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来源类型 | ISSUE BRIEF |
规范类型 | 简报 |
Corporate Governance and Workers | |
Andy Green; Christian E. Weller; Malkie Wall | |
发表日期 | 2019-08-14 |
出版年 | 2019 |
语种 | 英语 |
概述 | Power within corporations has shifted away from Main Street in favor of Wall Street, but collective bargaining, competition, tax fairness, and corporate long-termism can help American capitalism do better. |
摘要 | The economic headlines are chock full of soaring corporate profits, booming CEO pay, and record share buybacks.1 Yet, America’s working families and communities are struggling to get by since wages and family wealth have barely budged after decades of stagnation. This is a dangerous situation, as the deep imbalances in how the U.S. economy works—and whom it fails to work well for—increasingly expose America to social and political division. This issue brief explores why companies share their benefits overwhelmingly with those at the top, leaving little for working families. It discusses why this is the case and what can be done to shift corporate accountability and governance so that economic growth is genuine, lasting, and more equitably shared with working families. A shift in corporate governanceThe boards and managers running companies, especially public companies, respond to the stakeholders who have the power to make demands of them.2 Stakeholders include the consumers who buy their products and services; workers and suppliers who produce them; investors who provide capital and other know-how; and even communities who provide a clean, safe environment and educated workers.3 However, boards and managers have been implementing corporate governance strategies that prioritize Wall Street and corporate executives, over the rest of the stakeholders. Why are America’s companies so responsive to some stakeholders, to the detriment of others? Corporate governance was not always so one-sided.4 Since the 1980s, relative power within companies shifted away from workers, communities, consumers, and retail investors, and dramatically toward corporate executives and financial sector professionals as a result of several trends:5
This multidecade rearrangement of power among corporate stakeholders generated strong pressures and plenty of new opportunities to squeeze workers’ wages and benefits. The 2008 financial crisis and subsequent Great Recession created enormous economic dislocations that intensified the stresses on American workers and working-class communities.6 These successive rounds of economic pain have contributed to social division that now poses a serious threat to the United States as a society and polity.7 Who is the economy working for these days?The U.S. economy today is not working for workers and working-class communities. Jobs have been created steadily since late 2010, but the headline jobs numbers have failed to capture the depth of economic pain that working Americans face. Employment opportunities stayed scarce for years after job growth returned; firms only gradually hired more people, and many workers found themselves in jobs that paid only low wages and offered few benefits.8 American workers without four-year college degrees make up roughly 60 percent of the American workforce,9 and yet their real compensation, namely wages and benefits, has been essentially stagnant since the Reagan era.10 What little wage growth has occurred, especially for the bottom 10 percent of workers, is due in no small part to the minimum wage increases passed in certain states rather than at the federal level, where it has been stagnant for more than a decade.11 ![]() Wealth levels overall have only recovered to 2007 levels, after falling by 49 percent compared with 2001.12 And among the bottom half of all Americans, who in aggregate own only 1.3 percent of all household wealth in America, the average real wealth is both dangerously low—roughly $20,000—and half of what it was in 1999.13 Moreover, the Black-white wealth gap is larger today than it was before the Great Recession.14 Wealth is an essential aspect of economic security, enabling families to send children to college, afford a retirement with dignity, and meet the unexpected vicissitudes of life. But the millions of Americans whose incomes are barely keeping up with costs and who lack benefits cannot easily accumulate the housing and financial assets needed to generate wealth.15 The challenge is even more pronounced in certain geographic regions as decades of economic decline and a lack of real, meaningful opportunities have hollowed out many working-class communities across America.16 In contrast, the financial crisis and Great Recession barely dented nonfinancial sector corporate profit, which recovered quickly and continued to grow. Since 2017, corporate profit has reached after-tax highs—jumping significantly following the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA).17 Recently, that growth has slowed, but the corporate profit rate—the ratio of total after-tax corporate profits to total assets—remains above 10 percent, high by historical standards. Indeed, after-tax profits for the current business cycle have reached an average of 9.6 percent of total corporate assets. This is the highest level for any business cycle since World War II. (see Figure 2) ![]() These soaring corporate profits have not translated to broad-based economic prosperity. Rather, by cutting corporate tax rates from 35 percent down to 21 percent; permitting the repatriation of offshore profits at bargain basement rates of 8 percent to 15 percent; and locking in permanent low rates on offshore profits, the TCJA was a corporate giveaway that sent the stock market booming but did little for long-term economic growth or for workers.18 As Warren Buffett aptly noted, nearly half of Berkshire Hathaway’s improved value for the year “was delivered to us in December [2017] when Congress rewrote the U.S. Tax Code.”19 Rewarding those at the topSo, where is all this money that companies are generating, or receiving, going? In large measure, those at the top are receiving it in the form of executive compensation and buybacks. In addition, merger and acquisition activities have continued at a strong pace, which often rewards and further concentrates economic power and wealth at the top.20 For starters, compensation to CEOs and executives has surged. (see Figure 3) A study by the Economic Policy Institute found a 17.6 percent jump in pay at the very top from 2016 to 2017,21 and the available evidence for CEO compensation this year suggests another robust year.22 Highly compensated financial sector professionals—such as hedge fund and private equity fund managers—also constitute a sizable portion of those at the top who have enjoyed a significant expansion in income.23 ![]() Furthermore, share buybacks have exploded. At a record high of more than $800 billion in 2018 for S&P 500 companies, buybacks exceeded capital expenditures.24 With companies’ stock prices increasingly hooked on buybacks, 2019 could be close to these highs—although the chance of a recession in the near future may weigh on returns.25 Share buybacks enable companies to boost their stock prices by buying back their own shares. This can give executives, compensated largely in stock, a handsome windfall.26 Analysis last year by U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Commissioner Robert Jackson found that company executives frequently sell stock during buybacks such that they “personally capture the benefit of the short-term stock-price pop created by the buyback announcement.” Jackson highlights how short-term rewards from buybacks undermine the link between pay and long-term performance.27 In addition, a range of commentators have expressed concerns that excessive buybacks are squeezing out investments in the future and diverting resources from the interests of other company stakeholders.28 Indeed, the growth effects of the TCJA were predicated on the assumption that firms would use the windfall for business investment, which would create the momentum for economic growth. However, domestic corporate investment has barely budged—and contrary to promises, foreign investment by corporations has increased.29 This leaves the bulk of the tax windfall to keep Wall Street and CEOs happy. Overall, the data highlight how much corporations reward their shareholders.30 The sum of net equity issues—the difference between new share issuances minus share buybacks and merger and acquisition share retirements—and dividend payouts have totaled about 100 percent of after-tax profits since the 1980s. (see Figure 4) This means that corporations on average spend all the money they make in profits, plus all the money they raise on the stock market, to buy back their own shares and pay out dividends. Typically, the same companies are not simultaneously raising money on the stock market and buying back their own shares. Thus, a lot of companies are spending more than their profits to keep their shareholders happy—a stunning fact, since corporate profits have also gone up at the same time. ![]() Mergers and acquisitions have also sustained robust levels.31 Frequently, mergers and acquisitions have served to lock out the competition and concentrate market power.32 Recent Center for American Progress analysis reveals the widespread scope of abnormal returns from this trend toward concentration.33 CAP has also highlighted the negative impacts of concentration on farmer incomes, among other groups.34 Golden parachute provisions—agreements that provide significant severance benefits to executives in case of termination—in CEO compensation packages of acquired businesses exemplify the misguided incentive structures built into many mergers and acquisitions.35 Recently, stock retirements due to merger and acquisition activity have come close to the levels observed during the subprime mortgage boom years before the Great Recession and have remained high in the wake of the 2017 tax cuts. (see Figure 5) ![]() Ultimately, the power to divvy up corporate profits looks very different for those sitting at the top versus just about anywhere else. When workers had powerThe 1950s and 1960s were not a golden age of inclusive capitalism for women, people of color, and the environment, to name just a few of the groups and areas affected by the insufficiencies of that era.36 Solely from the perspective of labor’s ability to share in the returns to companies, however, it was a period during which corporate profits were shared more broadly than they are today. That is partly because, coming out of the Great Depression and a war against fascism in Europe and Asia as well as facing the new threat of communism, workers and government demanded that capitalism work better than it had been before.37 Figure 6 shows the decline in labor’s share of economic output over time.38 Notably, the gap between the 1950s and today may be even starker, as these data do not break out higher-income workers whose wages are growing at a faster pace than mid- and low-wage workers.39 ![]() Although a range of policies and broader economic forces were at play, several factors were noteworthy in the context of this issue brief.40 First, with high union density, unions were, in large measure, the most important check on corporate management during that period.41 Union density arose both from hard-fought battles by workers and the concerted efforts of the Roosevelt administration to support unionization through government procurement.42 Workers’ power and willingness to make claims on corporate income are demonstrated by the far greater incidence of worker actions such as strikes. Indeed, strikes were a regular part of bargaining over the economy’s returns but fell dramatically beginning in the early 1980s.43 The international trade environment supported unions’ ability to make those claims, in part because opportunities for companies to seek lower-cost production venues were limited. To begin with, international trade was far less integrated globally.44 Europe and Asia were recovering from the devastation of World War II, while the Soviet bloc, China, as well as much of the developing world were closed to international investment for political, ideological, or other reasons. In addition, there were far greater constraints on communication and transportation than exist today. This meant that outsourcing and offshoring supply chains to low-cost jurisdictions—and the resulting downward pressure on U.S. worker bargaining power—was far less prevalent.45 Notably, the New Deal framers of the postwar international economic order believed strongly in international trade but also recognized the risk that could arise from trade integration without labor standards and protections against other anti-competitive practices.46 Unfortunately, their vision was blocked by American business interests, which eventually won out when the obstacles to international trade noted above fell away. During the 1950s and 1960s, many industries were also subject to governmental industry-based regulation and vigorous antitrust enforcement. Both exerted a degree of governmental control and public pressure on companies to act more favorably toward workers.47 For example, managers in regulated industries were more acutely aware of the public oversight and reputational risks that regulatory accountability created.48 Vigorous antitrust enforcement had similar effects.49 In addition, regulation and antitrust enforcement resulted in greater distribution of economic power and fairer forms of competition. For example, it was much harder for companies to occupy a dominant position in a supply chain and utilize that position and contractual restraints to pressure other firms and workers in the supply chain.50 A broader distribution of economic opportunity had other salutary effects for workers, such as more effective democratic engagement by workers and other benefits.51 Worker power over corporations was substantially assisted by the relative inability of Wall Street to make demands on a company’s returns.52 Investors overall tended to be far more dispersed, with retail investors a larger percentage of shareholders in companies than today. Those retail shareholders tended to be more passive in their demands on company management than the institutional shareholders of more recent times. Although this was not without costs on corporate performance and executive accountability, it cleared the way for other actors, outlined above, to exert greater demands on boards and management.53 Tax policy also helped. With an average corporate tax rate of 50 percent, individual marginal tax rates on the wealthy upward of 70 percent, and estate tax rates above 70 percent, tax policy throughout the 1950s and 1960s leaned against excessive concentrations of wealth.54 It also generated the revenues needed for government to make robust investments in housing, transportation, education, and communities across the country. The economy and society of the 1950s and 1960s were far from perfect and cannot—and should not—be recreated. In particular, they often excluded women and people of color from fully participating in the labor market—more so than today. But in developing new proposals to make the economy work better for working families, policymakers can study the lessons of that period to understand the conditions under which worker and governmental power acted to constrain the upward redistributive pull of laissez-faire capitalism. Toward 21st-century accountable capitalismFor those who believe America can still be a vision of hope for all people, addressing whom the economy is working for is essential. To make capitalism work for working families, America needs to maximize the alignment between the long-term interests of companies with those of the public, in particular working families. Boost worker bargaining power: The starting point for enabling workers to demand a greater share of the returns to companies has to be rebuilt collective bargaining rights and higher basic wage laws. In “Blueprint for the 21st Century: A Plan for Better Jobs and Stronger Communities” and several other publications, CAP highlights how policymakers can help enable workers to demand their fair share of the fruits of their labor by adopting a $15 national minimum wage; reforming existing labor laws to facilitate sectorwide bargaining; and taking additional steps to ensure that all workers are free to join a union, as well as secure their broader rights in court.55 Workers’ ability to bargain for higher wages is heavily affected by whether trade policy actively counters the downward pressure on wages and standards from globalization by setting higher floors on labor and environmental standards.56 Empowering workers globally to demand a greater share of corporate returns helps workers in America do so as well—especially if the internal opportunities for labor market arbitrage are also closed, such as in so-called right-to-work states. As such, tools such as cross-border collective bargaining; the inclusion of labor and environmental standards in anti-dumping duty calculations; and the exclusion of products made under conditions without sufficient labor rights and environmental standards, among other changes, must be part of the new toolkit in U.S. trade agreements to rebalance capitalism for workers—whether they be in Ohio, Oaxaca, or Anhui.57 Trade agreements must also not unduly limit governments’ ability to enforce the antitrust laws or to regulate in the public interest.58 Keep markets competitive and well regulated: Fair, competitive markets are important for keeping corporations properly |
主题 | Economy |
URL | https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2019/08/14/473095/corporate-governance-workers/ |
来源智库 | Center for American Progress (United States) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/437067 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Andy Green,Christian E. Weller,Malkie Wall. Corporate Governance and Workers. 2019. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
Corporate-Governance(522KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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