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The United States has no closer Arab counterterrorism partner than the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Military and intelligence relations between the two countries date back to the 1950s. In recent decades, the two countries have worked closely to address shared security threats, shore up Jordan’s stability, and strengthen the kingdom’s capacity to confront terrorism at home. The wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria all strengthened these bonds, but the rise of the Islamic State group (IS) in 2014 saw bilateral security cooperation enter a new and even deeper phase of cooperation.

Today, Jordan is a key member of the anti-IS coalition. The kingdom hosts more than 2,800 U.S. military personnel;¹ has supported train and equip efforts in southern Syria; and provides critical bases for the air campaign against the group.² For its part, the United States has significantly increased not just its security assistance, but also its economic support and humanitarian aid to help Jordan shoulder new burdens imposed by regional turmoil, including the influx of nearly 700,000 refugees from Syria.³ By 2016, U.S. assistance had reached almost $1.6 billion annually.⁴

Despite record aid levels, the internal security situation in Jordan took a turn for the worse in 2016. In that year, the kingdom suffered a string of terrorist attacks, including its most deadly in a decade. A number of factors appear to be at play. Civil war, IS, and a resurgent Al Qaeda in Syria have increased the threat along Jordan’s northern and eastern land borders. Domestic religious extremism also appears to be on the rise in Jordan. In addition, an estimated 2,000 to 4,000 Jordanians have crossed those borders to fight for extremist groups⁵ and many have begun to return home, elevating the threat of domestic attacks.⁶ Finally, Iran’s presence and power projection in Syria poses a strategic threat by creating instability and conflict along Jordan’s borders.

These trends do not yet constitute a strategic threat to Jordan’s stability. However, the recent spate of internal terrorist attacks has raised concerns over the kingdom’s capacity to fully manage a dynamic and complicated matrix of threats emanating from inside and outside Jordan. As the region enters a new chapter in the fight against terrorism, the United States and Jordan will need to make important choices about how best to further strengthen the capacity of the kingdom to manage these threats. The first step should be an honest look at what has and has not worked, particularly in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, after which the United States made significant investments in counterterrorism partners in the Middle East.

The good news is that Jordan has already taken steps to address gaps in its highly capable armed forces and security services. These institutions have historically enjoyed significant U.S. support, with most U.S. counterterrorism assistance flowing to partner organizations such as the General Intelligence Department (GID) and the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF), including its special operations forces. Following the 2016 incidents, King Abdullah II replaced the minister of interior, as well as the leadership of JAF, the GID, and other security services. The personnel changes were designed to discourage interagency competition and improve coordination, and were welcomed by Jordanian and American security professionals alike.

Other elements of the reform packages that followed the 2016 attacks deserve greater scrutiny. Of particular note is the restructuring and downsizing of the Jordanian Special Operations Command (JORSOCOM)—a longtime partner of the U.S special operations community housed under JAF. Jordanian officials described this as a move to strengthen their special operations forces, but there is a risk that the changes could actually diminish the operational effectiveness of these forces over time. In addition, while the shake-up in leadership may have improved coordination across Jordan’s security institutions, opportunities remain to strengthen the kingdom’s counterterrorism services and enhance cooperation across them.

To better understand the challenges inherent in the next phase of U.S.-Jordanian counterterrorism cooperation, a research team from the Center for American Progress visited Jordan in July 2017 to interview officials and experts from JORSOCOM; the Jordanian military and intelligence community; the Border Guard; the U.S. diplomatic corps and military; local media; and academic institutions. The team also spoke with U.S. military officials and experts based in the United States from July 2017 through November 2017. The team’s findings build on previous CAP research on both Jordan and U.S. counterterrorism cooperation in neighboring countries.⁷

This report presents an overview of U.S. security assistance to Jordan and current threats to Jordanian security. It explains the roles played by the main counterterrorism institutions in Jordan and details the challenges that they face moving forward. Finally, the report recommends that the United States and Jordan use the security reform process to strengthen Jordan’s ability to confront both internal and external threats by taking six key steps:

• Clarify the objectives of the Jordanian special forces reform plan and articulate a vision for the role of special forces in future counterterrorism operations.
• Ensure that Jordanian special forces retain adequate aviation support for counterterrorism operations and improve its personnel recruitment and selection process.
• Maintain a U.S. special forces presence large enough to maximize the outcome of the reorganization of Jordanian special forces.
• Expand the participation of Jordanian special forces in expeditionary operations with U.S. forces.
• Enhance Jordanian counterterrorism coordination at the national and tactical levels.
• Regularize recruitment for Jordanian intelligence and review opportunities for additional technical support and enhanced cooperation with the U.S. intelligence community.

For decades, Jordan has been a central U.S. ally in the Middle East. The security of the Hashemite Kingdom remains critical to U.S. interests in the region. Jordan plays an essential role in the Middle East peace process, and its stability and cooperation are important for Israeli security. Following the Sept. 11 attacks, Jordan supported the U.S. military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, despite its opposition to the 2003 invasion of the latter.⁸

Jordan also plays an important role in the fight against IS and Al Qaeda in Syria and Iraq by gathering intelligence, participating in limited airstrikes, and providing training grounds for coalition forces. With more than 2,800 U.S. troops alone currently deployed in the country,⁹ Jordan also provides essential access to its air bases to U.S. and coalition forces. As one senior U.S. diplomat to Jordan noted, access to Jordan alone makes U.S. assistance a “bargain” in counterterrorism terms¹⁰ due to its strategic location in the region.¹¹

Today, Jordan is one of the largest recipients of U.S. security assistance. Even as the Trump administration slashes foreign military assistance to more than 40 countries, it has recognized the long-standing U.S. strategic interests in Jordan, and its requested 2018 budget proposal preserves U.S. security assistance to Jordan.¹² The same senior U.S. diplomat observed, “Jordan is fenced off from the Trump austerity budget.”¹³

Given the constantly shifting regional security landscape, however, Jordan may not be immune to shifts in U.S. priorities in the coming years. Senior U.S. officials noted that resources for U.S. special operations in Jordan will be scaled back significantly in fiscal year 2018.¹⁴ The number of U.S. military personnel could fall by as much as 50 percent.¹⁵ These cuts are reportedly being driven by a need to redeploy special operations forces to other countries in the region to address more pressing tasks.¹⁶

Breakdown of U.S. assistance in Jordan

In 2015, the United States and Jordan signed a nonbinding memorandum of understanding that outlined a U.S. commitment to provide Jordan with $1 billion in assistance annually from fiscal year 2015 through fiscal year 2017,¹⁷ including a minimum of $300 million per year to be dedicated to security assistance. In reality, the United States has given Jordan at least double this amount in security assistance each year since 2015.¹⁸

Under the Obama administration, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) listed Jordan as its “top funding priority” among countries receiving support from the DOD’s Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund.¹⁹ U.S. security assistance to Jordan supports counterterrorism capacity-building—specifically training, equipment, and border security for JAF, including the Jordanian Border Guard, Jordanian Quick Reaction Force (QRF), and the Royal Jordanian Air Force. Key examples of each assistance category are provided below.

Training

After the Sept. 11 attacks, the United States established a bilateral operations center with Jordan’s GID.²⁰ The United States has since provided funding, technical assistance, and training to many of the GID’s staff.²¹

• In 2005, Congress allocated $99 million to build the King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Center (KASOTC), Jordan’s state-of-the-art special operations forces training facility.²² The center trains both Jordanian and international special operations forces and hosts Eager Lion, a major multinational military and special operations exercise.
• The United States conducts training courses for Jordanian special operations forces in counterterrorism operations, as well as military training for JAF to conduct counterterrorism operations.
• The United States also organizes trainings for the QRF in disrupting terrorist groups attempting to operate within Jordan’s borders.

Equipment and weapons

• U.S. assistance provides operational equipment, such as body armor and ammunition, as well as special operations equipment for counterterrorism, such as night vision devices; weapons; munitions; and communication and electronics equipment.
• In 2015, the Obama administration denied requests for armed drone exports to Jordan for anti-IS operations,²³ but the Trump administration could reverse this decision and approve the request.

Border security

• In 2009, the United States established the Jordan Border Security Program, an “integrated border security surveillance, detection, and interdiction system”²⁴ along Jordan’s borders with Iraq and Syria.²⁵ In 2016, the system became operational.
• U.S. assistance provides vehicles, equipment, weapons, munitions, and training for the Jordanian Border Guard to respond to border incursions by terrorist elements.

Despite years of regional upheaval and conflict, Jordan has remained relatively stable. The last two years, however, have seen a spike in incidents and a general increase in the severity of the terrorist threat facing Jordan. The U.S. Department of State suggested this year that Jordan had become a target “for several reasons, including its proximity to regional conflicts in Iraq and Syria, the state’s official rejection of Salafi-Jihadi interpretations of Islam, and its membership in the Defeat-ISIS Coalition.”²⁶ While terrorist threats facing Jordan remain largely domestic, the border area and foreign fighters are additional areas of concern.

Domestic extremism

Like much of the Middle East, Jordan has experienced a rising tide of Salafism, an ultraconservative interpretation of Islam. Jordanian officials describe tackling this rise in extremism as a top priority across ministries.²⁷ Jordanian experts on jihadi groups estimate that there are 7,000 to 10,000 Salafi-jihadi supporters, or Salafists who support the use of violence to achieve their preferred political and social outcomes in Jordan.²⁸ Jordanian security officials and civil society leaders alike are also concerned about the rise of the quietist Salafi community, which does not actively engage in political activities. As one leading academic observed, the rise of “soft extremism is equally as dangerous” to the long-term stability of Jordan as its violent counterpart.²⁹

On a positive note, recent polling suggests a significant drop in the broader public’s support for terrorist groups and terrorist attacks. Surveys conducted by the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan show that in 2014, support for terrorist groups was roughly 35 percent nationwide, but more recent surveys indicate that this figure has dropped to between 5 percent and 6 percent.³⁰ Several officials and experts pointed to the burning of Jordanian fighter pilot Muath al-Kasasbeh by the IS as a turning point in support for terrorist groups.³¹

Terrorism inside Jordan

Jordan suffered several terrorist attacks over the past two years, all carried out by Jordanians and mostly directed at security and military personnel.³² In particular, four key incidents highlighted new threats faced by Jordan’s counterterrorism institutions.

Amman Compound attack

On November 9, 2015, a Jordanian police captain killed two American police trainers, one South African trainer, and two Jordanian civil servants. The attack also wounded seven people, including two Americans, who were private military contractors working for the U.S. company DynCorp International. At the time of the incident, Jordanian officials cautioned against speculation that the gunman was tied to anti-American militants, though the timing of the incident generated suspicion.³³

Irbid raid

On March 2, 2016, Jordanian special forces and the Gendarmerie raided a residential building in Irbid. The suspects refused to surrender and exchanged fire with special forces. The ensuing firefight killed the head of the 71st Counterterrorism Battalion—also known as the 71st Special Battalion—and seven suspects. Jordan’s GID alleged that the men had ties to IS. Jordanian forces claimed to have foiled an IS plot to attack civilian and military targets, having seized automatic weapons, munitions, and explosives.³⁴ Experts were concerned that it took the battalion—considered Jordan’s most effective special forces unit—more than 12 hours to defeat a cell of terrorists.³⁵ One source also reported that the operation “was said to have been severely hampered by breakdowns in communication between the security services.”³⁶

King Faisal Air Base attack

On November 4, 2016, a Jordanian soldier opened fire on a convoy at King Faisal Air Base.³⁷ The soldier killed three American military trainers, despite the American soldiers’ attempts to identify themselves. After investigation, the Jordanian government concluded that the Jordanian solider disobeyed rules of engagement, and a Jordanian military court sentenced the soldier to hard labor for life. The Jordanian government denied the possibility of jihadi ties, but some analysts suggest the attack was intentional and premeditated.³⁸

Karak attack

On December 18, 2016, gunmen opened fire on two police patrols near the city of Karak.³⁹ The gunmen then fled to a hideout in the nearby Crusader castle, where four gunmen engaged security forces.⁴⁰ The five-hour shootout killed at least 14 people, including four members of the Jordan Public Security Directorate (PSD), three members of the General Directorate of Gendarmerie, a Canadian national, two Jordanian civilians, and the four gunmen.⁴¹ The shootout wounded at least 28 more people.⁴² Jordanian special forces also claimed to have rescued at least 10 hostages from the hideout.⁴³ This incident prompted concerns over response times and coordination across the security services. The lack of coordination allowed the attackers to travel 50 kilometers without being intercepted.⁴⁴ Moreover, a dispute between Jordanian special forces and the other security services regarding jurisdiction resulted in a less-prepared Gendarmerie taking charge of the incident.⁴⁵

With the possible exception of the Irbid cell, these incidents do not appear to have been directly coordinated by IS or other transnational terrorist groups. However, Jordanian military officials elaborated that local terrorist cells and sympathizers have been galvanized and inspired by IS’s initial successes and its call for supporters to carry out attacks in their countries.⁴⁶ They also observed that many of the attackers were prevented from exiting Jordan to fight with terrorist groups in Syria, but may not have been adequately monitored after being denied exit.

Transnational terrorism in the region

IS and Al Qaeda remain top concerns for Jordan’s counterterrorism professionals. While Jordanian military officials believe that “there is no framework for external terrorist cells to operate in Jordan,”⁴⁷ they remain troubled by the group’s long-term capacity to spread its ideology and inspire attacks, especially among youth. One interlocutor shared the popular view that “Daesh [IS] is out of Mosul but left their ideas with this generation.”⁴⁸ U.S. security officials in Jordan are particularly concerned over an IS-aligned group known as the Khalid ibn al-Walid Army, which operates in southern Syria within miles of the Jordanian border.⁴⁹

While IS has taken center stage since 2014, Jordanian security officials have recently refocused on renewed threats from Al Qaeda.⁵⁰ One senior Jordanian military official opined that, in the future, Al Qaeda “will be more lethal than the Islamic State. They have survived, have experience and capabilities and key commanders. Some of them will melt into the Syrian community and rebrand under local groups. They will benefit from defeating ISIS and will carry out new operations to prove itself and its leadership.”⁵¹

A related threat could emerge as moderate Syrian rebels in southern Syria join more extremist groups as a result of insufficient international support. The United States, Jordan, the United Kingdom, and some Gulf countries reportedly continue to provide covert assistance to rebels in southern Syria—in part to fight extremist groups and provide a cushion against terrorist activity along the Jordanian border.⁵² The U.S. element of that assistance is reportedly scheduled to end in December 2017. Tens of thousands of fighters will need to find other means of support.⁵³ Jordanian experts on jihadi groups worry that diminishing support and oversight of these rebels could push them to align themselves with groups such as IS and Al Qaeda, or their local affiliates.⁵⁴

Returning foreign fighters

As IS suffers major setbacks in Iraq and Syria, the specter of Jordanian foreign fighters returning en masse looms on the horizon. Jordanian officials said that 900 Jordanians are currently fighting with terrorist groups in Iraq and Syria.⁵⁵ However, nongovernment studies estimate that 2,000 to 4,000 Jordanian foreign fighters have joined such groups in Iraq and Syria since 2011, which would make Jordan either the first or second largest contributor of foreign fighters on a per capita basis.⁵⁶ While many fighters joined IS, many are also thought to have joined Al Qaeda in Syria.⁵⁷

Jordanian security officials offer mixed assessments of the challenge posed by returning foreign fighters. The leadership of the Jordanian Border Guard was confident that Jordan’s intelligence capabilities, counterterrorism law,⁵⁸ and the new sophisticated border security system funded by the United States were up to the challenge. According to one official, Jordan has “dealt with foreign fighters for a long time … so it’s easy to find information on them.”⁵⁹

Others were less sanguine. One senior military official admitted that significant improvements in “operational and technical capabilities and intelligence” would be required in order to manage returning foreign fighters.⁶⁰ One leading Jordanian academic observed, “I don’t think the government is thinking about returning foreign fighters. They don’t even have real numbers.”⁶¹ Another jihadism expert noted that foreign fighters could exploit corruption among the Jordanian Border Guard.⁶²

Iranian power projection in Syria

Recent Iranian power projection in southern Syria presents the Jordanian government with another long-term challenge.⁶³ Hundreds of thousands of mostly Sunni Muslim Syrians have been displaced into Jordan from Syria and especially by the fighting along the 230-mile Jordanian-Syrian border. The increasing presence of militias supported by Iran in southern Syria could deter these refugees from eventually returning home. Moreover, the buildup of Iranian proxies in the Golan Heights could destabilize the area by increasing the likelihood of conflict between Iran and Israel.⁶⁴

This past summer, Jordan, the United States, and Ru