| 结论 | The study identified the following implications for national security:- 'Hybrid war' targets the role of popular opinion in shaping national strategy. 'Hybrid war' as it is now construed is less about 'real war' than about political influence as a substitute for war. The Internet and influence operations are used as part of hybrid warfare to promote messages that divide British society against itself. The reason for concern is that these divisions are already present—they can therefore be easily exploited by malign and covert actors. Britain's demonisation of 'hybrid war' rests on an implicit recognition of its own weaknesses, although they are themselves the product of a free society.
- Social resilience is receiving increasing attention in relation to national security. Societal ownership itself underpins resilience. Awareness of the need for security creates a more robust society, and that in itself provides a level of protection as it reduces the returns on attack. Public engagement in defence creates a level of mass participation, which itself leads to resilience. This rests on the integration of the armed forces within the community, and in particular on direct evidence of their contribution to security. A lack of mature public engagement creates a lack of national resilience.
- The effect of ignoring domestic resilience is to undermine deterrence. As with resilience, societal ownership strengthens deterrence. If the public do not understand what they are interested in defending or what they will fight for, then the enemy will assume that the democratic state will pursue every policy option short of war, but not war itself.
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| 摘要 | The presence of a communication gap between the government and the public on matters of defence policy can undermine the development of strategy and potential for the coherent use of military force. The Global Strategic Partnership (GSP) was therefore commissioned by the UK's Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) to challenge the traditional relationships between the UK's military, government and people, explore the relevance of the construct for the 21st Century, and the implications of this evolving relationship for the nature of the utility of force. The British government perceives the public as reluctant to support the cost of defence and unpersuaded of the utility of military force. Yet the formation of effective strategy in a democracy requires conversations both between the government and its civil service and armed forces, and between the government and its electorate. These two conversations are often conducted in different registers, undermining the coherence of national strategy. Moreover, the public is not a monolith, but a community that includes opinion formers, spouses of service personnel, and former armed forces personnel, all of them groups whose members engage with the use of force as do those in government. To generate a mature attitude to the use of armed force and, if necessary, to the utility of war itself, Britain will require a mature debate about defence—one that trusts and engages the public, allows the armed forces to participate in the discussion, and in which the government enables and enhances the structures to permit those conversations. |
