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来源类型Publication
How Accountability Pressure on Failing Schools Affects Student Achievement
Hanley Chiang
发表日期2009-10-30
出版者Journal of Public Economics, vol. 93, issue 9-10
出版年2009
语种英语
概述Although the threat of sanctions on low-performing schools can raise student test scores in the short run, the extent to which these test score improvements are due to schools\u0027 manipulation of the accountability system has remained uncertain. ",
摘要Although the threat of sanctions on low-performing schools can raise student test scores in the short run, the extent to which these test score improvements are due to schools' manipulation of the accountability system has remained uncertain. This article evaluates the relative importance of educational reforms and gaming behavior in generating test score gains by threatened schools. The author uses a regression discontinuity design to estimate medium-run effects on student test scores from having attended a threatened elementary school. Threat-induced math improvements from elementary school largely persist at least through the first one to two years of middle school, while evidence for persistence of reading improvements is less consistent. Sanction threats tend to raise school spending on instructional technology, curricular development, and teacher training.
URLhttps://www.mathematica.org/our-publications-and-findings/publications/how-accountability-pressure-on-failing-schools-affects-student-achievement
来源智库Mathematica Policy Research (United States)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/486338
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Hanley Chiang. How Accountability Pressure on Failing Schools Affects Student Achievement. 2009.
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