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• There was resistance to the principle of financial incentives. Teachers who opted out of the trial tended to be resistant to the principle of financial incentives, but these views were not universally held.
• There were concerns about the perceived unfairness and impact of a financial incentive which could lead to some teachers 'gaming the system'. Some of the teachers and both headteachers expressed serious concerns about the perceived unfairness and impact of a financial incentive that, as a consequence of the research design, would have been available to some teachers but not others. Respondents expressed concern about teachers in receipt of the incentive payment 'gaming the system' by focusing more attention on children whose test performance would influence the incentive award.
• Factors motivating teachers to participate in the trial included an interest in coaching, the attraction of receiving additional pay, and the contribution the trial would make to education research.
• The communications strategy for the trial could have been refined, but this was not the primary reason for under-recruitment. Among those who made an active decision to participate or not, there was a good understanding of the trial, with teachers believing that they had enough information to make an informed decision. However, not all teachers were aware that they had the opportunity to participate and not all teachers had read the emails intended for them.

While performance-based compensation systems in primary and secondary education are no longer a novelty in the US, they are still not yet common in the UK. Research from the US finds mixed results regarding the effects of performance-related pay on pupil achievement, but there is limited evidence around this concept from the UK.

Therefore, RAND Europe, in collaboration with the University of Cambridge, was commissioned by the Education Endowment Foundation to conduct a randomised controlled trial to explore the impact of incentivised pay and peer coaching in the teaching of mathematics. The incentive payment would have been in addition to normal teacher pay, with the final amount being dependent on the performance of pupils in the end of year tests. Coaching was included as part of the study on the basis that some teachers might be motivated by pay incentives, but might require support to improve their performance.

However, the study faced difficulty recruiting teachers for the study and due to this reason was subsequently cancelled. A follow-up investigation of the factors associated with the difficulties with recruitment then took place.

The follow-up study found that a combination of teachers being resistant to the principle of financial incentives and a lack of awareness about being able to participate in the trial were key reasons why the recruitment strategy had failed initially.

• Chapter One

  Introduction

• Chapter Two

  Methodological approach

• Chapter Three

  Findings from survey, document review and interviews

• Chapter Four

  Conclusion and recommendations