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Evaluation of Combatant Command Security Cooperation Objectives

• Most individual country objectives did not meet the SMART criteria of being specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and results-oriented, and time-bound. In particular, most objectives were not yet measureable or time-bound, and their achievability could not be determined.
• Combatant command security cooperation planning was "SMARTer" than individual country objectives. Although most country plan objectives failed the SMART test, country plans overall and other supporting documents showed more-positive results.
• Combatant command security cooperation planning could benefit from greater standardization. Combatant commands have different objective hierarchies, and they do not define their terms in the same way.
• Responsibility and priority for developing country objectives differed by combatant command.
• Understanding of the SMART concept varied among stakeholders. For the most part, communication of the SMART concept was informal and ad hoc.
• SMART objectives did not adequately serve as a foundation for security cooperation assessment, monitoring, and evaluation. The entire security cooperation planning system needs to follow a SMART approach, with different levels of detail linking broad end states to concrete tasks.

Translating security cooperation goals into effective action is challenging, given the multitude of stakeholders, changing political and security environments, and resource limitations. To help ensure that limited security cooperation resources are properly directed for greatest effect, the U.S. Department of Defense has highlighted the need to develop security cooperation objectives that are specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and results-oriented, and time-bound (SMART). The SMART concept has been used for several decades in the private sector to develop objectives that facilitate assessment, monitoring, and evaluation.

This report evaluates DoD's effectiveness in developing SMART security cooperation objectives. It also proposes a systematic approach to developing security cooperation objectives for use by policymakers, planners, program managers, and resource managers. The authors present a detailed evaluation of the extent to which the security cooperation objectives used by U.S. European Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. Southern Command meet the SMART criteria, and they recommend changes to improve DoD security cooperation guidance and planning.

• Chapter One

  Introduction

• Chapter Two

  Why Aren't SMART Objectives Enough?

• Chapter Three

  PACOM Findings

• Chapter Four

  EUCOM Findings

• Chapter Five

  SOUTHCOM Findings

• Chapter Six

  Findings and Recommendations

• Appendix

  SMART Country Planning