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Current Policy Levers Will Probably Suffice to Enable Regeneration

• Relatively quick regeneration of the active component would carry a number of risks, particularly when expanding from a Total Army of 920,000.
• Potentially the most critical risk revolves around the fact that while the Regular Army is expanding, the Army as a whole will still need to meet operational demands.

External Conditions Can Substantially Affect the Difficulty of Recruiting

• A good civilian labor market is generally bad for Army recruiting, and vice versa.
• Public support for the conflict is also likely to affect the difficulty of recruiting.

Regeneration Would Stress the RC, Especially When Starting from 920,000

• All regeneration scenarios we considered would require the RC to rotate above a 1:3 mobilization-to-dwell ratio for a number of years.

The 2014 Army Posture Statement considered two future Army end strengths: one that includes an active component (AC) of 450,000, as part of a Total Army of 980,000 (980K), and one that includes an AC of 420,000, as part of a Total Army of 920,000 (920K). These force sizes call into question the Army's ability to "regenerate" itself to higher strength levels in a timely way should the nation require it to do so. This analysis modeled the Army's ability to increase its AC end strength over a five-year period — starting from a Total Army of 980K and starting from a Total Army of 920K — so that the Army could provide the number of deployable troops available at the end of the last conflict in 2010 (what we term a "550K" AC). The analysis indicated that the policies the Army and the Department of Defense currently have at their disposal are likely adequate to expand the force to provide the capacity associated with a 550K AC, starting with either the 980K or 920K Total Army. The analyses did not uncover any constraints that would make such regeneration infeasible but did suggest a number of risks, particularly when expanding from a Total Army of 920K. Potentially the most critical risk revolves around the fact that the Army as a whole will still need to meet operational demands even as the AC is expanding. Thus, the Army would have to draw on its reserve components (RC) to an unprecedented extent to sustain high levels of operational commitment until it accomplishes regeneration.

• Chapter One

  Introduction

• Chapter Two

  Efforts to Expand the Army

• Chapter Three

  Regeneration Scenarios

• Chapter Four

  Conceptual Framework and Policy Options for Regeneration

• Chapter Five

  Modeling Results

• Chapter Six

  Conclusions and Implications for Preparation

• Appendix A

  Additional Modeling Results

• Appendix B

  Sensitivity of Results with Regeneration Wedges