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来源类型 | Article |
规范类型 | 其他 |
DOI | 10.1016/j.energy.2009.12.036 |
ISBN | 0360-5442 |
Design of the incentive mechanism in electricity auction market based on the signaling game theory. | |
Liu, Zhen; Zhang, Xiliang; Lieu, Jenny | |
发表日期 | 2010-01-08 |
出处 | Energy |
出版者 | Elsevier |
出版年 | 2010 |
页码 | 1813-1819 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | At present, designing a proper bidding mechanism to decrease the generators’ market power is considered to be one of the key approaches to deepen the reform of the electricity market. Based on the signaling game theory, the paper analyzes the main electricity bidding mechanisms in the electricity auction markets and considers the degree of information disturbance as an important factor for evaluating bidding mechanisms. Under the above studies, an incentive electricity bidding mechanism defined as the Generator Semi-randomized Matching (GSM) mechanism is proposed. In order to verify the new bidding mechanism, this paper uses the Swarm platform to develop a simulation model based on the multi-agents. In the simulation model, the generators and purchasers use the partly superior study strategy to adjust their price and their electricity quantity. Then, the paper examines a simulation experiment of the GSM bidding mechanism and compares it to a simulation of the High-Low Matching (HLM) bidding mechanism. According to the simulation results, several conclusions can be drawn when comparing the proposed GSM bidding mechanism to the equilibrium state of HLM: the clearing price decreases, the total transaction volume increases, the profits of electricity generators decreases, and the overall benefits of purchasers increases. |
URL | http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/73723/ |
来源智库 | Science Policy Research Unit (United Kingdom) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/467671 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Liu, Zhen,Zhang, Xiliang,Lieu, Jenny. Design of the incentive mechanism in electricity auction market based on the signaling game theory.. 2010. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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