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Identifying Which Sensitive Unclassified Information in Defense Acquisition Requires Protection and How to Properly Protect It Through the Use of Appropriate Markings and Security Policy Can Be Problematic

• The current environment in which acquisition data are protected and shared can be characterized by many organizations promulgating policy on overlapping and interrelated topics, policies that are relatively new and change frequently, and an ill-defined Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) policy. Those who originate the policies do not fund their implementation, meaning that a new or changed policy is effectively an unfunded requirement for information system managers.
• The authors were unable to find any single document that collects and describes the most commonly used CUI labels in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. Some of these labels are legacy markings and practices that are not aligned with draft CUI policy. As a result, acquisition documentation with CUI may be mislabeled.
• Proprietary information (PROPIN) is a special class of CUI that relates to information and data developed by a private entity but shared with the government. Substantial confusion exists within DoD about what information is truly proprietary, who can have access to it, and how to grant access when needed. While there are some laws and policy that describe PROPIN, no single source describes the processes and procedures.
• Security policies tend to be one-size-fits-all, which does not reflect the unique characteristics of each information system. Originators of security policies do not fund their implementation, meaning that a new or changed policy is effectively an unfunded requirement for system managers.

Acquisition data play a critical role in the management of the U.S. Department of Defense's (DoD's) portfolio of weapon systems. Identifying which unclassified but potentially sensitive data require protection as Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) and how to properly protect them through the use of appropriate markings or labels can be difficult: Management and sharing of these data are subject to the interaction and interpretation of a number of laws, regulations, and policies. Therefore, the Office of the Secretary of Defense asked RAND to evaluate current CUI labeling procedures, practices, and security policies. The authors found that documentation on CUI labeling procedures is incomplete and unclear. To define and establish proper handling procedures for CUI, a function (additional responsibility for a currently existing office with experience using a large number of CUI labels in multiple roles) and reference (a central, authoritative online resource that references all relevant guidance on information management, handling, access, and release for acquisition data) should be established within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.

Because the RAND Corporation operates three federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs), the authors have an interest in FFRDC access to data. However, the authors believe that the results are valid independent of that interest. They also have firsthand experience with the struggles of DoD personnel managing data and access.

• Chapter One

  Introduction

• Chapter Two

  Proprietary Information: Clarifying and Creating Confusion

• Chapter Three

  Origins and Meaning of Commonly Used Controlled Unclassified Information Labels on Acquisition Data

• Chapter Four

  Security Policy and Its Implications for AIR and DAMIR

• Chapter Five

  Conclusions and Options

• Appendix

  DoD OGC Legal Opinion Dated February 1999