both nations were present, the research team found that nearly all experts were exceptionally candid. Most importantly, they nearly universally saw the research team’s visit as an important opportunity to urge action on key issues of concern to them.

Conversations in the six countries visited were varied, reflecting diverse national perspectives and priorities. However, nine themes emerged from the sum of the team’s research.

1. Southeast Asian countries welcome U.S.-China cooperation on challenges facing Southeast Asia and seek stable U.S.-China relations

One of the research team’s primary concerns prior to the initiation of this project was that it would be perceived by Southeast Asians as an attempt by the United States and China to take a G-2 approach to Southeast Asia in which the United States and China jointly determined the fate of the region. Concerns over a possible G-2 have emerged at various points in recent years, particularly during the early years of the Obama administration, with smaller countries making clear that such an arrangement is undesirable.⁸ However, the research team’s concerns that this project would be perceived as a G-2 approach proved unfounded.

Rather than fearing an impending G-2, Southeast Asian interlocutors are almost universally far more worried about the likelihood of U.S.-China confrontation, which they believe would come at the expense of the broader region. For this reason, the research project was warmly received throughout in all six countries visited. In fact, given perceptions of U.S.-China relations in the region, scholars and officials were surprised that CAP and the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations would undertake this joint research project. As one Myanmar scholar put it, “This is the first joint China-U.S. team we have received. It is strange, but we are glad to see it, especially given that it includes collaboration with local counterparts.”⁹ A Singaporean scholar pointed out that more dialogue between major powers is a priority for Singapore, which is why Singapore hosts the annual Shangri-La Dialogue.¹⁰ Likewise, individuals in Indonesia and Thailand stressed their countries’ interest in being a bridge between the United States and China.¹¹

Interlocutors repeatedly expressed concerns about severe competition or even conflict between the United States and China.¹² Experts in each country made clear that they do not want to see conflict between the United States and China because it would undermine the foundation of regional stability and prosperity and potentially force smaller countries to take sides.¹³ A Thai scholar pointed out that the major desire of ASEAN is for the “two powers to maintain peace and security.”¹⁴ Furthermore, emerging challenges such as terrorism, climate change, environmental conservation, natural disasters, poverty alleviation, human and drug trafficking, and more require their attention—not great power rivalry.¹⁵ Due to the complexity of these factors, Southeast Asian countries are generally cautious about their relations with both the United States and China, emphasizing the importance of maintaining a balance of power.

Currently, Southeast Asian countries are becoming increasingly concerned about the possibility of direct U.S.-China military conflict, particularly in the South China Sea. Regarding this, most Southeast Asian countries—both claimant and nonclaimant countries—expressed their hope for mutual restraint on the part of both sides.¹⁶ As a Thai scholar put it, “ASEAN’s major goal is to maintain peace and stability, and ASEAN members need that. ASEAN nations do not want to see a U.S.-China war.”¹⁷

Despite their focus on and concern about the likelihood that U.S.-China relations could trend toward confrontation, many also did remind the team that the United States and China should not become too close. Indeed, on numerous occasions, the team heard versions of the regional adage “when the elephants fight, the grass gets trampled; when elephants make love, the grass also gets trampled.”¹⁸ Likewise, the team was repeatedly told that Southeast Asia’s preference is for a “not-too-hot-nor-too-cold relationship” between the United States and China.¹⁹ In practice, this would amount to a functional level of strategic coordination and cooperation rather than a “coalition” or “condominium” between the two powers.²⁰ This would include the United States and China cooperating with individual Southeast Asian countries and ASEAN as a whole to address regional challenges.

2. Southeast Asian countries expect the United States and China to respect ASEAN centrality if the United States and China cooperate in Southeast Asia

While broadly supportive of the concept of U.S.-China cooperation and collaboration in the region, Southeast Asian officials and nongovernment experts were clear that they expect to maintain ASEAN centrality and unity in any endeavor. As they seek to build a regional order with ASEAN remaining at the center—in the driver’s seat, so to speak—they hope for the outside powers to be constrained by the smaller countries of the region, while avoiding a self-described “tug of war” between the United States and China.²¹ As one leading Indonesian scholar stated, “ASEAN should not be treated like a chauffeur. Those who are interested in peace and stability should be careful on dividing and conquering ASEAN.”²²

To Southeast Asian nations, ASEAN centrality and unity is a key founding idea for ASEAN internal integration as well as cooper