全球智库信息集成服务系统

MCP-ODs have demonstrated that, if they are given at least 270 days of advance notice, they can successfully deploy with an AC division HQ and accomplish their missions

• MCP-ODs affect the capacity rather than the capabilities of division HQ.
• Without substantial advanced notification of sourcing, MCP-OD personnel will not be able to deploy as quickly as the AC soldiers in a division's command posts.
• This limitation was known when FARG II was designed and explicitly accepted as a risk by the Chief of Staff of the Army.

The instances of risks found in the research were adequately anticipated by the FARG II designers

• The FARG II and MCP-OD designs successfully mitigate the FARG I risks they were intended to address.
• Nonetheless, several implications of MCP-OD readiness and availability limitations might need further mitigation.
• Requirements to accomplish in-garrison tasks were inadequately considered in the FARG II design.

After applying various levels of MCP-OD readiness, mission requirements, and deployment time lines, the model showed that the new structure should be able to meet a range of contingencies

• MCP-OD personnel are unlikely to be fully deployable for short-notice missions, such as those in response to Global Response Force orders.
• In the worst-case scenario of a full HQ deployment on less than 90 days' notice, a main command post shortfall emerged.

To effect reductions in institutional and operational headquarters (HQ), Focus Area Review Group II (FARG II) HQ design was developed and included a new unit type — the Main Command Post–Operational Detachment (MCP-OD) — through which reserve component (RC) personnel augment active component (AC) staffs. This report identifies the effects of this design on division HQ readiness and develops potential mitigation strategies.

The authors reviewed Army history, doctrine, and force structure documents to define when a division HQ deploys and the missions it might be assigned. They visited several AC divisions to interview participants in a multicomponent HQ and conducted telephone interviews with other units. The authors then analyzed how AC and RC staffs have prepared their combined forces for employment as a single HQ and where their efforts have been challenged. Last, the authors developed a model to illustrate when a division HQ will experience increased risk as it tries to meet requirements.

MCP-ODs have demonstrated that, if they are given at least 270 days of notice, they can successfully deploy with an AC division HQ and accomplish their missions. However, without substantial notification, MCP-OD personnel will not be able to deploy as quickly as the AC soldiers in a division's command posts. Many of the risks found in the research were adequately anticipated by FARG II designers. Nonetheless, room for improvement exists in both design and execution. The model showed that the new structure should be able to meet a range of rotational and small-scale contingencies.

• Chapter One

  Introduction

• Chapter Two

  The Division Headquarters: History, Organization, and Roles

• Chapter Three

  History of the Focus Area Review Group II Design and Intent/Limitations

• Chapter Four

  DOTMLPF-P Analysis of Focus Area Review Group II Impacts

• Chapter Five

  Impact of Focus Area Review Group II Changes on Short-Notice Readiness

• Chapter Six

  Conclusion and Recommendations

• Appendix A

  Aligning Active Component and Reserve Component Training Management

• Appendix B

  Division Headquarters Fill Rate Tables

• Appendix C

  A Short History of U.S. Division Headquarters Deployments Since the End of the Cold War