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The Islamic State's caliphate was never just territorial, but the group clearly desires to regain territory

• It was always a caliphate of the mind, a vision of an Islamic state that the modern group's leaders imagined to have existed in history.
• Were it to exist in reality as its leaders envisioned, it would be a regional menace to its neighboring states and a nightmare primarily for the world's Muslims.
• The group has withstood numerous challenges not only to its effectiveness but also to its very survival. It has remained a persistent threat throughout its history and various organizational incarnations — including those without unilateral control over territory.

While far less money is coming in to support its activities, the group's operating expenses have greatly decreased

• With the loss of the territorial caliphate, there is no need to provide services to a populace.
• With a significantly lower operating budget, continued revenue-generating activities and the cash the Islamic State hoarded will provide it with adequate funds to survive as a clandestine terrorist movement with the ability to wage prolonged guerrilla warfare throughout Iraq and Syria.

As an insurgency, the group will also maintain a diversified revenue stream, including resorting to criminal activities to raise funds

• The group's knack for fundraising through criminal activities will prove useful as its members seek to extort, kidnap, kill, steal, smuggle, and traffic to obtain the money they need to survive.
• Controlling territory would facilitate these activities but is far from a prerequisite.

With the end of its territorial caliphate, the Islamic State will almost certainly attempt a comeback. Such efforts will require money. The authors examine the group's history as an insurgency and a self-styled caliphate, drawing from the literature, the group's documents, and interviews with individuals who lived under the caliphate, with a focus on how the group has financed itself. The Islamic State has prided itself on drawing from local funding sources rather than external donations. As a territorial caliphate, it could openly levy taxes and fees and sell oil from fields it controlled to cover its expenses. Now that it can no longer rely on such sources, the group will go with activities that it has used successfully in the past, as an insurgency. Criminal activities will prove useful, with its members seeking to extort, kidnap, steal, smuggle, and traffic to obtain the money they need to finance the group's activities. On top of this, the Islamic State likely has detailed information on the population it once ruled, and it appears to have sizable assets in reserve. As an insurgency, rather than a territorial government, its expenses are far lower than they were at the peak of its power. Accordingly, the United States will need to stay involved with counter–Islamic State activities across several lines of effort, including counterfinance and potentially including military action.

• Chapter One

  Introduction

• Chapter Two

  The Islamic State's Ideology, Strategy, and Organization

• Chapter Three

  Islamic State Revenues

• Chapter Four

  Raising Revenue: On-the-Ground View

• Chapter Five

  Islamic State Expenditures

• Chapter Six

  Conclusions and Implications