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The history of the Battle for Baghdad is recounted from prewar planning to withdrawal

• In this report, the Iraq War and the Battle for Baghdad are divided into the following periods: prewar planning, occupation, GEN George Casey's command, the troop surge, and withdrawal. These periods frame the analysis, and each is mined for lessons. The history recounted in the report focuses on events and actions from the national command level down to tactics and techniques employed by combat brigades. It also includes decisions and actions by both military and civilian leaders, because both had an effect on ground operations.
• The evidentiary base for the report's history of the war comes from a broad literature review, primary sources, and interviews, including with former senior military commanders and national security officials.

The overarching lessons learned from the Battle for Baghdad could help leaders avoid the same mistakes in future conflicts

• The Army needs to anticipate and take steps to prevent insurgencies.
• Capacity and capability matter, and the "whole of government" beyond the military could not provide them in Iraq.
• Robust and high-quality headquarters are critical.
• As the Army continues to perform the training and advising mission, developing competent advisers and understanding sustainable outcomes are key.
• Building and advising foreign armies should enable them to operate without direct U.S. engagement.
• Military transition teams and advisers are key to developing forces that provide sustainable security.
• The Battle for Baghdad provides a wealth of information about how to reimagine future urban combat.
• Army professional military education is critical in preparing Army leaders for the future.

The U.S. Army's many adaptations during the Iraq War were remarkable, particularly in the areas of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, personnel, and leader development and education. The Army has already institutionalized some of those adaptations; however, other important lessons have not yet been institutionalized. In an effort to help the U.S. Department of Defense and the Army retain institutional knowledge and capabilities and fully prepare leaders for future conflicts, RAND researchers recount the Army's efforts in the Iraq War, especially in Baghdad, and offer lessons learned and recommendations. For example, if the United States engages in a similar conflict in the future, the Army should prepare to prevent insurgencies; provide robust division, corps, and theater headquarters; and consider making advisement a necessary assignment for career advancement. Instability and insurgency are part of the future, and if history is any guide, the United States will look to the Army to deal with these challenges. Thus, the ultimate goal of this report is to help the Army continue to institutionalize the lessons from the Iraq War and the Battle for Baghdad to minimize the amount of adaptation the Army will have to undergo when it is called to serve in similar circumstances.

• Chapter One

  Introduction

• Chapter Two

  Prewar Planning

• Chapter Three

  Occupation

• Chapter Four

  The Casey Period

• Chapter Five

  The Surge

• Chapter Six

  Withdrawal

• Chapter Seven

  Overarching Lessons for the U.S. Army

• Appendix

  Timeline of Major Events in the Battle for Baghdad