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The problems with DoD's capabilities for joint analysis are substantial, strong differences of opinion exist, and the root problems run deep

• OSD and the Joint Staff no longer have much internal ability to conduct detailed model-based walk-throughs of joint operations and combat in planning scenarios at the campaign level. This degraded capability hampered development of the most recent Quadrennial Defense Review in 2014.
• The preexisting campaign-modeling capability, however, also had serious problems. The SSA process and its particular use of models has undercut the intent of successive defense Secretaries to seek broad and adaptive capabilities to address the range of potential needs, rather than planning for specific cases as though we could foresee their details.
• The level of strategic analysis has been too detailed, precluding more far-reaching analysis addressing uncertainty and, at the same time, overly specifying operational details that should be addressed contextually by the military. Whereas strategic planning generates rich scenario challenges, the process narrows to much more specific cases, dependent on myriad assumptions.
• Also, in effect, the SSA process uncritically accepts the services' programs of record and traditional concepts and operations, rather than encouraging innovations seen as essential by DoD leadership because of numerous adverse military trends over the past decade.
• DoD should rethink its needs and replace SSA rather than attempt to patch it on the margins.

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has long had broad capabilities for joint analysis, whether for planning future forces or supporting field commanders during current challenges. DoD is envied by other government agencies for its analytic capabilities and processes. Nonetheless, issues have arisen. This report stems from a congressional request for an independent report about DoD's capabilities for joint analysis and ways to improve them. Congressional concerns largely involved the activity called support for strategic analysis (SSA). In 2011, the director of the Office of the Secretary of Defense's (OSD's) Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) disbanded campaign-modeling and reduced CAPE's participation in the SSA activity, weakening SSA significantly. This report is largely about SSA and how and whether to revise it.

The author drew on previous research and conducted new interviewees with present and past DoD officials and working analysts. The concerns expressed by interviewees fell into in two groups: those seeing great value in various aspects of the SSA, including the campaign-modeling and analysis for which capability is seen to have plummeted, and those giving low marks to the SSA processes and some products. The research concluded that, rather than making on-the-margin tweaks to SSA, DoD should make fundamental revisions to the overall planning construct to which SSA contributes. Doing so will lead naturally to changes in functions, organization, process, methods and tools, and staffing. The author recommends creating a new activity to assist in mid- and longer-term planning, called analytic support for strategic planning.

• Chapter One

  Introduction

• Chapter Two

  Functions of Joint Analysis and Attributes of Related Infrastructure

• Chapter Three

  Evaluation and Diagnosis

• Chapter Four

  Prescriptions

• Chapter Five

  Recommendations

• Appendix A

  Congressional Request

• Appendix B

  Support for Strategic Analysis

• Appendix C

  The Varied Backgrounds of Senior Department of Defense Analysts

• Appendix D

  Options for Model Development, Maintenance, and Usage