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来源类型 | Faculty Working Papers |
规范类型 | 工作论文 |
来源ID | CID Faculty Working Paper No. 301 |
CATalytic Insurance: The Case for Natural Disasters | |
Tito Cordella & Eduardo Levy Yeyati | |
发表日期 | 2015-09 |
出版年 | 2015 |
摘要 | Why should developing countries buy expensive catastrophe (CAT) insurance? Abstracting from risk aversion or hedging motives, we find that insurance may have a catalytic role on external finance. Such effect is particularly strong in those low to middle income countries that face financial constraints when hit by a shock or in its anticipation. Insurance makes defaults less likely, thereby relaxing the country's borrowing constraint, and enhancing its access to capital markets. The presence of multilateral lenders that explicitly or implicitly provide inexpensive reconstruction funds in the aftermath of a natural disaster weakens but does not eliminate the demand for catalytic insurance. |
URL | https://www.hks.harvard.edu/centers/cid/publications/faculty-working-papers/catalytic-insurance |
来源智库 | Center for International Development (United States) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/503228 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Tito Cordella &,Eduardo Levy Yeyati. CATalytic Insurance: The Case for Natural Disasters. 2015. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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