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DoD can field individual capabilities on Mosaic timescales today

• Nothing inherent to DoD's existing requirements, resourcing, and acquisition systems prohibits or even inhibits the development, procurement, operation, or sustainment of systems that are fractionated, heterogeneous, and dynamically composable.
• DoD has means to accelerate fielding of individual systems today.

Current means of accelerating acquisition are limited in scalability and thus likely unaligned with institutionalizing a Mosaic force

• However, DoD mechanisms to accelerate acquisition are, by and large, exceptions to standard process and thus likely unaligned with the Mosaic vision of routinely and systematically fielding new capabilities on operational timescales.
• Even if DoD could cost-effectively field systems that are more heterogeneous, fractionated, and composable, the time required to execute the associated acquisition functions for an entire Mosaic force is likely incompatible with developing and fielding on operational timescales.

An alternative governance model—one that would centralize some acquisition authorities while requiring joint service, COCOM, and OSD approval before fielding—would address some challenges but create other risks

• In the game, consolidating acquisition authorities allowed taking the divisive actions that would allow Mosaic Warfare to scale.
• Requiring service, COCOM, and OSD approval for fielding incentivized players to resolve competing interests.
• However, the model created new institutional seams and introduced risks, such as managing the rate at which new capabilities must be integrated into the training, maintenance, and operational planning enterprises.
• The report highlights other possible governance models and foreshadows that there is likely no optimal model but a set of options with trade-offs.

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has a vision for Mosaic Warfare, conceived as both a warfighting concept and a means to accelerate capability development and fielding. Mosaic Warfare entails a more fractionated, heterogenous force that can be dynamically composed on tactical timelines. It entails shifting away from monolithic platforms, which can be slow to develop and field, to simpler force elements that can be developed and fielded quickly and integrated at mission execution.

The Mosaic Warfare vision is more challenging to transition than a single program or technology. Anticipating this, DARPA asked RAND Corporation researchers to examine the opportunities and challenges associated with developing and fielding a Mosaic force under existing or alternative governance models, as would be required for the vision to move from DARPA to widespread acceptance by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD).

The researchers designed and executed a policy game that immersed players in acquiring a Mosaic force. During the game, players first operated within the authorities, responsibilities, and constraints of DoD's existing acquisition governance model for setting requirements, allocating resources, and overseeing acquisition. Then, they operated under an alternative governance model that centralized some of those authorities within a new office while still requiring joint service, combatant command (COCOM), and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) approval before fielding new capabilities. In this report, the researchers present insights on the challenges and opportunities of acquiring a Mosaic force under the current and the alternative model and highlight other acquisition models worth exploring.

• Chapter One

  Introduction

• Chapter Two

  Frameworks, Assumptions, and Acquisition Models for Analysis

• Chapter Three

  The Mosaic Acquisition Policy Game

• Chapter Four

  Insights About Mosaic Warfare Under the Department of Defense's Current Acquisition Paradigm

• Chapter Five

  Insights About Mosaic Warfare Under an Alternative Acquisition Paradigm

• Chapter Six

  Alternative Models Beyond the Joint Mission Office

• Chapter Seven

  Conclusions and Next Steps

• Appendix

  Mosaic Warfare Scenario and Vignettes