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The United States still faces several hurdles in building interoperability

• U.S. units generally are not specifically tasked and resourced to build interoperability with particular partners for particular functions. Thus, the actual requirement for building interoperability — the formal admission from the resourcing authority that it needs to be done and funds will be expended to do so — and the tasking — top-down guidance on how much of what type and with whom those units should be building interoperability — are not there.
• There is often poor understanding of the significant efforts that are involved in making multinational units interoperable.
• The value of interoperability may not be wholly understood from a U.S. perspective, limiting the funding and interest in building it.

There are two main arguments for building interoperability

• Being interoperable allows access to additional forces the United States might wish could either lead or be in support of operations aligned with U.S. interests.
• Building interoperability (strengthening the legitimacy of a military operation or building stronger relationships with partner nations in general) is also linked to having alliances and building coalitions.

The United States can build interoperability through a three-part framework

• U.S. policymakers can facilitate "activities" that increase interoperability between the United States and its partners.
• Those activities help to build five main interoperability "outputs": having common equipment, sharing the art of command, having individual interoperability, having interoperable communication and information systems equipment, and having interoperable processes.
• These outputs lead to "outcomes," which are predicated on having specific abilities to share services between at least two partners.

Significant literature exists on all types of interoperability, with the common refrain being that more and better interoperability is needed. And, with few exceptions in recent decades, the United States tends to engage with multinational partners and allies in military operations, thus bringing multinational interoperability to the fore. So, with all this interest, why is the United States not interoperable when and how it wants? There are several reasons, including a lack of understanding of the significant resources that interoperability takes, a reluctance to expend time and money when the value of doing so is not clear, and a one-size-fits-all attitude toward finding solutions. This report looks at what motivations exist for building interoperability and defines a reasonable framework from which to work if and when interoperability needs and investments meet strategic language. The framework proposed has three main parts. First, the authors catalogued nearly 200 programs into ten categories, which comprise "activities" that in one way or another increase interoperability between the United States and its partners. Those activities help to build five main interoperability "outputs": having common equipment, sharing the art of command, having individual interoperability, having interoperable communication and information systems equipment, and having interoperable processes. The "outcomes" are what those outputs lead to. Those are predicated on having specific abilities to share services between at least two partners. The framework necessarily stops short of broader operational outcomes — like winning a war or deterring conflict — as the basic interactions that translate interoperability into qualitative goals of legitimacy or deterrence are not known.

• Chapter One

  Introduction

• Chapter Two

  What Is Interoperability?

• Chapter Three

  Why Build Interoperability?

• Chapter Four

  What Kind of Interoperability Is Being Built?

• Chapter Five

  How Do You Build It?

• Chapter Six

  Interoperability Outcomes

• Chapter Seven

  Choosing Partners for Interoperability

• Chapter Eight

  Findings and Recommendations

• Appendix A

  Short Discussion of Interoperability Successes and Failures in Iraq and Afghanistan

• Appendix B

  U.S. Army-U.S.M.C. Interoperability Problems in the Battle of Fallujah

• Appendix C

  Very High Readiness Joint Task Force

• Appendix D

  French Army Approaches to Interoperability

• Appendix E

  Interoperability Programs

• Appendix F

  NATO Defense Spending Data

• Appendix G

  Subject Matter Expert Survey on Interoperability Outcomes

• Appendix H

  Activity Categories

• Appendix I

  Targeted Interoperability Unit Types

• Appendix J

  Regression Modeling of Security Cooperation Activities and Interoperability Outcomes