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Airpower Prevented an Early Regime Victory

• The air campaign enabled the opposition to survive Qaddafi's offensive in March 2011.
• Imposition of the no-fly zone and the continuation of coalition air strikes had a profound effect on the Libyan rebels beyond the protection those strikes provided from air and ground attacks.

Airpower Enabled Rebels to Go on the Offensive

• Aerial intervention made possible not merely a victory against Qaddafi, but a Libyan victory.
• The availability of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, especially of developed targets, was central to the conduct of the air campaign.

Intervention Was Done Cheaply and Effectively

• No coalition personnel were killed, or even seriously wounded, carrying out operations over (or in) Libya.
• Target planners and aircrews generally succeeded in their considerable efforts to avoid civilian casualties.
• The war is estimated to have cost the coalition several billion dollars, a relatively low figure compared to other conflicts.
• Several nations' air forces were stretched to the limit of their abilities to sustain aircraft deployments.

Airpower Was Intertwined With Politics

• The Libyan aerial intervention was unusual in having a rationale that explicitly revolved around a mandate to protect civilians.
• The Arab states' most important strategic contribution was in the political domain and in providing assistance to the Libyan rebels.
• The United Nations' endorsement of the intervention heavily influenced the participation of some countries.
• Applying the "Libya model" of using airpower to enable victories by indigenous ground forces to other settings is potentially powerful but will often be more difficult, especially where political conditions are less favorable than in Libya.

Between March and October 2011, a coalition of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states and several partner nations waged a war against Muammar Qaddafi's Libyan regime that stemmed and then reversed the tide of Libya's civil war, preventing Qaddafi from crushing the nascent rebel movement seeking to overthrow his dictatorship and going on to enable opposition forces to prevail. The central element of this intervention was a relatively small multinational force's air campaign operating from NATO bases in several countries, as well as from a handful of aircraft carriers and amphibious ships in the Mediterranean Sea. The study details each country's contribution to that air campaign, examining such issues as the limits of airpower and coordination among nations. It also explores whether the Libyan experience offers a potential model for the future.

• Chapter One

  Examining the Air Campaign in Libya

  Karl P. Mueller

• Chapter Two

  Strategic and Political Overview of the Intervention

  Christopher S. Chivvis

• Chapter Three

  The Libyan Experience

  Frederic Wehrey

• Chapter Four

  The U.S. Experience: National Strategy and Campaign Support

  Robert C. Owen

• Chapter Five

  The U.S. Experience: Operational

  Deborah C. Kidwell

• Chapter Six

  The British Experience: Operation Ellamy

  Christina Goulter

• Chapter Seven

  The French Experience: Sarkozy's War?

  Camille Grand

• Chapter Eight

  The Italian Experience: Pivotal and Underestimated

  Gregory Alegi

• Chapter Nine

  The Canadian Experience: Operation Mobile

  Richard O. Mayne

• Chapter Ten

  The Belgian, Danish, Dutch, and Norwegian Experiences

  Christian F. Anrig

• Chapter Eleven

  The Swedish Experience: Overcoming the Non–NATO-Member Conundrum

  Robert Egnell

• Chapter Twelve

  The Arab States' Experiences

  Bruce R. Nardulli

• Chapter Thirteen

  Victory Through (Not By) Airpower

  Karl P. Mueller

• Appendix A

  Timeline of Events in Libya

• Appendix B

  Air Order of Battle