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Intermediate-level supply sections are currently overextended and require additional personnel to meet supported units' needs

• Based on available data and capacity modeling, SMUs and RIPs are understaffed, and tasks require more man-hours per day than what is recommended.
• Data collection is inconsistent across the three MEFs, and there are significant deficiencies in data required to forecast appropriate staffing requirements.
• Personnel instability and lack of E-5 and E-6 personnel significantly decrease unit efficiency.
• Significant equipment deficiencies impede the ability of Marines to perform their primary tasks.
• Inconsistent funding allocations cause inefficiencies.

Force reductions to the United States Marine Corps (USMC) due to budget cuts, sequestration, and redeployments from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have affected logistics units, and in 2015 intermediate-level supply accounts experienced a reduction in personnel authorizations. At the same time, a movement toward supporting smaller-sized units in more distributed operations has placed a heavy burden on logistics support elements. Under the dual impositions of reduced manpower and increased requirements, intermediate-level supply forces may not be able to meet the needs of future contingency operations, and further personnel reductions may place additional strain on intermediate supply capacity.

In order to help the USMC address this problem, RAND researchers focused on the two main types of intermediate-level supply organizations in each Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF): the Supply Management Unit (SMU) and the Repairable Issue Point (RIP). They conducted field visits to the SMUs and RIPs at each of the three MEFs to document supply processes, interviewed subject matter experts to better understand the challenges faced by SMUs and RIPs, and identified best practices that can be shared across these accounts. Subsequently, researchers developed a methodology that can be used to determine the recommended personnel numbers and daily workload depending on the supported force. This will help the Marine Corps assess whether intermediate supply accounts are manned sufficiently to meet the supported units' requirements. Process improvements that could help intermediate supply units work more efficiently in garrison are also proposed.

• Chapter One

  Introduction

• Chapter Two

  Supply Management Unit and Repairable Issue Point Processes

• Chapter Three

  Workload Demand Models: Intermediate Supply Functions

• Chapter Four

  Challenges and Best Practices

• Chapter Five

  Findings and Recommendations

• Appendix A

  General Intermediate Ground Supply Process

• Appendix B

  Model Evolution and Validation