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During the last week of August 2017, the Lebanese government completed its largest counterterrorism operation in years, pushing Islamic State (IS) militants from the group’s stronghold along the Lebanese border with Syria. As many as 7,000 soldiers from the Lebanese army and special operations forces took part.¹ The offensive underscored Lebanon’s contribution to the global counter-IS coalition and the key role that its military and security services have played in blocking the expansion of Sunni militant groups in the region.

None of this would be possible without the long-term support of the United States, which has quietly bolstered Lebanon’s counterterrorism capabilities over the course of a decade. The cornerstone of the American effort has been a program to strengthen the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) that was launched after Syrian troops withdrew from Lebanon in 2005.² In particular, Lebanon’s special operations community has made impressive strides in confronting the threat posed by Salafi-jihadi terror groups.

However, as the August operation also made clear, U.S. assistance has been far less successful in countering Hezbollah, Iran’s most important nonstate ally.³ During the LAF offensive, Hezbollah simultaneously cleared IS positions from the Syrian side of the border in concert with the Syrian army. The LAF and Hezbollah then both declared supposedly separate ceasefires with the Islamic State on August 27.⁴ These ceasefires were followed by the exchange of the remains of captured Lebanese soldiers for the safe passage of Islamic State fighters and their families from Lebanon to the group’s strongholds in eastern Syria.⁵

The Lebanese government has repeatedly denied any coordination with Hezbollah. However, events along the border make these claims increasingly implausible. Reports of such coordination undercut the LAF’s standing and raise vexing questions for policymakers regarding the utility of U.S. security assistance to Lebanon. Indeed, the Trump administration’s proposed fiscal year 2018 budget zeros out American military aid for the LAF—a decision made even before the beginning of recent operations.

However, despite real limitations and frustrations, it would be a mistake to abandon more than a decade of investment in a military the U.S. State Department considers “one of the most effective counterterrorism forces in the region.”⁶ To do so would risk further empowering Hezbollah and its Iranian sponsors. Weakening the LAF would only allow Hezbollah to claim a greater role in the country’s security. The result could threaten the country’s delicate sectarian political balance and destabilize the country. This would be a far worse outcome than the current status quo, as unpalatable as it may be.

To better understand the value of U.S. counterterrorism and security assistance to Lebanon, a Center for American Progress research team visited Lebanon in May 2017 to interview a broad range of officials from the LAF, the Internal Security Forces, the General Security Directorate, the General Directorate of State Security, the U.S. and U.K. embassies, and other international interlocutors working in Lebanon. The objectives of the research team were to assess the threat landscape, identify strengths and weaknesses in counterterrorism capabilities, and explore the implications for U.S. counterterrorism strategy and operations.

The report focuses on the Lebanese government’s ability to mitigate threats from Salafi-jihadi groups, and it only explores U.S. policy toward Hezbollah insofar as it is relevant to this focus. It argues against the Trump administration’s proposed cuts to the LAF and suggests additional steps that it and Congress can take to strengthen Lebanon’s counterterrorism capabilities, including:

1. Ensure continued Foreign Military Financing for Lebanon
2. Maintain support for the Lebanese Special Operations Forces
3. Leverage U.S. assistance for better counterterrorism coordination
4. Bolster assistance designed to strengthen state institutions and counter the influence of nonstate actors
5. Fund a feasibility study for the civilian counterterrorism court
6. Call on Saudi Arabia to restore its $4 billion security assistance package for Lebanon

The August offensive has shown that Lebanon remains an important player in the fight against the Islamic State. The Lebanese military is the most popular public institution in Lebanon and serves as a key foundation of the country’s stability. While concern over the rising influence of Hezbollah is merited, pulling support for the Lebanese army will only serve to further empower the Iranian proxy at the expense of the country’s legitimate institutions.

Background

U.S. security and counterterrorism assistance to Lebanon is part of a wider Lebanon policy that balances competing priorities. On the one hand, the United States seeks to shore up stability in Lebanon and ensure that the country does not slide back into civil war. That stability has recently been threatened by dysfunction in Lebanon’s confessional political system, which distributes government power and positions proportionally among religious sects. The current confessional system dates back to the 1989 multiparty Taif Agreement.⁷ The agreement distributed power within the Lebanese political system to help end the country’s 15-year civil war.

Hezbollah’s influence in the confessional system and opposition to several presidential candidates recently left the country deadlocked and without a government for more than two years. Lebanon’s stability is also threatened by a civil war in Syria and Hezbollah’s sizable role in sustaining the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. This has flooded Lebanon with more than 1 million refugees⁸ and resulted in cross-border attacks by the Islamic State and a local Al Qaeda affiliate that have primarily targeted Lebanon’s Shiite population.⁹

On the other hand, the United States seeks to mitigate the threat posed by Hezbollah to the United States, Israel, and other U.S. partners in the region. Hezbollah is a powerful Shiite militant group and political movement that serves as an Iranian proxy in Lebanon and the Middle East.¹⁰ The United States has targeted the group’s leadership outside Lebanon,¹¹ but it has not directly confronted Hezbollah inside Lebanon. Most analysts and policymakers believe an overt confrontation inside Lebanon would risk plunging the country into internal conflict. Instead, the United States has used sanctions to disrupt Hezbollah’s financial flows and sought to build up Lebanese state institutions that could serve as alternative and legitimate power centers. At the heart of this effort is the Lebanese Armed Forces.

The United States launched a support program for the LAF after the withdrawal of Syrian forces in 2005. At the time, according to former Pentagon official David Schenker, “the Bush administration did not believe the LAF would be able to supplant Hizballah (sic) anytime soon.”¹² While U.S. officials hoped the LAF might eventually balance Hezbollah’s influence, the support program was designed primarily to create military and special forces units capable of containing the domestic terror threats posed by Salafi-jihadi and other Sunni Muslim extremists.¹³ This was viewed as critical to preventing terrorist groups from developing a strong presence in Lebanon, which could pose a threat to Israel and other regional allies.

Between 2006 and 2013, the United States provided “72 percent of overall military aid to Lebanon,”¹⁴ and roughly $1.4 billion in assistance from 2005 to 2016.¹⁵ By 2015, Lebanon had become the fifth-largest recipient in the world of U.S. Foreign Military Financing (FMF).¹⁶ For an overview of U.S. security assistance to Lebanon, see Figure 1 above and the text box below.

The specter of Hezbollah

Critics of U.S. security assistance to Lebanon have long worried about Hezbollah’s penetration of the LAF. As one international journalist in Beirut described it, “The relationship between Hezbollah and the LAF is complex. They have to coexist. Hezbollah is the most powerful but lets everyone get on with their lives if it isn’t threatened.”²⁶

With the resolution of Lebanon’s political crisis last October, which saw Christian leader and former LAF commander Michel Aoun assume the presidency, this concern became more acute. President Aoun is a political ally of Hezbollah, and his election was facilitated by a significant weakening of the pro-Western and anti-Hezbollah March 14 political coalition.²⁷ The coalition consists primarily of Sunni Muslim and Christian political parties and includes Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s Future Movement party.²⁸ This shift in political power draws into question the ability of state institutions such as the armed forces to operate independently of Hezbollah. Indeed, critics also highlight reports that the LAF and Hezbollah may even share weaponry.²⁹

But those closest to U.S. security and counterterrorism programs for Lebanon tell a different story. In interviews with the authors, both military and civilian officials overseeing American security assistance in the United States and those in the field insisted that Hezbollah has not compromised the independence of the LAF.³⁰ Several current and previous U.S. officials note that the LAF has a “sterling” reputation for end-use monitoring of equipment and weapons. This means that the Lebanese government: 1) does not transfer articles without prior U.S. consent; 2) uses articles for the intended purpose; and 3) provides the same level of security as the U.S. government would provide for the same articles.³¹ These officials were highly skeptical that Hezbollah could have acquired any LAF weapons supplied by the United States.³² Moreover, Gen. Joseph Votel, commander of U.S. Central Command, underscored his overall confidence in the LAF during a recent visit to Beirut.³³

Senior U.S. counterterrorism and special operations officials told the authors that their Lebanese counterparts are some of the best in the region.³⁴ These forces are arrayed against significant existing and potential threats inside Lebanon and emanating from across the border in Syria. Like its neighbors, Lebanon juggles threats to its security and stability beyond terrorism, including an overburdened economy and influence from regional powers with competing interests. Taken together, these threats constitute a series of interlocking challenges for Lebanon to address to preserve its stability.

Hezbollah

Hezbollah is “the most capable terrorist group” in Lebanon.³⁵ The group is suspected of carrying out at least one major terrorist attack last year in downtown Beirut.³⁶ Hezbollah continues to receive significant support from Iran and to stockpile arms, which it justifies by claiming the mantle of “resistance”³⁷ to Israel. It bears significant responsibility for the major threats facing the country. This has been particularly true since the beginning of the recent Syrian conflict. Hezbollah’s large-scale military support of the Assad regime has prolonged the conflict and increased the number of refugees flowing into Lebanon. Hezbollah’s behavior has also aggravated sectarianism in Lebanon and made the country a target for Sunni militants and extremists. Finally, Hezbollah plays a role in weakening the Lebanese government and military and undermining their ability to keep the country secure.

Infiltration of the Syrian refugee population

Lebanese and international interlocutors all agreed that the presence of more than 1 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon poses one of the biggest direct threats to the country’s security and stability. All Lebanese security agencies highlighted infiltration of the refugee population by the Islamic State, Al Qaeda, or other extremist groups as the principal security challenge. Refugee camps such as Ain al-Hilweh and cities with major refugee populations such as Arsal were of major concern.³⁸ These concerns have been reinforced by several attacks executed by Sunni extremists in Lebanon over the past year in and around Syrian refugee camps.³⁹ The LAF has also reportedly disrupted a number of attacks targeting Beirut and surrounding areas.

Radicalization of the Syrian refugee population and tension with the Lebanese population

The presence of the refugee population also poses a long-term challenge because refugees could be vulnerable to radicalization over time.⁴⁰ Because most refugees live in very poor conditions, they could be susceptible to recruitment by extremist and terrorist organizations. Lebanese security officials pointed to the history of radicalization among the Palestinian refugee population, which faced challenges similar to those of Syrian refugees.⁴¹ After 20 years in Lebanon, Palestinian refugee camps became hubs for militants, who then challenged the government and played a role in sparking the civil war in 1975.⁴² The number of Syrian refugees has far outstripped the number of Palestinian refugees, and there is little reason to believe that they will return to Syria in the foreseeable future. The higher number of Syrian refugees and the resulting challenges could result in radicalization more quickly than in the Palestinian refugee population. Further, there is growing resentment against refugees in Lebanon because of their burden on the country’s economy and infrastructure, creating tensions and escalating the risk of radicalization.⁴³

Cross-border attacks

Lebanese and U.S. security officials remain deeply concerned about the ability of the Islamic State and other extremist organizations to launch attacks from the border area with Syria. In recent years, terrorists from the Islamic State and Al Qaeda Syrian affiliates have demonstrated the ability to plan and execute complex and deadly suicide attacks in Beirut and along the border from their bases of operation inside Syria.⁴⁴ Attacks in Lebanon reached a low between 2009 and 2011 then began to increase, spiking in 2014 with the rise of the Islamic State. These attacks by Sunni militants have largely targeted the LAF and members of the civilian security forces,⁴⁵ as well as Shiite neighborhoods—presumably in retaliation for Hezbollah’s support for the Assad regime. However, recent efforts by the LAF and the internal security services to secure the border have significantly lowered that threat. The offensive against the Islamic State in the Arsal area is the latest and most significant LAF operation to mitigate the threat emanating from Syria.

Lebanese extremists

The Sunni jihadi group Fatah al-Islam remains active, if diminished in its capabilities. Roughly 1,000 Lebanese citizens are thought to have fought for Sunni Islamist militant groups in Syria and Iraq,⁴⁶ and they could pose a threat upon their return to Lebanon. In addition, radicalization in Palestinian refugee camps via groups such as Jamaat Jund al-Sham also remains a threat. In recent months, clashes in Ain al-Hilweh and Bourj el-Barajneh Palestinian refugee camps resulted in multiple casualties.⁴⁷ Moreover, the Islamic State is estimated to have hundreds of Lebanese supporters clustered around Tripoli,⁴⁸ not to mention Al Qaeda’s Syria affiliate, which is thought to have a footprint—albeit a much smaller one—in northern Lebanon.

Arrayed against these threats are Lebanon’s main counterterrorism agencies, which include the Land Border Regiments and Lebanese Special Operations Forces within the Lebanese Armed Forces, the civilian Internal Security Forces, the General Security Directorate, and the General Directorate of State Security. The United States and European countries have provided critical support to these agencies in varying degrees. However, it is unclear how U.S. support for the LAF and civilian agencies would be affected by the Trump administration’s proposed budget cuts.

Lebanese Armed Forces

The regular LAF plays a key role in the country’s counterterrorism strategy. In addition to its special operations units, the LAF’s Land Border Regiments shoulder significant responsibilities in defending Lebanese territory from incursions by the Islamic State and other Salafi-jihadi groups operating from Syrian territory. In 2013 and 2014, for instance, more than 100 people were killed and hundreds more wounded in over a dozen suicide bombing attacks on Shiite-populated areas across Lebanon.⁴⁹ Since these attacks, Lebanese Hezbollah has asserted control over the Syrian side of the border. On the Lebanese side of the border, the LAF is increasingly taking on responsibility for defending Lebanese communities.

The United States and the United Kingdom have both provided support to LAF Land Border Regiments to secure the border. As part of this commitment, since 2012, the UK has been assisting the LAF, through the Rapid Land Border Security Assistance Project, to establish and mentor the LAF Land Border Regiments (LBRs). The mission of the LBRs is to observe, identify, deter and deny activities by illegal armed actors in the near border areas, in line with agreed international human rights standards. Between 2012 and 2015 around £26m of Conflict Pool and Conflict Security Stability funds were allocated to provide observation, protection, mobility and communications equipment to 1, 2, and 3LBRs, and to establish the lead elements of a 4th LBR, as well as a programme of training and mentoring.As part of this commitment, since 2012, the UK has been assisting the LAF, through the Rapid Land Border Security Assistance Project, to establish and mentor the LAF Land Border Regiments (LBRs). The mission of the LBRs is to observe, identify, deter and deny activities by illegal armed actors in the near border areas, in line with agreed international human rights standards. Between 2012 and 2015 around £26m of Conflict Pool and Conflict Security Stability funds were allocated to provide observation, protection, mobility and communications equipment to 1, 2, and 3LBRs, and to establish the lead elements of a 4th LBR, as well as a programme of training and mentoring.The United Kingdom has been particularly active in its support and committed to spending more than £26 million from 2016 to 2018 to provide observation, protection, mobility, and communications equipment to the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Land Border Regiments and establish the lead elements of a fourth regiment, in addition to a program of training and mentoring. The fourth regiment is now deploying between the towns of Masnaa and Arsal in northeast Lebanon, one of the most sensitive areas on the border with Syria. In particular, Arsal faces a sizable presence of Sunni extremists from the Islamic State and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham groups. Traditionally protected by Hezbollah fighters, the 4th Land Border Regiment is now asserting state control in this region as Hezbollah units withdraw.⁵⁰

Lebanese Special Operations Forces

Composed of four main regiments, the Lebanese Special Operations Forces (LSOF) are responsible for critical and high-risk counterterrorism operations in Lebanon. The 1,500-person Lebanese Ranger Regiment is the largest and most well-known LSOF unit. Built around five mechanized infantry companies, three mountain companies, and an armor company, the Ranger Regiment serves as Lebanon’s national strategic reserve force. Consisting of five combat infantry companies, one armored company, an artillery battery, and a support company, the 1,100-person Air Assault Regiment serves as a strategic mobile reserve force. The regiment can conduct reconnaissance, raids, ambushes, long-range patrols, and search and rescue missions. The 1,080-person Marine Commando Regiment—trained in combat dive operations, underwater demolition, maritime counterterrorism, and interdiction—provides the LAF a maritime special operations capability. Finally, the Counter-Sabotage Regiment, commanded by LAF Military Intelligence, plays an importa