全球智库信息集成服务系统

The United States and Its Allies Can Adopt Several Strategies to Counter an Adversary's Aggression When Shielded by A2/AD Capabilities

• A proven approach is to establish regional bases from which to operate land, air, and maritime forces projected from the United States, but it would be very difficult to successfully employ a similar strategy against peer or near-peer military forces.
• Imposing A2/AD challenges on enemies would allow allied forces to contest maritime areas without exposing U.S. forces to easy attack.
• A2/AD capabilities might be a particularly effective way to raise the costs for aggression. U.S. allies and partners could field a mix of anti-ship, anti-aircraft, and surface-to-surface missiles to impose the same problems on adversaries threatening them with attack over water. The U.S. joint force could provide support — and potentially reinforcements — to its allies.
• A2/AD concepts shift the primary responsibility for defense to U.S. allies and partners.

Ground-Based A2/AD Missions Include Anti-Ship Missions, Surface-to-Surface Missions, and Short-Range Air and Cruise Missile Defense Missions

• Threats in the Pacific theater clearly demand that the United States and its allies and partners possess anti-ship capabilities.
• Surface-to-surface strike is a critical capability to conduct counterbattery fires against enemy anti-ship missile batteries, long-range anti-aircraft missile systems, and adversary air and sea bases.
• The demands for air and cruise missile defense are great in the western Pacific, owing both to the threat posed by the large Chinese investment in cruise missiles and to emerging joint operational concepts that geographically disperse air bases. The same is likely true to an even greater extent in Eastern Europe in potential operations against Russia.

This report examines the role that land-based, multi-domain anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) forces can play in deterring or defeating aggression. The focus is primarily on aggression by China, but the report also examines the use of such forces against Russia and, briefly, against Iran. A discussion of the strategic context in the Asia-Pacific region (centered on China) and the Baltic Sea (centered on Russia) highlights growing Chinese and Russian A2/AD capabilities, as well as potential scenarios for conflict. With that context, the report argues that the United States and its allies can take two approaches to counter an adversary's A2 capabilities. The first is to defeat enemy forces, including their A2/AD capabilities, such as long-range and increasingly precise ballistic and cruise missiles. The second is to impose A2/AD challenges on enemies to raise the costs for aggression. Allies and partners could field a mix of anti-ship, anti-aircraft, and surface-to-surface fires when they feel sufficiently threatened to employ force in their own defense, while the United States could provide support — and, potentially, reinforcements. The report focuses on the second of these approaches — helping allies and partners develop A2/AD defenses. RAND estimates the costs of several options for land-based missile systems; provides some near-term force structure options for ground-based, multi-domain fires; and offers recommendations for the U.S. Army as part of a joint ground-based, multi-domain A2/AD force.

• Chapter One

  Introduction

• Chapter Two

  China in the Western Pacific: Core Interests and Strategic Intentions

• Chapter Three

  China-Japan Relationship from Japan's Standpoint

• Chapter Four

  China-Philippines Relationship from the Philippines' Standpoint

• Chapter Five

  China-Taiwan Relationship from Taiwan's Standpoint

• Chapter Six

  The Growing Chinese A2/AD Threat and Blue A2/AD Strategies and Operational Concepts to Counter It

• Chapter Seven

  Potential Roles for U.S. Land-Based Fires in Joint Missions

• Chapter Eight

  Recommendations, Open Questions, and Next Steps