全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Firm-Level Early Intervention Incentives: Which Recent Employers of Disability Program Entrants Would Pay More? (Journal Article)

G2TT

来源类型	Publication
	Firm-Level Early Intervention Incentives: Which Recent Employers of Disability Program Entrants Would Pay More? (Journal Article)
	David C. Stapleton; David R. Mann; Pragya Singh; and Jae Song
发表日期	2017-12-30
出版者	Journal of Disability Policy Studies, vol. 28, issue 3 (subscription required)
出版年	2017
语种	英语
概述	We simulate the effects of Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) reform proposals that make firms partially responsible for SSDI benefits paid to their former workers. The simulations suggest the proposals (if implemented) would greatly affect firms and the workforces that the firms employ. ",
摘要	Key Findings: The proposals would create substantive additional labor force costs, especially on small firms Firms may respond to the changes by hiring fewer workers with disabilities The declining economic status of people with disabilities and the predicted 2016 depletion of the Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund have generated considerable interest in proposals for reforming the DI program. Some proposals would hold firms partially responsible for a portion of the DI benefits paid to their recent employees. We analyze the implications of this approach for employers and workers in general and specifically consider two prominent reform proposals: one would require employers to carry short-term disability insurance; the second would apply an experience rating to the DI portion of the Federal Insurance Contributions Act premium. We find the proposals would place a relatively large burden on the labor costs of many relatively small (fewer than 500 workers), low-wage firms. Firms with high potential liabilities might react by seeking to accommodate and retain workers with challenging medical conditions but might also reduce hiring or retaining workers at high risk for medical problems. Hence, although these proposals would likely reduce DI expenditures, they might have less desirable unintended consequences.
URL	https://www.mathematica.org/our-publications-and-findings/publications/ja-firm-level-early-intervention-incentives-which-recent-employers-of-disability
来源智库	Mathematica Policy Research (United States)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/489118
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	David C. Stapleton,David R. Mann,Pragya Singh,et al. Firm-Level Early Intervention Incentives: Which Recent Employers of Disability Program Entrants Would Pay More? (Journal Article). 2017.