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These days, foreign policy and national security publications are filled with stark warnings about the demise of the U.S.-led rules-based international order—the system of global alliances and institutions that helped advance peace and prosperity for America and its allies in the aftermath of World War II. The Brexit vote in the United Kingdom; the election of President Donald Trump in the United States; new protest movements against global capitalism; the increasing strength of right-wing, anti-immigrant parties in Europe; and the rising power of nondemocratic regimes in China, Russia, and elsewhere are all seen as clear evidence that the old system of international relations is collapsing and may be permanently broken.¹ With the post-war order under assault from both the nationalist right and the anti-imperialist left, observers fear that it is devolving into a fractured system of uncooperative nations led by populist or anti-democratic forces pursuing parochial interests while stoking hostility toward outsiders and fostering distrust of collective global action.

But are voters in Western societies experiencing a genuine attitudinal break with the old democratic order, or rather, are they going through a corrective period based on years of pent-up frustrations about economic and social conditions that have yet to improve?

Scholars and analysts have put forth numerous explanations for the ongoing disruption of global politics, ranging from middle class concerns about economic inequality and diminished social mobility to rising political tribalism and declining trust in major institutions.² Behind each of these theories lie assumptions about voter attitudes driving the chaos seen in international affairs: Voters are angry and fearful. Voters dislike politicians and government. Voters are worried about uncontrolled immigration and increasing diversity. Social solidarity across groups is less important to voters than personal economic security. Liberal values of tolerance, pluralism, and individual liberty have given way to in-group loyalty, mutual suspicion, and support for anti-democratic solutions among key voting blocs. Failed military interventions have driven widespread skepticism about the use of force. Intergenerational unity and consensus remain elusive, as younger voters hold far different social values and norms about democracy and the economy than their elder peers.

Many of these assumptions about attitudinal trends are certainly true, particularly those related to voter anger, distrust of institutions, and concerns about the global economy and recent military actions.³ But much remains unexplored in terms of what voters believe and what they want their leaders to focus on today, particularly in the United States.

In the U.S. context, some of the important questions without clear answers include: Do voters want the United States to be more or less involved in solving global challenges and, if more involved, on which issues and in what manner? How do domestic priorities connect to international and security ones, if at all? What is the desired balance between military and nonmilitary action? Are there significant partisan divisions on foreign policy, and if so, is there any room for consensus across party lines? Do younger voters hold different priorities and values on foreign policy and national security issues than do older voters?

To better understand what precisely is motivating American voters today, the Center for American Progress, along with partners at public opinion research and strategic consulting firm GBAO, devised a comprehensive qualitative and quantitative research program to get at these and other questions about the fundamental values, beliefs, and priorities undergirding U.S. voter opinion on foreign policy and national security issues. Our goal with this particular project is not to advocate specific policy solutions or ideas but rather to get a clear reading about voters’ views in a number of areas. We hope that this far-reaching examination of voter attitudes will be of use to other researchers, practitioners, and policymakers as they devise their approaches to important foreign policy and national security issues.

Methodology and findings

Phase one of the study began in January 2019 with focus groups among a cross section of voters in Atlanta, Georgia, and Detroit, Michigan, followed by an online discussion with middle-of-the-road voters from across the country over several days to explore these issues in more depth. (see text box for methodological overview)

The qualitative research revealed important gaps in voters’ basic understanding of U.S. foreign policy objectives and widespread confusion about what the nation is trying to achieve in the world. Voters in focus groups did not see an overarching principle, rationale, or clear set of goals in U.S. foreign policy. Questions emerged along the lines of: Why are we in the Middle East and not dealing with Russia and China? What exactly did we gain from years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan? Why can’t we balance our economic dealings with other countries to better benefit U.S. workers and businesses? Several participants wondered why the United States does not have a plan for economic and political success in the world like they perceive China and other competitors do.

Likewise, traditional language from foreign policy experts about “fighting authoritarianism and dictatorship,” “promoting democracy,” or “working with allies and the international community” uniformly fell flat with voters in our groups. Some participants questioned the idea that an international community actually exists. Democracy promotion reminded others of the 2003 Iraq War and the failures of the George W. Bush administration. When asked what the phrase “maintaining the liberal international order” indicated to them, all but one of the participants in our focus groups drew a blank. Voters across educational lines simply did not understand what any of these phrases and ideas meant or implied.

Subsequently, voters across party lines in our groups tried to make sense of a confusing set of issues by deferring to known mental models and shorthands based on their own personal values and experiences, such as: We should look out for ourselves first, then help others; we should be stronger and stop being weak; or we can’t do everything on our own, and we need to work with others to get things done. Given basic confusion about foreign policy, numerous voters in the focus groups and the online discussion reacted favorably to core elements of “America First” nationalism, primarily notions that the United States should stop being the world’s policeman and that it should focus more on its own problems rather than worrying about what is happening in other countries.

These qualitative findings, along with new concepts and theories, were then tested in phase two of the study: a nationally representative online survey of 2,000 registered voters conducted in February and March 2019. The results of the national survey are presented in detail in later sections of this report.

The national survey provides overwhelming evidence that American voters want the United States to be “strong at home” first and foremost to help it compete in the world. Voters across demographic lines express a clear desire for more investment in U.S. infrastructure, health care, and education—and less of an exclusive focus on military and defense spending—as part of a revamped foreign policy approach that gets America ready to compete with other countries. Large percentages of voters want the government to focus on “our own problems” as a means for bolstering America’s position economically and politically, especially in the face of rising challenges from nations such as Russia and China.

The findings in this survey suggest that American voters are not isolationist. Rather, voters are more accurately described as supporting “restrained engagement” in international affairs—a strategy that favors diplomatic, political, and economic actions over military action when advancing U.S. interests in the world. American voters want their political leaders to make more public investments in the American people in order to compete in the world and to strike the right balance abroad after more than a decade of what they see as military overextension.

In contrast to much of the debate among political leaders and foreign policy experts today, voters in this survey express little interest in the processes and tactics of foreign policy or the workings of international alliances and institutions. They generally support cooperation and engagement with allies, but these are not top-tier objectives on their own.

At the most basic level, voters want U.S. foreign policy and national security policies to focus on two concrete goals: protecting the U.S. homeland and its people from external threats—particularly terrorist attacks—and protecting jobs for American workers. They also support efforts to protect U.S. democracy from foreign interference, advance common goals with allies, and promote equal rights in other countries. But these are second-order preferences. In the hierarchy of concerns about foreign policy, terrorism and a strong economy are more immediate issues for voters than are efforts to advance democratic values around the world.

In the political arena, President Trump receives poor marks from American voters for his foreign policy stewardship—worse than his overall job approval ratings—although he performs better on the economy. Despite Trump’s unpopularity, several of the nationalist ideas embedded in his “America First” vision—including placing U.S. problems above those in other countries and making allies pay their fair share for security—receive strong support from his most ardent backers and the Republican base and lower but noticeable support from Independent and Democratic voters. His restrictive views on immigration, however, produce major divisions between Republican and Democratic voters, who remain far apart in their prioritization of immigration as an issue and on the scope of what they see as the appropriate U.S. response.

In terms of other countries, China is overwhelmingly viewed as America’s top competitor. Voters express a clear desire for a cautious approach to dealing with China, and pluralities of voters favor steps to defuse tensions and increase cooperation on political and economic grounds. Russia is viewed mostly as an enemy of the United States, but voters also prefer more caution than confrontation in dealing with Russia. Voters overwhelmingly reject putting military action on the table in dealing with both China and Russia. Although few participants in our focus groups said they were following the Mueller investigation into Russian meddling in the 2016 elections, the survey shows that many voters believe protecting U.S. democracy from foreign interference should be a top foreign policy goal.

The study finds significant generational and partisan divides across multiple measures tested, including foreign policy goals, priorities, and beliefs about international engagement; the use of force; climate change and poverty; and “America First” attitudes.

Younger voters are much less committed to traditional international and military engagement than are their elder cohorts, and they are more in favor of global action on issues such as climate change, human rights, and basic living standards for all people. Younger voters are also far less committed than older voters to several “America First” sentiments, particularly those related to trade and immigration. At the same time, the survey finds that many Generation Z and Millennial voters hold no strong views whatsoever about any foreign policy or national security issue. Many of these youngest voters are entirely disengaged from foreign policy and national security news and debates and consequently hold few strong opinions on many issues.

In the partisan context, Democratic voter priorities lean more toward nonmilitary global action on issues such as combating climate change and reducing poverty, while Republican voter priorities are much more focused on stopping terrorist threats and reducing illegal immigration.

However, in perhaps the most important findings in the survey, voters across generational and partisan lines strongly desire more domestic investment in infrastructure, health care, and education to increase the United States’ global competitiveness rather than merely increasing military and defense spending. Voters across party lines also strongly agree that the United States faces new threats—including cyberattacks, chemical weapons, and drones—that require coordinated military and intelligence efforts with other countries.

None of these well-supported areas for action receive much public focus from foreign policy decision-makers and political leaders today, reflecting the divide between elite discourse and voter opinion on national security and global affairs issues.

The study also highlights how engagement with foreign policy news and developments, as well as measures of social trust—perceptions about the trustworthiness and reliability of other people—and media viewership, connect to a range of attitudes. Voters with low levels of foreign policy engagement and low social trust express much lower levels of strong agreement with statements about U.S. leadership in the world and multilateral actions to fight climate change and poverty and higher levels of strong agreement with actions focusing on home and domestic problems first. In addition, regular Fox News viewers express much higher levels of agreement than do non-Fox viewers on issues related to military engagement and prioritizing military spending, as well as on “America First” sentiments.

Another important observation from the project is that many of the categories and labels used in the past to describe different foreign policy camps no longer apply. Terms used to describe voters’ beliefs such as neoconservative, liberal interventionist, or isolationist do not adequately capture the complexity of attitudes and values that emerged in this project.

Based on responses to questions about goals, priorities, and attitudes tested throughout the survey, our project divided the electorate into four distinct groupings. One-third of American voters fall into what we label the “Trump nationalist” camp. Composed heavily but not exclusively of Republicans and regular Fox News viewers, this group is strongly in favor of prioritizing military spending and strongly against immigration and the United States acting as the world’s policeman.

Balancing this nationalist bloc are two kinds of voters more open to U.S. engagement in the world: “traditional internationalists” and “global activists.” A little less than one-fifth of the electorate, including a mix of Republican and Democratic, mostly older voters, may be described as “traditional internationalists.” These voters are the strongest believers in international engagement in a general sense and are the most committed to U.S. leadership in the world. Just less than 3 in 10 voters occupy what we call the “global activist” camp, a group that is heavily Democratic, very liberal, and well-educated. This group strongly favors diplomacy over military action and is very supportive of cooperative global actions on issues such as climate change, human rights, and poverty.

The final segment of the electorate—a little more than one-fifth—form the “foreign policy disengaged” bloc: Disproportionately younger, less educated, and less attentive to international developments, these voters lack strong opinions on most foreign policy issues and ideas.

These new categories described above should be just the start of a deeper and longer exploration of how U.S. public attitudes on foreign policy and national security have changed in the past decade. Given the dynamic and complicated geopolitical environment—and the shifting nature of American politics—it is likely that more major shifts in attitudes will be seen in the years to come.

But for now, American voters do not desire a full retreat from global affairs. They want to work with U.S. allies and international institutions to solve global challenges but only if the nation is also committed to putting its domestic house in order. They want to know that the United States is focused on its own economic and security needs first before tackling global problems it cannot control. Voters desire protection above other foreign policy goals—protection from harm and protection of U.S. jobs—and favor investment in domestic infrastructure and economic opportunities.

Put simply: American voters believe that America needs to be strong at home in order to be strong in the world.

This report is divided into several sections that can be read together or separately, including: the larger national and political landscape of voter views on foreign policy; voter goals and priorities for foreign policy; basic views about U.S. leadership and values; 20 attitudes defining voters’ foreign policy worldviews; social trust and Fox News effects on foreign policy views; profiles of the major groups in the electorate; and voter perceptions about which countries are America’s friends, enemies, and competitors. The full topline results, broken out by generation, are posted separately on the Center for American Progress website, and the full dataset is on file with the authors.

The Center for American Progress, in conjunction with GBAO, set out to better understand how voters today think about foreign policy and national security issues across a range of topics. Major findings from a nationally representative online poll of 2,000 registered voters that we conducted in February and March 2019 are discussed in the sections below.

Understanding of U.S. foreign policy goals and attention to news

• As indicated in focus groups, the survey finds high levels of uncertainty among voters about U.S. foreign policy goals. Decades after the end of the Cold War and 18 years after the terrorist attacks on the United States on 9/11, many voters want to know: What exactly are we trying to accomplish as a nation?

Asked to choose which of two statements comes closer to their own view, only a slight majority of voters, 51 percent, report, “I generally have a good understanding of our foreign policy goals and what the United States is trying to accomplish internationally,” while 43 percent say, “I am generally confused by our foreign policy goals and don’t really understand what the United States is trying to accomplish in its dealings with the rest of the world,” and another 6 percent are not sure.

Significant education differences emerge on this question. Nearly 6 in 10 college educated voters, those with a 4-year degree or higher, feel they generally have a good understanding of foreign policy goals, while 39 percent of these voters say they are generally confused. In comparison, only 47 percent of noncollege educated voters, those without a 4-year degree, say they have a good handle on what the United States is seeking to do with its foreign policy, with a nearly equal proportion, 46 percent, saying they are confused.

• In terms of foreign policy news, voters are somewhat split on how much attention they pay to international developments. Fifty-six percent of voters overall report that in a given week they either pay “a great deal” or “quite a bit” of attention to news and developments related to U.S. foreign policy and national security issues, while 44 percent say that their attention amounts to “some,” “not too much,” or “almost none” on these matters in a given week.

Democrats and Republicans report nearly identical levels of high attention (“a great deal” or “quite a bit”)—57 percent and 58 percent, respectively—with Independent voters well below at 43 percent.

A noticeable gender gap emerges on voter attention to news and developments on foreign policy and national security: 66 percent of men say they pay “a great deal” or “quite a bit” of attention to foreign policy news each week, compared with only 46 percent of women.

Top voter goals and priorities for foreign policy

• Concerns about protecting the country from attacks and terrorism clearly dominate other important goals in voters’ minds. Nearly 90 percent of American voters say that “protecting the U.S. homeland from enemy attacks and terrorism” should be either a top or very important goal of U.S. foreign policy, with a full 63 percent of voters saying it should a top priority.

None of the other goals measured independently in the survey approaches this level of top priority in voters’ minds. Forty-six percent of voters say that “protecting our democracy from foreign interference” should be a top priority, and 40 percent feel similarly about a goal of “ensuring that U.S. workers have good jobs and high wages.”
At the bottom of the list of top priorities, 27 percent of voters overall believe that “fighting for equal rights for women, racial and ethnic minorities, and people of different faith traditions” should be a top priority goal, and only 19 percent feel similarly about “promoting democracy and democratic values around the globe.”

• Asked to choose the three most important foreign policy priorities over the next five years from a specific list, “protecting against terrorist threats from groups like ISIS or al-Qaeda” ranks at the top of the list, chosen by 40 percent of voters, followed closely by “protecting jobs for American workers” at 36 percent and “reducing illegal immigration” at 35 percent.

The study finds significant generational and partisan divides on issue priorities for the next five years, with younger voters and Democrats placing a much higher premium on combating global climate change and less of a priority on reducing illegal immigration than do older voters and Republicans.

Views of U.S. leadership in the world

• American voters have not rejected traditional internationalism, but they are clearly weary after decades of military intervention in the Middle East and desire more focus on domestic investments in infrastructure, education, and health care at home.

Voters are essentially divided, however, about the basic role of U.S. leadership in the world. Asked which statement comes closer to their view, a slight majority of voters, 51 percent, believe, “America is stronger when we take a leading role in the world to protect our national interests and advance common goals with other allies,” versus 44 percent who believe the opposite, that “America is stronger when we focus on our own problems instead of inserting ourselves in other countries’ problems,” with another 5 percent of voters not sure either way.

• In addition, voters express skepticism about claims that U.S. ideals and norms apply widely around the world. Asked, “Do you think American values like democracy are universal to all people, regardless of country, or do you think they only apply to certain people and in certain parts of the world?”, only 45 percent of voters believe these values are universal, while 55 percent say they are confined to certain parts of the world.

20 attitudes defining voters’ foreign policy views

• The core of the survey comprises 20 attitudinal questions broken into four separate groupings related to: U.S. leadership in the world, the use of force, multilateral actions on global issues, and “America First” ideas. Voters were asked to rate each statement independently on a zero to 10 scale, with zero indicating that a respondent strongly disagrees with a statement and 10 meaning that a voter strongly agrees with a statement.

At the top of list—with 68 percent of voters strongly agreeing (a rating of 8–10) and a mean score of 8.2—is the idea: “In order to remain competitive in the world, the United States must invest more to improve our own infrastructure, education, and health care, not just increase military and defense spending.” At the very bottom of the list—with only 33 percent of voters strongly agreeing and a mean score of just 5.9—is the inverse notion: “The United States must prioritize spending for the military and defense, even if it means making cuts in other areas.”

Sixty-three percent of Generation Z/Millennial voters strongly agree with this top-rated statement about domestic investment, along with 65 percent of Generation X voters and 73 percent of Baby Boomer/Silent Generation voters. Likewise, 74 percent of Democrats; 64 percent of Independents; and 62 percent of Republicans express strong agreement with the idea of domestic investment to bolster America’s global competitiveness.

• As a complement to investing at home to make us more competitive globally, there is also broad agreement among voters about the importance of new threats in the world. Ranking second on the list, with 64 percent of voters strongly agreeing and a mean score of 8, is the statement: “Today, the United States faces new threats, such as cyberattacks, chemical weapons, and drones, that require coordinated military and intelligence efforts with governments across the world.” Sixty-two percent of Democrats, 52 percent of Independents, and 71 percent of Republicans strongly agree with a focus on emerging threats, as do majorities of Generation Z/Millennial voters at 53 percent, Generation X voters at 56 percent, and Baby Boomer/Silent Generation voters at 78 percent.

• Voters from the two major parties depart significantly from one another on statements related to prioritizing military spending, use of force, and international treaties and institutions. Some of the starkest partisan divides arise on core components of President Trump’s “America First” approach.

More than three-quarters of Republicans strongly agree with a very restrictive view on immigration—“In order to protect our country, we must secure our borders and put strong limits on both legal and illegal immigration”—compared with just one-fifth of Democrats. More than two-thirds of Republicans strongly believe, “For too long, the United States has let other nations take advantage of us in terms of global trade and economic policies,” versus around one-fifth of Democrats.

• Democrats and Independents do report more agreement with some aspects of Trump’s nationalism, though at lower levels than his most ardent backers. Forty-one percent of Democrats and 55 percent of Independents strongly agree that “we should focus more on helping people here at home instead of getting involved in trying to help people in other parts of the world,” along with 62 percent of Republicans. Forty-percent of Democrats also strongly agree that “other countries should pay more for their own security needs and stop expecting the United States to be the world’s policeman,” along with strong majorities of both Independents, at 55 percent, and Republicans, at 74 percent.

Social trust and Fox News effects

• Social trust indicators, first developed by the Pew Research Center, are also related to several dimensions of foreign policy engagement and attitudes in this survey.⁴ Voters with “high” social trust report higher levels of attention to foreign policy news and developments, higher levels of perceived personal impact and connections to people in other countries, and higher levels of agreement that U.S values are universal than do voters with “low” social trust. Voters with high social trust are also in much stronger agreement with ideas about U.S. leadership in the world and the need for international cooperation. Conversely, voters with low social trust are more likely to score highly on a number of “America First” sentiments.

• Regular Fox News viewers are twice as likely as non-Fox viewers to score highly on our military engagement index—44 percent versus 22 percent, respectively—and nearly twice as likely to score highly on the “America First” index—50 percent versus 26 percent, respectively. (A high score on an index represents an 8 or greater average response across several statements in each category.)

The strongest relationship between Fox News viewership and foreign policy attitudes, however, is on the issue of immigration: 71 percent of regular Fox News viewers strongly ag