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U.S. forces evolved a concept of operations for controlling an urban insurgency.

• The concept of operation involved isolating an area of operations with concrete T-walls, providing access control.
• Access control would ultimately enable U.S. forces to set the tempo of operations and methodically capture or kill insurgent leaders through targeted raids.

Conditions on the eve of battle favored U.S. forces and their Iraqi allies.

• Much of the overall insurgency had been neutralized.
• U.S. forces had trained appropriately prior to deployment.
• The active portion of the insurgency was weakened in key ways.
• The urban terrain allowed good use of U.S. technical advantages.

After hard fighting early in the battle, each side retained advantages and disadvantages.

• U.S. forces seized key enemy rocket-launch sites early in the battle.
• However, insurgents still enjoyed considerable freedom of movement making allied forces vulnerable to attack from unsecured portions of Sadr City.

The allied construction of the wall along a key route changed the dynamics of the battle.

• Insurgents, their freedom of movement rapidly disappearing, were drawn into battle on disadvantageous terms.
• Allied forces continued and improved suppression of enemy rocket fires.
• The Iraqi Army enjoyed increasing success in conducting operations on its own.
• The leader of the uprising offered a cease-fire, though many individuals kept fighting.

U.S. commanders moved quickly to exploit the success of battle.

• U.S. forces launched an ambitious program of reconstruction intended to convince Sadr City's population to transfer its loyalties to the Government of Iraq.
• The last remaining insurgency fighters came under increasingly destructive attack.

In late March 2008, a Shi'a uprising in Baghdad's Sadr City district challenged the authority of the Government of Iraq (GoI) at its heart. The Jaish al Mahdi (JAM) overran GoI outposts in the district and barraged the International Zone with short-range rockets. The eruption of violence threatened to draw U.S. forces into a battle in a closely packed urban area inhabited by an estimated 2.4 million people, many of whom strongly supported the GoI's main antagonist, Moqtada al-Sadr. U.S. casualties and collateral damage could have been substantial. Instead, through innovative tactics combining high-technology airborne surveillance and strike, elements of siege warfare and vigorous exploitation through civil military operations, coalition forces managed to subdue the uprising with minimum loss to U.S. forces and the civilian population. Success in this battle solidified Iraqi government control over all of Baghdad and throughout Iraq, creating conditions that enabled the United States to realize contemporary operational objectives in Iraq. The authors present the first full operational analysis of the battle and distill insights and lessons that can inform a broader understanding of urban operations, particularly those conducted as part of irregular warfare. This new paradigm can help the Army focus on what capabilities it will need in the future for such operations.

• Chapter One

  Introduction

• Chapter Two

  Setting Conditions for the 2008 Battle

• Chapter Three

  Conditions on the Eve of the Battle of Sadr City

• Chapter Four

  The Battle Begins

• Chapter Five

  Defeating JAM: Operation Gold Wall

• Chapter Six

  Exploiting the Success of Battle

• Chapter Seven

  Assessing the Outcome of the Battle

• Chapter Eight

  Reimagining Urban Combat

• Appendix

  Analysis of Contemporary Arabic Language Sources on the Battle of Sadr City