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来源类型Publication
Pay by Design: Teacher Performance Pay Design and the Distribution of Student Achievement
Prashant Loyalka; Sean Sylvia; Chengfang Liu; James Chu; Yaojiang Shi
发表日期2019
出版者Journal of Labor Economics
出版年2019
语种英语
摘要

We present results of a randomized trial testing alternative approaches of mapping student achievement into rewards for teachers. Teachers in 216 schools in western China were assigned to performance pay schemes where teacher performance was assessed by one of three different methods. We find that teachers offered “pay-for-percentile” incentives (Barlevy and Neal 2012) outperform teachers offered simpler schemes based on class average achievement or average gains over a school year. Moreover, pay-for-percentile incentives produced broad based gains across students within classes. That teachers respond to relatively intricate features of incentive schemes highlights the importance of close attention to performance pay design.

主题Teaching and Leadership Effectiveness
子主题Student Success ; Teacher Labor Markets ; Teacher Quality
URLhttps://cepa.stanford.edu/content/pay-design-teacher-performance-pay-design-and-distribution-student-achievement
来源智库Center for Education Policy Analysis (United States)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/491861
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Prashant Loyalka,Sean Sylvia,Chengfang Liu,et al. Pay by Design: Teacher Performance Pay Design and the Distribution of Student Achievement. 2019.
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