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• The game-theoretic methodology provides a broad framework for assessing the potential effects of alternative offensive space control (OSC) and defensive space control (DSC) systems.
• There are four types of analysis in which the game-theoretic methodology can be applied through a variety of space deterrence and escalation management-related questions.
• In the first type, analysts apply the process in a dynamic strategic assessment to identify what OSC and DSC options would likely be most attractive to belligerents on each side of a confrontation, thereby anticipating potential paths of conflict and escalation in space.
• The second type consists of a threat-driven assessment in which analysts evaluate a particular OSC option to determine the most effective DSC counters within acceptable levels of escalation risk and political cost.
• The third type consists of a technology-driven assessment of particular DSC options that U.S. leaders might be contemplating to evaluate their merits and determine whether opponents might be able to easily counter those defenses.
• Finally, the analytical process can also be used in reverse to do a Blue OSC assessment to identify the most effective, least escalatory, and least politically costly ways to attack enemy space capabilities.
• Each type of analysis would result in one of several outcomes: the emergence of a dominant strategy for one side or the other; a saddle point in which one side or the other would have effective OSC or DSC options at its disposal, but with very high escalation risks, political costs, or both; or an indeterminate draw for both sides.

U.S. space capabilities are at risk. Potential adversaries are well aware that U.S. transformational warfighting capabilities are increasingly reliant on support from space systems. As a result, they may be developing offensive space control (OSC) weapons to hold U.S. space systems at risk in crisis or attack them in war. Consistent with the inherent right of self-defense, the United States has stated it will defend its space systems.

The objective of the research in this report is to help the Air Force assess the deterrent value of alternative defensive space control (DSC) options. Specifically, we sought to develop a methodology to identify those DSC options that would likely contribute to deterrence and those DSC options that would likely generate escalation dynamics or political costs that could further imperil U.S. interests.

This report should be of interest to U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) personnel developing capabilities, plans, and options to deter, defend against, and, if necessary, defeat efforts to interfere with or attack U.S. or allied space systems. It should also be of interest to other U.S. government personnel responsible for developing and implementing national and DoD space policies and strategies.

• Chapter One

  Introduction

• Chapter Two

  Policy Guidance

• Chapter Three

  Explaining the Methodology

• Chapter Four

  Types of Analysis

• Chapter Five

  Interpreting the Outcomes of Game-Theoretic Analyses

• Chapter Six

  Observations, Applications, and Recommendations

• Appendix

  Modeling the Assessment