| 来源类型 | Publication |
| A Taste for Taxes: Minimizing Distortions Using Political Preferences | |
| Emiliano Huet-Vaughn; Andrea Robbett; and Matthew Spitzer | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-12-01 |
| 出版者 | Journal of Public Economics, vol. 180 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 概述 | The authors conduct an experiment with online workers to assess whether the distortionary effect of a tax is sensitive to the ideological match between taxpayer and tax expenditures.", |
| 摘要 | The authors conduct an experiment with online workers to assess whether the distortionary effect of a tax is sensitive to the ideological match between taxpayer and tax expenditures. They find that, among self-identified political moderates, the labor supply elasticity with respect to the net of tax wage is significantly smaller when individuals pay taxes to a favored government agency as compared to an unfavored one. While the tax has a significant distortionary effect in the latter case, with a point estimate for the labor supply elasticity of approximately 0.77, the elasticity point estimate is close to zero when taxes go to a favored agency. There is also an increase in total output for the matched population among moderates. There is no evidence that these effects hold for self-identified liberals or conservatives. |
| URL | https://www.mathematica.org/our-publications-and-findings/publications/a-taste-for-taxes-minimizing-distortions-using-political-preferences |
| 来源智库 | Mathematica Policy Research (United States) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/489786 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Emiliano Huet-Vaughn,Andrea Robbett,and Matthew Spitzer. A Taste for Taxes: Minimizing Distortions Using Political Preferences. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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