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• Potential aggressors' motivations are highly complex and typically respond to many variables whose interaction is difficult to anticipate.
• Opportunism in aggression seems less common than desperation through paranoia about growing threats to security or status. Large-scale aggression tends to emerge as a last resort based on intense fears rather than an opportunistic grab.
• Clarity and consistency of deterrent messaging are essential. Half-hearted commitments risk being misperceived.
• The principle of "firm but flexible" is very important: Leaving an adversary without a way out is not an effective way to sustain deterrence. Compromise and concession are part of any successful extended deterrence of large-scale aggression.
• Multilateral deterrent contexts are especially dangerous. Deterring an aggressive ally and an opposing major power at the same time is extremely difficult.
• The foundation for deterrence outcomes — that is, the initial and in some ways decisive variable — is provided by aggressor motivations. Weakly motivated aggressors are easy to deter; intensely motivated ones, whose level of threat perception may verge on paranoia, can be impossible to deter.
• The first step toward bolstering deterrence is to manage the motives of a potential aggressor. Doing so often requires concessions, as well as steps to shape the surrounding geopolitical context to ease its concerns and also raise the political costs of aggression.

The challenge of deterring territorial aggression, which for several decades has been an afterthought in U.S. strategy toward most regions of the world, is taking on renewed importance. An increasingly belligerent Russia is threatening Eastern Europe and the Baltic States with possible aggression, conventional and otherwise. China is pursuing its territorial ambitions in the East and South China Seas with greater force, including the construction of artificial islands and occasional bouts of outright physical intimidation. North Korea remains a persistent threat to the Republic of Korea (ROK), including the possibility of large-scale aggression using its rapidly advancing nuclear arsenal.

Yet the discussion of deterrence — as a theory and practical policy requirement — has lagged in U.S. military and strategy circles. The authors aim to provide a fresh look at the subject in this context, with two primary purposes: to review established concepts about deterrence, and to provide a framework for evaluating the strength of deterrent relationships. For greater focus, they concentrate on a specific category or form of deterrence: extended deterrence of interstate aggression. The authors consider the requirements for the United States to deter potential aggressors abroad from attacking U.S. allies or other countries in large-scale conventional conflicts. Examples include Russian attacks on the Baltic States and a North Korean assault on the ROK.

The study stems from a specific research question: What are the requirements of effective extended deterrence of large-scale military aggression? The focus is therefore on the criteria that tend to distinguish successful from unsuccessful efforts to deter interstate aggression.

• Chapter One

  Understanding Deterrence and Dissuasion

• Chapter Two

  Effective Deterrence and Dissuasion: A Framework for Analysis

• Chapter Three

  Evaluating and Revising the Framework: Quantitative and Case Study Assessments

• Chapter Four

  Applying the Revised Framework: Deterring Russia in the Baltic Region

• Chapter Five

  Conclusions, Recommendations, and Implications for the U.S. Army

• Appendix A

  Quantitative Analysis: Cases of U.S. Extended Deterrence Since 1945

• Appendix B

  Qualitative Case Study Analyses: Berlin

• Appendix C

  Qualitative Case Study Analyses: Deterring Saddam, 1990

• Appendix D

  Qualitative Case Study Analyses: NATO's Northern Flank in the Cold War

• Appendix E

  Qualitative Case Study Analyses: Russian Aggression Against Georgia