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Common Factors That Affected the Decisions and Outcomes of the Cases Studied

• Identify whether a propitious policy window exists.
• Understand and leverage established processes to initiate proposals and pursue objectives.
• A proposal is most likely to succeed if development is rigorous and its substance is externally validated.
• Map stakeholders and incorporate them from the outset to solicit input and encourage buy-in.
• Cultivate networks and advocates at all levels in the stakeholder community.
• Provide subject-matter expertise to Congress and develop relationships with staff through authorized engagements.
• Address bureaucratic rivalry with deliberate strategies that advance whole-of-government synergy and avoid zero-sum outcomes.
• Pursue incremental change as part of a long-range plan.

This report examines major U.S. decisions related to the development or employment of special operations forces (SOF). The purpose of the report is to analyze how change has previously occurred in Army, Joint, and U.S. Department of Defense policy regarding SOF to inform future development of options for policymakers and to better articulate the ways in which the varied Army Special Operations Forces capabilities can help to meet U.S. national security objectives. The report aims to assist the special operations community to better understand the policy process; formulate appropriate, sound courses of action; and engage with other members of the U.S. government interagency community in a constructive manner.

Thirteen cases are covered in this report: (1) creation of 6th Army Special Reconnaissance Unit; (2) creation of the Office of Strategic Services; (3) creation of U.S. Army Special Forces; (4) special forces expansion under President Kennedy and contraction through the Vietnam War; (5) Central Intelligence Agency – SOF cooperation in Southeast Asia, 1961–1975; (6) special operations capabilities: creation of U.S. Special Operations Command and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict; (7) special operations capabilities post-9/11 SOF expansion; (8) special mission unit expansion; (9) operational authorities and employment of SOF: section 1208; (10) operational authorities and employment: the Global SOF Network initiative; (11) operational authorities and employment: irregular warfare directive; (12) operational authorities and employment: SOF and Plan Colombia operational authorities and employment; and (13) SOF support to Syrian fighters.

• Chapter One

  Introduction

• Chapter Two

  Special Operations Capabilities: Creation of 6th Army Special Reconnaissance Unit

• Chapter Three

  Creation of the Office of Strategic Services: SOF-CIA Precursor

• Chapter Four

  Special Operations Capabilities: Creation of U.S. Army Special Forces

• Chapter Five

  Special Operations Capabilities: Special Forces Expansion Under President Kennedy and Contraction Through the Vietnam War

• Chapter Six

  CIA-SOF Cooperation in Southeast Asia, 1961–1975

• Chapter Seven

  Special Operations Capabilities: Creation of U.S. Special Operations Command and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict

• Chapter Eight

  Special Operations Capabilities: Post-9/11 SOF Expansion

• Chapter Nine

  Special Operations Capabilities: Special Mission Unit Expansion

• Chapter Ten

  Operational Authorities and Employment of SOF: Section 1208

• Chapter Eleven

  Operational Authorities and Employment: The Global SOF Network Initiative

• Chapter Twelve

  Operational Authorities and Employment: Irregular Warfare Directive

• Chapter Thirteen

  Operational Authorities and Employment: SOF and Plan Colombia

• Chapter Fourteen

  Operational Authorities and Employment: SOF Support to Syrian Fighters

• Chapter Fifteen

  Findings and Recommendations