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Chinese leaders are ramping up their ambitions for the global order. Chinese President Xi Jinping is calling for his nation to “lead the reform of the global governance system,” which is the set of international rules, institutions, and enforcement mechanisms the global community uses to solve common problems.¹ As the largest global economy—China has surpassed the United States in purchasing power parity—it is natural for China to seek a stronger voice on global governance issues. However, the problem is that, within China, President Xi is rolling out new systems to strengthen authoritarian control, raising concerns that Beijing seeks to make the international system more authoritarian as well.

The United States and other democratic nations need to understand Beijing’s vision for the global governance system and how that vision differs from the prevailing liberal democratic order, which recognizes limits to state authority, such as binding international law and unalienable individual rights. It is difficult to map China’s true intentions based on Xi Jinping’s international speeches, which make fuzzy promises that can be spun many different ways, such as his frequent claim that China aims to make the global governance system more democratic in order to “build a community of shared future for mankind.”² Yet when viewed through President Xi’s domestic messaging and the actions Beijing has taken thus far to implement its global agenda, a clearer picture emerges. The current global governance system is rules-based, and it privileges liberal democratic values and standards; Beijing’s alternative vision is a system based on authoritarian governance principles in which nations negotiate issues bilaterally instead of following common rules and standards. From a liberal democratic perspective, if Beijing succeeds in bringing about that vision, the world will be less free, less prosperous, and less safe.

This report aims to provide a deeper and more nuanced perspective on China’s real global governance intentions by mapping what President Xi and other Chinese leaders are saying to their domestic audience and how Chinese foreign policy scholars interpret those statements. In the Chinese political system, internal leadership statements are particularly revealing because they convey Beijing’s intentions to officials throughout the Chinese Communist Party and government hierarchy. This report will analyze that internal messaging alongside the empirical pattern of actions Beijing has taken thus far in order to assess the risks and opportunities that China’s new activism presents for the current liberal order.

Deeper analysis indicates that there is ample reason for concern. China’s stated goals include watering down liberal democratic principles and either replacing or augmenting them with authoritarian ones. At the same time, this analysis also reveals that liberal democracies have powerful levers for shaping China’s actions in the global governance space. Using those levers, however, will require liberal democracies to figure out what they stand for, what they want the global order to look like over the coming decades, and how to create more space within the international governance system for China and other developing nations without ceding ground on fundamental principles. China’s reform ambitions may actually provide the impetus democracies have been waiting for to kick-start that process.

Chinese analysts view the global governance system as a direct outcome of the distribution of power among nations. According to the Chinese view, powerful nations design global institutions, rules, and norms to reflect and further their own national interests. Since the United States and other Western developed nations designed many of today’s institutions in an era when China was a much weaker power, Beijing assumes that the current system benefits Western nations at China’s expense. Now that China is becoming a rival power center, Beijing expects the global governance system to increasingly reflect Chinese interests. That expectation is a legitimate one, but as this report will illustrate, some of China’s national interests conflict with broader global interests, particularly liberal democratic interests.

Chinese observers view the 2008–2009 global financial crisis as the first major shift in global power from the United States to China. China’s state-directed economy weathered that crisis better than market economies in the United States and Europe, convincing many in Beijing that the Chinese model is superior to the Western one. When the dust settled, the predominant Chinese view was that the United States was declining, China was ascendant, and the global power balance had just passed a major tipping point. In a 2016 article for a leading Chinese foreign policy journal affiliated with the Ministry of State Security, Cui Liru, senior adviser to the China Institutes for Contemporary International Relations, noted the shift in the international power dynamic. He described the post-crisis era as a new world order in which the United States was “no longer able to easily exercise hegemonic authority like it did in the post-Cold War era” and power was more evenly distributed among nations with “different power centers competing and cooperating at different levels according to their own superiority and characteristics.”³ At the time, Chinese leaders were more cautious; they still viewed the world as a unipolar one with the United States at its center, but they saw it shifting toward a new multipolar configuration at an accelerating rate.

After the financial crisis, Chinese leaders began to lean in and play a stronger role on global governance issues—particularly transnational issues such as global climate change—but they were careful to avoid leaning in too far. In Beijing’s view, it was time for China to have a louder voice, but that voice should be part of a broader international chorus.⁴ In 2009, at the 11th Ambassadorial Conference, then-President Hu Jintao and other senior Chinese leaders called on the Chinese foreign policy establishment to increase the nation’s influence on global governance issues, but also stated that China should not take the lead.⁵ President Xi Jinping followed a similar script after he came to power in 2012. In his November 2014 speech at the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs, Xi stated that China would “work to reform the international system and global governance” but carefully avoided calling for China to play a leading role.⁶

Beijing perceived another major power shift in 2016 and 2017 when the United Kingdom voted to exit the European Union (EU) and Donald Trump became the U.S. president. Chinese observers viewed both the Brexit referendum and the Trump administration’s isolationist foreign policy as evidence that the world’s oldest and most powerful democracies were beginning to stumble, creating an opening for China to play a stronger role on global governance issues. President Trump’s first two years in office provided ample evidence to support that conclusion. He pulled the United States out of the Iran deal, the U.N. Human Rights Council, and negotiations for the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration. Furthermore, Trump announced his intent to withdraw the United States from the Paris climate agreement and the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).⁷ Chinese scholars began to argue that U.S. withdrawal was creating a shortfall in global governance, making it harder to address common challenges and generating rising demand for China to step up and fill the gap. Chen Xiangyang, deputy director of the Institute of World Politics at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, described the new dynamic as one in which “US selfishness has caused the world to turn to China to play a greater role,” saying: “US withdrawal has led to greater confidence in and respect for China’s role, enabling China to move closer to the center of the world stage through participating in global governance and expanding its clout and voice in the world.”⁸

In June 2018—immediately following Trump administration withdrawals from the Iran nuclear deal and the U.N. Human Rights Council—President Xi delivered a major foreign policy speech in which he stated that China would “lead the reform of the global governance system.”⁹ That speech marked Beijing’s first official deviation from the “never claim leadership” principle Deng Xiaoping established in 1989 when laying out the regime’s post-Tiananmen survival strategy.¹⁰ The global governance actions China has taken thus far—which are outlined in this report—largely predate Xi’s June 2018 speech. Going forward, the international community should expect China’s ambitions and activities to increase substantially, particularly if the United States continues to disengage from the multilateral arena and provide maximum maneuvering room. 

When President Xi and other Chinese leaders outline their global governance vision for an international audience, they do not provide much detail. That is partly to avoid triggering international concern and partly because there are divergent views in Beijing regarding where the current system benefits China, where it disadvantages China, and how and where Beijing should push for reform. Although debates continue at the margins, three key macro-level themes are emerging in China’s internal discussions, and those themes are increasingly reflected in Chinese foreign policy.

Beijing intends to weaken liberal democratic principles and augment or replace them with authoritarian governance principles

Chinese leaders recognize that in order to continue advancing economically, they cannot wall off China’s economy or society from the global community. However, integrating with a global system that values liberal principles over authoritarian ones brings sizable risk, because it exposes Chinese citizens to a set of ideals, standards, and benefits their current leaders do not intend to meet or provide. To address this risk, Chinese leaders are seeking to make the international system more like China. This is the opposite of what Western nations intended when they brought China into that system.

In the United States and other Western nations, there is a tendency to avoid framing disputes with China in ideological terms, which is generally viewed as veering toward dangerous Cold War thinking. On the Chinese side, however, Chinese leaders frequently claim that their nation is fighting an ideological battle against Western values—particularly freedom, democracy, and human rights—which, from a Western perspective, are universal values that should apply equally to all citizens. As a repressive authoritarian regime, Beijing does not want Chinese citizens to judge their own leaders using those standards. Where those standards exist in the global governance system, Beijing views them as a fundamental security threat.

President Xi outlined those fears at the 2013 National Propaganda and Ideological Work Conference in Beijing when he described Western nations as “hanging up a sheep’s head while selling dog meat.”¹¹ By that, he was intimating that Western nations were engaging in false advertisement, making self-righteous claims about promoting universal values for the sake of humanity when their real purpose was, in his words, “to fight with us for positions, fight over the will of the people, fight over the masses, and ultimately overthrow the leadership of the Communist Party of China.”¹² A few years later, at a 2015 work conference at the Chinese Communist Party Central Party School, President Xi warned that among nations who fall for the universal values trap, “some have been tormented beyond recognition, some have split up into pieces, some have been enveloped in flames of war, some are noisy and in disarray all day.”¹³ He pointed to Syria, Libya, and Iraq as prime examples.

To avoid that fate, President Xi has called, and continues to call, on China to use its own “discourse power” to push back against universal values in the global governance space.¹⁴ Still, at first glance, some of President Xi’s international statements appear to support liberal values. For example, in a 2017 speech to the United Nations, Xi claimed that China’s aim is to “build an open and inclusive world” and that Beijing believes “diversity of human civilizations … drives progress of mankind.”¹⁵ What Western observers need to understand, however, is that when Chinese foreign policy experts unpack that statement, they view it as a call for political diversity where authoritarian systems and values have global status equal to liberal democratic ones.¹⁶ For example, writing on internet freedom, People’s Liberation Army Major General Hao Yeli writes that the global system should “avoid the excessive pursuit of unregulated openness, in order not to cross a tipping point beyond which global cultural diversity is subordinated to a single dominant culture.”¹⁷ Similarly, Han Zhen, secretary of the Beijing Foreign Studies University Chinese Communist Party Committee, calls for a global pivot away from “Western centrism,” which he defines as a form of “cultural absolutism” that seeks to hold China and other nations accountable to Western liberal democratic standards.¹⁸ Echoing President Xi’s call for diversity, Han writes: “It is imperative to make more people realize the ‘universal values’ that have long been lauded by Western societies are actually a duplication of Western political, economic, social, and cultural models … human society should extricate itself from the vicious circle of Western-centrism and build a system of values that is characterized by mutual learning and mixing between diverse groups.”¹⁹

Xi’s oft-stated call for a “community of common destiny for mankind” is part of this effort to give authoritarian principles more sway in the global governance system.²⁰ In a liberal democratic order, individuals have inalienable rights that the state cannot take away. In China’s preferred authoritarian order, collective rights and interests—so-called mankind—are more important than individual rights and interests, and the state speaks on the collective’s behalf to determine its interests. Beijing is trying to convince the global community that authoritarian systems are better than democracies in this regard. Zhang Weiwei, dean of the China Institute at Fudan University, lays out that argument in the Chinese Communist Party political journal Qiushi, writing:

The biggest difference between the institutional arrangements of China and Western countries is that the former has a political force representing the people’s collective interest and the latter do not. In the West, different political parties represent the interest of different social groups. As a result, national policies are constantly wavering, political parties and interest groups are frequently engaged in bigger conflict with each other, and national development easily loses direction. In contrast, the CPC is a political party dedicated to serving the people wholeheartedly, and one that has played the role of leader, regulator, and coordinator throughout China’s modernization drive.²¹

Moreover, Zhang argues that the same dynamic applies at a global level: The Chinese model can effectively address complex problems that a democratic policymaking process cannot. Since he views the Chinese model as superior, Zhang calls on China to put forward “a series of Chinese solutions to difficult issues in global governance.”²² When President Xi calls for a “community of common destiny for mankind,” he is pushing a new vision for global governance in which the state, not the individual, is always the ultimate authority.

Beijing aims to reduce U.S. dominance and give developing nations a stronger voice

Beijing’s primary complaint about the prevailing global governance system is the fact that, in its view, the system was designed by and for the United States. In a 2017 article in The Diplomat, Fu Ying, China’s former vice minister of foreign affairs, lays out that perspective, stating, “After emerging victorious at the end of the Cold War, the United States crowned itself as the world leader and has tried to extend the Western order to be the new world order.”²³ She describes the U.S.-led global order as one in which the United States “seeks to transform non-Western countries to a Western political system and set of values with evangelical zeal” and is solely “focused on pursuing their own interests.” Fu continues, saying that when the U.S.-dominated approach was used to address global challenges, it sometimes resulted in unilateral military action, which “led to a succession of blunders, leaving ensuing turbulence for the rest of the world to deal with.”²⁴

In contrast, Chinese officials and scholars claim that China will take a more egalitarian and benevolent approach, using its rise to bring about a more balanced system in which no single nation’s interests predominate. Beijing describes its approach as U.N.-centric: avoiding unilateral action, giving all nations a seat at the table regardless of their size, and making decisions by consensus.²⁵

In his speech to a Chinese Communist Party convening of political parties in December 2017, President Xi promised that China will move the global governance system “in a more just and reasonable direction.”²⁶ Similarly, in his report to the 19th Party Congress, he stated that Beijing “supports the efforts of other developing countries to increase and strengthen their voice.”²⁷ He used similar language in his 2017 speech to the United Nations, stating: “All countries should jointly shape the future of the world, write international rules, [and] manage global affairs. … Big countries should treat smaller ones as equals instead of acting as a hegemon imposing their will on others.”²⁸

Chen Xiangyang contrasts China’s egalitarian approach with the U.S. model, stating that “China will not follow the example of some Western powers that have flaunted their wealth but not shown benevolence or generosity.”²⁹ Similarly, Fu Ying describes Beijing’s aim as a system that “respects the legitimate interests and values of nations, regardless of their social systems or their levels of development.”³⁰

Yet despite these lofty promises, in practice—as the empirical examples in this report will demonstrate—China’s behavior often leans more dictatorial than egalitarian, reflecting the same hegemonic behavior China’s scholars associate with U.S. leadership.

Beijing wants the global governance system to effectively address global challenges

As the largest global economy, China is heavily dependent on the global system. Therefore, it is in China’s national interest to work collaboratively with other nations to address challenges that threaten global safety and prosperity. On issues such as climate change, terrorism, pandemic disease, nuclear proliferation and global financial crises, China shares common interests with other nations, and that is something Western nations should not forget as they assess China’s global governance ambitions. Where there are common interests, China’s growing capabilities can present more opportunity than risk.

On global climate change, for example, China’s National Development and Reform Commission describes the nation as “a country vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change,” citing domestic risks, including “economic security, energy security, ecological security, food security, and people’s lives and property.”³¹ To be sure, when negotiating in multilateral forums, Chinese diplomats will try to find solutions that are particularly good for China. That is to say, they will try to make commitments that do not exceed what other nations put forward and will be relatively easy for Beijing to meet. However, Beijing understands that no global action would be worse for China than action that requires it to move beyond its comfort zone.³²

China’s economic might is its primary lever for global governance reform. Other nations want access to China’s domestic market or outbound investment, and Beijing can provide or withhold that access to exert leverage over other nations. China’s development success provides additional political capital. Leaders in other developing nations—particularly those that do not want to pursue liberal reform—seek to emulate the China model. Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, China is augmenting those positive drivers with coercive power: extending its military and security services overseas to apply targeted pressure against nations or individuals who, in Beijing’s view, undermine Chinese interests.³³ Beijing mixes these capabilities—economic, political, and coercive—to pursue its national interests in the global governance space. Those actions cover six key categories: (1) shaping multilateral action; (2) disrupting international legal regimes; (3) shifting international norms; (4) co-opting international organizations; (5) creating new international institutions; and (6) building a China-centric platform for international cooperation.

1. Shaping multilateral action on global challenges

From a U.S. perspective, China has a mixed record on global challenges. On transnational challenges that do not emerge within a single nation, China often plays a positive role. When the global financial crisis struck in 2008, China worked collaboratively with the United States and other G-20 nations to take coordinated action that prevented global economic collapse. From 2014 to 2015, China worked collaboratively with the United States to forge a new global climate agreement for the post-2020 era.³⁴ As Ebola outbreaks continue in Africa, China is sending medical personnel and financial aid to support international response efforts and is helping the region establish a new Africa Center for Disease Prevention and Control.³⁵

When individual nation-states create global challenges, China is more likely to play a spoiler role. Responding to those challenges often requires the multilateral community to impose pressure on the offending nation, and Beijing fears that if China faces another massive social movement such as the 1989 Tiananmen crisis, it could once again find itself on the receiving end of multilateral pressure. To reduce that risk, China leverages its role in multilateral forums such as the U.N. Security Council to push a Chinese principle of “non-interference in other nations’ internal affairs.”³⁶ Chinese officials and scholars apply this term broadly, using it as a rationale to oppose activities ranging from U.S. military action in Iraq and Libya to Japan hosting a World Uyghur Congress meeting to British efforts to investigate whether Beijing’s crackdown on Hong Kong violated the Sino-British Joint Declaration.³⁷ Within the United Nations, China has blocked, among other things, six U.N. resolutions on Syria’s humanitarian crisis and other resolutions on Zimbabwean government violence toward its political opposition; Myanmar military use of force against ethnic minority regions; and a peace process for Guatemala.³⁸

Chinese leaders are willing to take a flexible approach on noninterference when they begin to suspect that by blocking multilateral action, China is increasing the risk that other nations will form military coalitions or take unilateral military action to address the crisis. In this respect, Beijing is more flexible on noninterference than on issues relating to universal values. During the Obama administration, China shifted its position on Iran’s nuclear program, eventually supporting strong sanctions designed to bring Iran to the negotiation table.³⁹ Beijing feared that strong sanctions could destabilize the Iranian regime but also had deep economic interests in the region and feared that, if Iran continued down the nuclear path, other nations—particularly the United States and Israel—were likely to react militarily, threatening China’s economic interests. China demonstrated a similar pattern on North Korea in 2017, backing stronger multilateral sanctions once it perceived a growing risk that the United States would respond militarily.

2. Disrupting international legal regimes

In the Chinese political system, there is no authority higher than the Chinese Communist Party. The party constitution describes China’s legal system as a “socialist system of laws with Chinese characteristics,” and calls for the party to “fully advance the law-based governance of China.”⁴⁰ In practice, the party is always above the law and can interpret or ignore laws as it sees fit. President Xi is currently working to reinforce that dynamic with a new initiative to “strengthen Chinese Communist Party leadership over law-based governance”—particularly China’s legislative apparatus, law enforcement agencies, and judicial system.⁴¹

This approach clashes with the international legal system. When nation-states sign treaties and other forms of binding international law, they are expected to abide by them, even when doing so conflicts with certain national interests. The United States and other Western nations agree to be bound by international law because doing so enables them to exist within a stable, secure, and predictable international environment. China has demonstrated a concerning pattern whereby it reaps benefits from that environment but flouts laws that go against China’s national interests. Unlike democratic norms, China is generally content to leave international legal regimes in place, but China sometimes v