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来源类型 | Publication |
Pay by Design: Teacher Performance Pay Design and the Distribution of Student Achievement | |
Prashant Loyalka; Sean Sylvia; Chengfang Liu; James Chu; Yaojiang Shi | |
发表日期 | 2019 |
出版者 | Journal of Labor Economics |
出版年 | 2019 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We present results of a randomized trial testing alternative approaches of mapping student achievement into rewards for teachers. Teachers in 216 schools in western China were assigned to performance pay schemes where teacher performance was assessed by one of three different methods. We find that teachers offered “pay-for-percentile” incentives (Barlevy and Neal 2012) outperform teachers offered simpler schemes based on class average achievement or average gains over a school year. Moreover, pay-for-percentile incentives produced broad based gains across students within classes. That teachers respond to relatively intricate features of incentive schemes highlights the importance of close attention to performance pay design. |
主题 | Teaching and Leadership Effectiveness |
子主题 | Student Success ; Teacher Labor Markets ; Teacher Quality |
URL | https://cepa.stanford.edu/content/pay-design-teacher-performance-pay-design-and-distribution-student-achievement |
来源智库 | Center for Education Policy Analysis (United States) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/491861 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Prashant Loyalka,Sean Sylvia,Chengfang Liu,et al. Pay by Design: Teacher Performance Pay Design and the Distribution of Student Achievement. 2019. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
Pay by Design.pdf(701KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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